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**SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS FOR MILITANCY:
THE CASE OF TURKISH HEZBOLLAH**

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**Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the award of Philosophy of Doctorate at
Durham University**

School of Government and International Affairs

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Abstract

Terrorism is a complex and multi-facet problem that negatively affects countries around the world. Turkey has suffered from terrorist activities from different polar of political spectrum. Turkish Hezbollah is one those terrorists threats for Turkey. To move closer toward the prevention of terrorism with the primary goal of eradicating terrorist groups, countries need to direct their efforts toward identifying the not only macro scale political issue but also the social characteristics of individuals at micro level in addition to the psychological and socio-psychological underpinnings of terrorism.

In furtherance of social characteristics at the recruitment level, the impacts of those characteristics in engaging in violent activities is the focus of this study. Through using individual level data the underlying social characteristics that are influential in a TH member's deployment (or choice) into military wing for violent activities or into political activities are identified. These include knowing the characteristics that where Turkish Hezbollah members come from, what motivates them towards Hezbollah's ideology, their family background, and their demographics.

This study mainly found that individual characteristics that are considered determinative for an individual to engage in terrorist activity are not much different for Turkish Hezbollah. In that most of the social characteristics of age, marital status, economic status, whether moved from hometown, lifestyle of members before organization, and crime history have similar effect with the generic sense of the related literature of average terrorist in the Middle East. In terms of the individual and collective impact of the social characteristics into the dichotomous deployment of military vs. political wing within the TH, this study found that age, marital status, economic status, whether moved from hometown, lifestyle of members before organization, and crime history have same effect in opting for (or being deployed) military vs. political wing positions in the organization at both, individual and collective level. In that, TH members are either choose or be intentionally/deliberately deployed into political and military wings of the TH based on certain social characteristics of younger age, in unmarried status, with lower educational attainment, with lower level work and in turn economic status.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Terrorism is a complex problem that affects countries around the world. It has the potential to negatively impact the political and social welfare as well as the economic stability of an entire country. The effects of terrorism can overburden systems designed to protect citizens and place significant demands on already strained criminal justice systems. According to a study completed by the Congressional Budget Office in 2002, the federal government of the United States spent \$37 billion after the September 11th attack and planned to spend more than ten (10) times this amount for fighting terrorism over the next decade (Stevenson, 2002). The military budget of the United States increased 2.5 percent between the years 1998 and 2001, in response to the terrorist attack in New York; the budget increased 36 percent within following two years (2001-2003). By 2005, the total increase of the budget approached 70 percent (Erdogdu, 2003).

Terrorism has the potential to divide groups or countries based on those who sympathize with the terrorist ideologies and those who do not. With all of these negative consequences, it is important to prevent the spread of terrorism.

Terrorism differs from traditional crime in its causes; such as ideology, beliefs, and differences in political view ((Deflem, 2004). Additionally, terrorism differs significantly from traditional crime with regard to research. Terrorism research is in its infancy, whereas traditional crime research has a considerable knowledge base. As the knowledge base begins to expand, and policy evolves, fighting terrorism slowly shifts away from the use of traditional criminal justice sanctions (e.g., arrest, imprisonment) to include counter-terrorism strategies (e.g., counter-insurgency strategies). To be more effective in counter-insurgency strategies, it is imperative that we understand what motivates the individual to join the terrorist movement. This new understanding should help systems to move away from the tradition of *strictly responding* to crime to that of *preventing* terrorism.

To move closer toward the prevention of terrorism with the primary goal of eradicating terrorist groups, countries need to direct their efforts toward identifying the psychological and socio-psychological underpinnings of terrorism. However, one problem with identifying the psychological and socio-psychological causes of terrorism is the great

variation that exists across terrorist members and organizations. Under this assumption, it is important to study single terrorist group to ensure that the internal group variation is not masked with the cross-group variation.

Characteristics of terrorists have long been an interest of political scientists who wished to bring general explanations to the root causes of terrorism. Terrorist characteristics differ not only across countries, or organizations, or ideology, but also within the same organization. These characteristics should be studied regularly since the ideology, organizational structure, and personal characteristics of contemporary terrorists are subject to an absolute change across time (J. Victoroff, 2005). However, past studies covered multiple organizations and included only a few characteristics (C. A. Russell & Miller, 1983). Every terrorist organization with its unique ideology, historical background, and geography may hold characteristics special to that organization only. Therefore, there is a need for research that focuses on an individual organization and its unique characteristics before attempting to compare organizations.

In addition to what individual factors lead joining in a terrorist organization, what social characteristics of members have impact on their role within the organization in terms of whether to join military or political wing is considered to have particular importance. In this regard, this study is two-fold; the first fold is exploratory in that it attempts to explore the social characteristics of an individual have impact in joining process the TH, the second fold is descriptive and (explanatory in a sense) in terms of identifying “what social member characteristics –if any- are significantly impactful in taking part in military or political wing of the TH.

1.1. Problem Statement and Purpose of the Study

Terrorism has also been a prolonged problem for Turkey. Turkey has been suffered every aspect of terrorist activities that ideologically lean on different polar of political spectrum. Other than ethnicity based terrorist organization the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) that cause over 35.000 fatalities, there exist leftist and extreme right terrorist organizations as well as religiously purported terror groups. Turkish Hezbollah, among these, pose a particular importance due to limited scientific research

conducted on it despite its high impact on the society based on its heinous killings of individuals and its implicit relations with underground structures of both state and non-state actors.

Many killings are reported in linkage with Turkish Hezbollah when the organization was highly active; however, nowadays it is found questionable due to the fact that there exist claims in undercover bonds with TH and underground structures of state of the time (known as Ergenekon and still under trial). Despite the conflicting arguments on the emergence and activities and their results of the Turkish Hezbollah, identifying TH's member characteristics and their impact on deviating for military or political activities within the organization is considered to provoke scientific research to disclose and portray underlying effects of dynamics for a highly covert organization. There exist no scientific research on TH, there only exist limited sources of information which are based mainly on argumentative perspectives or state centric government reports. Within these regards, this study is considered to fill an important gap on a very impactful terrorist organization with underground ties by affirming government oriented information with open sources of editorials and books of independent political writers.

Turkish Hezbollah has been posing a threat for the security and safety of Turkish people; to both combatant and non-combatant civilians. The target status of Turkish Hezbollah ranges from civilians (non-compliant and/or symbolic individuals that are allegedly against the ideological notion of Turkish Hezbollah) to government officials. Personal, cultural, and social characteristics of terrorists require special attention for any government when developing counter-terrorism policies. Knowing the characteristics of Hezbollah will tell government officials where Hezbollah members come from, what motivates them towards Hezbollah's ideology, their family background, and their demographics is considered to invoke a great importance for identifying the underpinnings of TH organizational membership assignment structures as well as enabling policy makers to develop policies and programs to prevent future deaths and injuries of both civilians and officials.

In 2000, police operations seized computer archives from the Turkish Hezbollah organization. These data revealed that the number of active members and sympathizers

reached more than 20,000 sympathizers (including the members in the TH organization), far exceeding what the police had originally estimated. The dissemination of the organization's archives and the numbers that have been arrested by the Turkish Police (2000 =3,366; 2001=1,596, 2002=710) reveals that the organization had already played a significant role in the history of radical terrorism in Turkey (Cagaptay & Uslu, 2005). The decreasing trend in arrestee numbers also indicates the decline of support toward the Turkish Hezbollah. More than 3,121 police operations focused on the organization between from 1990 to 2003 and 14,000 members were arrested as a result of these operations; more than 6,000 of the arrestees are still held in Turkish prisons (Kilic, 2004).

Therefore, identifying the characteristics of terrorists in order to direct its energy and other resources on an effective policy that will ultimately serve to reconcile issues posed by fundamental terrorism invokes great importance. Although the root of the organization can be traced back to the early 1980s, this disclosure is recent and prompts the need for more research. Research directed at analyzing the root-causes individual social characteristics of religious-based terrorism in general and the characteristics of Turkish Hezbollah in particular demands particular attention.

Within the aforementioned regards, this study attempts to respectively discuss the generic sense of social characteristics of terrorists as reflected through general terrorism literature; to focus on background information for Turkish Hezbollah (its emergence and social constriction, evolution, organizational structure, ideological underpinnings and etc.); to portray social characteristics of average terrorist from multiple levels (general, regional, Middle East in particular); finally analyze the membership profile of TH and to identify which social characteristics of TH members fit in at the participation level and more importantly, which -if any- individual social characteristics lead a TH member to be assigned or choose to be in political vs. military (violent) activities.

1.2. Significance of the Study

Little is known or written about the Turkish Hezbollah in terms of characteristics and structure. A review of related literature indicates that present Turkish Hezbollah studies

are mostly anecdotal. There is no scientifically based research that validates the characteristics of Hezbollah members.

Most intelligence data on the Hezbollah terrorists are classified and unavailable for scholarly research. In the past, the only data available has been that of interviews from captured members. A recent Turkish National Police initiative establishing a “study abroad program” for officers that originated in 2003 promises to open a new gateway to scientifically explore some of the untapped data.

This study will utilize a data set which is derived from Hezbollah members’ autobiographies. These biographies were originally taken by Hezbollah leadership and written by new recruits as a formal membership application. These documents are classified and scrutinized meticulously by terrorist leadership. Traditionally, this type of data is not readily available to researchers.

This study will help to fill the void in the literature by developing lists of characteristics found in terrorist autobiographies of each of the two groups of Turkish Hezbollah.

The purpose of this study is to disclose the basic characteristics of Turkish Hezbollah, which is often confused with Hezbollah in Lebanon; though these two groups are totally different in the sense of both their manifestation and their organizational structure. There are many studies that focus on Lebanese Hezbollah (Byman, 2003; Jaber, 1997; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Sprinzak, 2000), but far fewer studies on Turkish Hezbollah. Learning more about the characteristics of the Turkish Hezbollah organization, should help guide policy makers and decision making authorities with developing prevention and intervention programs, as well as any needed treatment programs.

The significance of this study is three-fold. First, this study will be one of the first contributions that describe the Turkish Hezbollah members’ characteristics in terms of reliable data with scientific rigor. Second, this study will help to develop a comprehensive understanding of the characteristics of one terrorist organization in preparation for future comparisons with other terrorist organizations. Finally, this study will develop solid data upon which to build prevention and intervention policies.

1.3. Definition of terms

Hezbollah

The very name “*Hezbollah*” refers to the meaning of the way of God; however, literally it means “*The Party of God*”.

Ilim

“Ilim” is the larger group of Hezbollah, which was divided into two after the disagreements and conflicts between the factions. The dictionary meaning of this word is “*Science*”. The group took this name after opening a book store named “*Science*” in the city of Batman and called itself “*The Scientists*”. This faction believed that the armed struggle and use of violence is the primary method to fight.

Menzil

One of two major groups in Hezbollah having a dictionary meaning of “*range*.” It originates from the name of a book store, which they opened in the city of Batman. They called themselves “*The Rangers*” thereafter. This wing of the organization believed that the first thing the organization should do is to spread the ideology and the mentality or methods of implementation of the movement among society using propaganda methods instead of committing terrorist attacks or actively fighting.

Sura

“Sura” literally means “council” in Arabic. It is the council composed of the designated members for decision and policy-making under the leadership of the Turkish Hezbollah organization.

Shari’a

“Shari’a” literally means the Islamic rules and laws in terms of the main sources of Islam, which are mainly the Qur’an, the holy book, and the hadith, the sayings and the doings of the prophet Mohammad.

Tebliğ

“Tebliğ” literally means “to declare, to call, to tell” in Arabic. It is the first stage of the Turkish Hezbollah Organization’s strategy in terms of establishing a new state ruling by Sheri’a.

Davet

“Davet” literally means “to invite, invitation” in Turkish. It is the invitation to the people into Islam within the Turkish Hezbollah’s jargon.

Cemaat

“Cemaat” literally means “community” in Arabic. The people creating this community share the same belief and the way of life in terms of religion.

Jihad

“Jihad” means to struggle or to strive for the sake of God.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

This chapter is comprised of three main sections. These respectively include, first, main conceptual and theoretical discussion on significant variables of terrorist member characteristics along with prior research on these characteristics. Second, in order to provide necessary information on the Turkish Hezbollah, foundational information such as the emergence, strategy, goal, ideology, member profile and historical background of the organization (Turkish Hezbollah) are portrayed. In addition to that, more insight on the stance of Turkish Hezbollah, the generic frameworks of radicalism, fundamentalism, terrorism and etc. are conceptually discussed in the third section.

2.1. Terrorist Member Characterization

The concept of this study reflects a two folded structure. In the first level, it identifies the social characteristics that potentially caused people become a member of Turkish Hezbollah. Second level include the analysis on what characteristics potentially played a role on Hezbollah members to take a position (or tasked in) within the military wing of the organization. Within this regard, the literature review, in this chapter, is two-fold. First, it reviews the conceptual framework by laying out the related theories from various disciplines (e.g., criminology, sociology, and political science), such as Anomy/Strain and Social Learning, which lays out the foundational concepts on social characteristics on relating to use of political violence (terrorism in this context). Theories are used to frame the concepts on what, if any, characteristics lead Turkish Hezbollah members become a member in the political or military division of the organization. Yet, the main theme of fundamentalism is identified in a separate section to review and relate the basics of radicalization and in turn either engaging in terror activities and/or choosing between political and military activities once became a Hezbollah member. Second, the literature review explores the social characteristics of terrorist members in general by drawing a special focus on social backgrounds and social characteristics that potentially led individuals to engage in terrorist activities and/or to take different positions in the terrorist organization (i.e., political versus military). While identifying the foundational

information, literature review is added where applicable to supplement the section with thematic of prior research on social characteristics of becoming a terrorist member.

2.1.1. Terrorist Member Characteristics

Social (Demographic) Characteristics

Demographic variables are applied to explain who becomes a terrorist relying on what reasons. One of the outcomes of this study is to find out the similarities and the differences between the Turkish Hezbollah members in perspective of the demographic characteristics. It will not only be a contribution to the contemporary terrorism literature but also will provide useful information to the authorities regarding the terrorist organization man support and source.

One of the other aspects of studying demographic characteristics of the terrorist members is to distinguish the circumstances; why some become terrorists whereas the others don't. Even though the sociological conditions remain the same, some involve terrorism but some don't. These were analyzed in the past by many different scholars and experts (Clarke, 1982; Handler, 1990; Pedahzur, Perliger, & Weinberg, 2003; C. A. Russell & Miller, 1983; Strentz, 1988; Teymur, 2004; Yayla, 2005).

2.1.1.1. Early Characteristic Studies

Characteristic studies might be dated back to 1870s' Russia. The target population was members of the Russian populist movement. Quantitative data were available for the scholars. The number of the movement members was manageable and biographical information existed in czarist police archives as they were attentive and also capable of collecting and saving records of the members. Merkulov (1977), an official in Czarist Russia, attempted the first statistical analyses of the group by writing a report about 1600 members. The report included demographic and sociological categories such as social and educational status, age, and geographical origin. Merkulov even identified universities as source for the man support of the movement in his report.

Another profiling study was conducted by a terrorist group from a political party established in Russia in 1879 named Narodnaia Volia (People's Will). The target group

was the revolutionaries in the movement. Narodnaia Volia's study divulged that revolutionaries had various backgrounds (Young, 1980).

Either Merkulov's or Narodnaia Volia's studies were not sufficient enough regarding the number of variables because very fitting studies would include more variables in characteristics studies. On the other hand, subjectivity might be mentioned about these studies because Merkulov's study was an official report while Narodnaia Volia studied its own cadre.

Following the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, populism was the center point of the scholars' attraction who studied characteristics of the populism activists regarding on the arrest records and autobiographies in 1870s. Again Merkulov published his confidential record in 1877. Some other scholars who were able to access official data sources started characteristics projects. Autobiographies of activists and individuals took an essential part in those data sources. However the Stalin's reign brought a standstill to those studies, after his death, the studies about revolutionary movement redeveloped in 1950s.

Itenberg's study was one of the prominent studies about revolutionary activists examining the Dvizhenie v. Narod of 1870s. Similar to Merkulov's study, Intenberg (1965) analyzed 1800 detainees' records of activist from Dvizhenie. Unfortunately, this study had the lack of variable numbers and therefore identified few characteristics of the activists. According to that study, Dvizhenie activists were educated men and women from towns which had universities.

Another significant study belonged to Mironov. In his study (1975), Mironov used new statistical methods about revolutionaries in 1870s. He analyzed a number of sociological variables of the revolutionaries. However he did not provide satisfactory information regarding the size and the source of his data, his analyses revealed valuable findings about the background factors of the activists; educational status and age contrary to religion, social origins, and nationality took significant roles in participation of the activists.

The American historian Young was one of the recent scholars who studied 1870s' Russian populism movement activists in 1980s. Among the 355 of activists' biographies, he used

131 of them who then involved into terrorism. He examined the variables (such as birth date, educational status, city of birth, gender, profession, father's profession, involving date to the terrorism, and arrest history) to distinguish terrorists from non-terrorists. However there were no common variables regarding to distinguish the terrorist from non-terrorists. Young also investigated three autobiographies of which belonged to Mark Natanson, Sofia Perovskaia, and Nikolai Morozov from Narodnaia Volia. He aimed to find out the despotic impacts of the czars and the coercion of the dictatorial regime of Russia on individuals becoming terrorists among the activists. He stated that revenge and frustration had dominant role among those terrorists who would later act in Bolshevik revolution in 1917. One of the hypotheses of Young was that there was no effect of quantifiable background variables on levels of involvement. He used the same data of those 131 who then became terrorists among the populism activists. The result was that the circumstances were significant within the terrorists group instead of a specific described terrorist profile. Young finally tested the relationship between terrorist activities committed by terrorists and prior arrest history (either how many times they were arrested or the experiences during the detainment). The result was there was a significant relationship between prior arrest history and experiences during the incarceration and the level of terrorist activities committed by terrorist individuals.

In conclusion, Young used the published biographies of the individuals who turned into terrorists among populism movement activists. His sampling method and using biographies diverged his study from the others above as the rest studies mostly utilized the data apprised by czarist police. There were no significant differences between terrorists and non-terrorists activists except for the use of violence among the terrorists.

2.1.1.2. Contemporary Characteristic Studies

1970s might be considered as the first decade for the contemporary terrorist characteristic studies. A great deal number of studies has been conducted from different origins as the terrorism occurs in different regions of the world. Recently, religiously motivated terrorism has begun popular. Therefore, that will be appropriate if the modern characteristic studies could be categorized into three; 1-Worldwide Terrorist

Characteristic Studies, 2- Regional and Nationwide Terrorist Characteristic Studies, and 3- Middle Eastern Terrorist and Suicide Bombers Characteristic Studies.

2.1.1.2.1. Worldwide Terrorist Characteristics Studies

Studies on terrorist profiles dating back to the 1960s and 1970s describe a typical “first generation” terrorist as a male in his mid-twenties, from a middle class family and with a well-educated background. Russell and Miller conducted the first worldwide terrorist characteristic study in 1977. Their study was cited by other scholars in a great deal number of study afterwards. Russell and Miller aimed to figure sociological modern urban terrorist characteristic by collecting more than 350 arrested German, Argentinean, Brazilian, Uruguayan, Japanese, Palestinian, Iranian, Spanish, Irish, and Turkish members of different terrorist organizations. They collected the variables such as gender, age, socio-economic background, educational level, occupation information, and marital status from the published data. Their study draw broadly accepted sociological characteristics of terrorist in 1970s. They reported the average age ranges between 20 and 25; mostly come from upper-middle class families; and have some type of higher education (Russell & Miller, 1977).

However, they limited their study by only including the urban terrorists and leaving the rural guerilla warfare out of the study. In addition to that, Russell and Miller compared the characteristics of terrorists from different countries and generalized the characteristics. This gave harm to the validity of their study in terms of methodology. Still, outcomes of Russell and Miller’s study have been referred and cited by scholars when generally profiling the characteristics of worldwide terrorists (Spot, 1999).

Taylor (1988) summarized in his international terrorism literature based study that the average terrorists were in their early twenties and unmarried (Taylor, 1988). Taylor continued that the age range dropped to 16-17 in the 1980’s. Even Arab and Iranian groups recruit 14 to 15 year old boys for the dangerous missions because they were less likely to attract attention and question the instructions given (Laqueur, 1977).

Sageman conducted a study by collecting information of 172 terrorists from public domain in 2004. Although these terrorists called themselves as members of “Salafi Mujahidin”, an informal branch of Egyptian Islamic Jihad and AL-Qaeda, they were transnational.

Sageman analyzed of both; social and psychological background variables together with the information of social affiliation. His variables were origin, family situation, socio-economic status, education level, and occupation as social background; terrorist personality and mental illness (paranoia, disciplinarian personality, and pathological narcissism) as psychological background; faith and relative deprivation as social affiliations. He also put forth a social network analysis of the Salafi Mujahidin and the characteristics of this network. However his study did not contain terrorists who involved in local terrorism, the sampling of the study led biases to the transnational terrorists and the terrorists who were not analyzed (Sageman, 2004).

2.1.1.2.2. Regional and Nationwide Terrorist Characteristic Studies

Due to the heterogeneity among the terrorist groups over the world (Victoroff, 2005) and the scarcity of worldwide terrorist and terrorism data sources, researchers conducted studies on regional terrorist characteristics (Yilmaz, 2009). Clarke’s study was one of them. Clarke in 1983 collected biographical information of ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna) members. The sampling size was 493 of which 48 were case study and the rest (447) were ETA members with more limited information. Clarke analyzed sex, age, ethnic background, and socio-economic status of terrorists and their families. He also examined the radicalization of Basque youth in the perspective of ETA members as well as the relationship with families/friends and the recruitment and leaving the organization.

Weinberg and Eubank (1987) conducted a study on Italian terrorists by complying information from court archives and two major newspapers of Italy. They cited biographical information of 2512 Italian terrorists of whom 451 were females. By this, their study was known the first ever cited the role of the women in a terrorist organization. Weinberg and Eubank stated the variables of the terrorists such as place of birth and residence, sex, age, occupation, membership to any political movements, roles and relationships of the members in the group.

Handler's study on American terrorists is to be mentioned finally in this category in 1990. His study focused on the relationship between political affiliation and socio-economic status. He examined socio-economic characteristics of 280 right-wing and left-wing terrorists who were active on the American politics stage in 1970s. His study was an experience of American domestic terrorism of which radical and reformist political groups such as anti-abortionists. He used the FBI's interviews of right-wing and left-wing terrorists as data (Handler, 1990). Accordingly, the proportion of female terrorists in left-wing terrorist groups was much larger than in right-wing terrorist group (46 versus 11 percent); high educational attainment (high school and/or university) was also much higher among left-wing terrorists compared to right-wing terrorists (68 versus 19 percent); and the proportion of those who have blue-collar jobs was higher among right-wing terrorists than among left-wing terrorists (75 versus 24 percent).

2.1.1.2.3. Middle Eastern Terrorist and Suicide Bombers Characteristic Studies

In the 1980s, terrorism scholars tended to profile a newly rising threat from middle-eastern terrorists. However, Russell and Miller's study on Middle Eastern terrorists was conducted long before this category of characteristic studies started (Russell & Miller, 1977)).

The profiles of terrorists have changed over time. During the 1960's and 70's, a typical terrorist would be profiled as a male in his mid-twenties, from a middle class family and with a well-educated background. During the 1980's, middle-eastern terrorists were described as age 17-23; coming from large and poor families; and having low-educational attainment.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PELP) and Al-Fatah were two of those organizations in the region with Marxist-Leninist motives even though their eventual goal was to establish a country with religious régime. Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas followed them in terms of using religious motivations for the purposes of religious régime. As the suicide bombing has been a sensational terrorist attack for these organizations within the last two decades, researchers and scholars paid attention to study on characteristics of the Middle Eastern terrorists and suicide bombers.

In one of these studies, a typical Palestinian terrorist was described as between the ages of 17-23; coming from large and poor families; and having low-educational attainment (Strentz, 1988). But the characteristics of middle-eastern terrorists changed over time especially after the 1990s. There were many university students, married men in their thirties and forties, and young adult females. The recruitment of female terrorists as suicide bombers began with Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, a secular terrorist group which was founded right after the Palestinian uprising, Intifada, in 2001 when the peace negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis resulted in a stalemate (Rees et al., 2002).

In 2001, Hassan conducted a study including on-site interviews with 250 suicide bombers of Islamic Jihad and Hamas in Gaza between 1996 and 1999. Participants were the suicide bombers who failed to accomplish the mission as planned. The secrecy principles of terrorist organizations would not normally allow an outsider researcher to access the information of the organizations systematically. Hassan was an exception to those as she promised to veil much of the demographical information of those participants from the organizations. Still, among the terrorists, suicide bombers had an age ranging from 18 to 38; more than half came from refugee families, many were middle class members (Hassan, 2001). Since Hassan was able to interview with the bombers by using intermediaries. Therefore, her study has been cited by many scholars (Kruger & Maleckova, 2002; Silke, 2004; Victoroff, 2005; Newman, 2006).

Pedahzur and his colleagues (2002) collected information about suicide terrorists (80) and non-suicide terrorists (743) from an Israeli newspaper (Ha'aretz) by searching all terrorist incidents between 1993 and 2002. They compared these two groups; suicide terrorists and non-suicide terrorists by using the variables; socio-economic background, education, terrorist incident history, age, marital status, and ideological attachment. Even though their study was criticized due to the data source as it was gathered from a journal which is a problem for the researchers unless the data were confirmed by any other more sources, this comparative study of suicidal and non-suicidal terrorists provided a constructive contribution to the field (Sageman, 2004).

Berrebi, in his study, (2004) investigated the association between terrorism and economic deficiency as well as to identify the similar and different sociologic demographics of

terrorist from Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas versus general population of Palestine. Berrebi collected the autobiographies of 335 killed members from Hamas, PIJ, and Palestinian National Authority (PNA) from their online sources. He included the variables of economic status, laboring status, age, education, marital status, kind of resident and location of resident (rural vs. urban) in his data set.

Berrebi used the general population information as his controlled group. This gave the advantage of quasi-experimental research design which terrorism scholars avoid to apply when they analyze the root cause of terrorism. This was an exception for Berrebi's study (Newman, 2006).

However, the accuracy of biographical information had been doubted and considered as a limitation of his study as the data were collected from terrorists' own sources. Another point about his study to mention was that there were no sharp informative statements regarding economic status of the terrorists in their autobiographies. Therefore, Berrebi conjectured economic status of the terrorists by evaluating the terrorists' occupation, ownership such as house or car, computer availability at home, travel abroad history if it existed in the autobiography. In other words, economic status variable was created based on the sub-information given in the autobiographies.

Terrorism scholars not only studied the profiles of terrorists but of the general public who support political violence as a means of gaining political interests. In 2001, such a study of 1,357 adults by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that support for terrorism perpetrated by Palestinians against Israelis was higher among white-collar workers than among blue-collar workers (43 versus 35 percent) and higher among those with secondary education than those with less education (39 versus 32 percent) (Kruger and Maleckova, 2002). Further, Kruger and Maleckova (2002) compared 130 dead Lebanese Hezbollah terrorists whose age ranged between 15 and 38 with the general public of the same ages. Accordingly, poverty rates were similar across groups (28 percent among terrorists versus 33 percent among the general public) whereas education level was somewhat different (33 percent of the terrorists attended secondary school versus 23 percent of the general public).

Public supporters of terrorist activities were likely to be white collar workers with higher education levels. The problem with all of these studies is the lack of focus on individual terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1986).

Previous studies found similar pattern in the profiles of terrorists. Evidence from aforementioned studies will be provided next to demonstrate that terrorists have common social backgrounds and that a similar analysis is possible to determine their involvement level as well. Victoroff (see Table 1) tabulated some of the demographic findings that the researchers chronologically conducted on terrorist member characteristics over time.

Author(s) and Years	Subjects	Age	Social Class
Russell and Miller(1983)	350 members of eighteen European, Middle Eastern, South American, and Japanese groups, active 1966- 1976	23.2-31.3	2/3 middle or upper middle class
Clark (1983)	48 ETA members, active 1970s	24 (avg.)	28 percent lower; 30 percent Middle
Weinberg and Eubank (1987)	451 Italian women terrorists	60 percent ages 20-29	Terrorists: 35 percent students, 43 percent white-collar workers or teachers, and 7 percent “workers”; fathers of subgroup of 27: 10 percent blue-collar workers and 41 percent upper middle class
Strentz (1988)	U.S. domestic terrorists 1960s and 1970s leftist groups (n, NA)	Leader, 25-40; follower, 20-25	Middle class
Strentz (1988)	1980s Middle Eastern terrorists (n, NA)	17-23	“Unskilled and unemployable”
Handler (1990)	161 right-wing and 119 leftwing terrorists active in United States, 1960s-1970s	NA	Right wing: 74.8 percent blue collar workers, 18.3 percent white-collar workers; left wing: 24.3 percent blue-collar workers, 15 percent white-collar workers
Hassan (2001)	“Nearly 250” Hamas or Islamic Jihad members, 1996-1999	18-38	“Many” middle class
Pedahzur, Perliger, and Weinberg (2003)	80 Palestinian suicide terrorists	24.5 (avg.)	Mean socioeconomic status (SES) = 5.97 (high SES = 1; low = 10)

Table 1: Demographics of Terrorists

NOTE: NA = not available; ETA = Euzkadi ta Askatasuna.

2.1.2. Relevant Theories

2.1.2.1. Relative Deprivation

Relative Deprivation theory was used by many disciplines such as sociology criminology, political science and psychology (Webber, 2007). Basic assumption of this theory is that people may feel they are treated unjustly compared to some standards or reference groups and because of this perception they feel deprivation. This theory alleges that people feel deprived when they perceive that they are treated unjustly compared to some standards or reference groups. According to the relative deprivation hypothesis a person compares what he/she has and doesn't have, besides what he/she wants or doesn't want, with others, and the stated others might be real or imaginary. This person mostly perceives a discrepancy between what is possible for him/her and what is possible for others to whom he/she is making the comparison and at the end he/she reacts with anger or angry feelings of injustice. Triggered by the perception of relative deprivation people may react in different ways and some of these reactions might be in the form of some kind of collective violence such as rebellions, revolutions, and riots. The issues that the theory is dealing with are mostly found related to economic conditions. Runciman (1966) got the basics of this theory from Merton and he explains the basic understanding of the theory as “Person A wants something and he do not have it, and compares himself with person B who has it, and A perceives himself deprived. Similarly if the expectation of A is higher than the expectations of B then he is relatively deprived” According to Runciman relative deprivation includes jealousy, greed, and lust. We can see relative deprivation not only in the poor people but also in the people who has money, because at the end one people compares himself with others and reaches a conclusion about his condition and can see himself poor according to this comparison.

Ted R.Gurr (1970) argued that this theory has some similarities with Dukheim’s anomie and Merton’s strain theories and they all argue that “specific conditions” lead to violence by exaggerating the feelings between the goal of a person and means available to that person (Ozdogan, 2006). Ted Gurr, (1970) states that relative deprivation contributed to explain the relationship between poverty, inequality and political violence. Gurr states that the gap between the ideal conditions and the current existing conditions of people create

tension and this yield people to the violent behaviors. If what people get in real life economically is less than what their expectations are, the possibility of occurrence of political violence is higher.

Applying the relative deprivation theory to the field of terrorism is not a new issue. Much previous study examined the relationship of poverty, economic inequalities, and poor socio-economic condition to the terrorism while they are searching the root causes of terrorism (Russell & Miller, 1983; Clarke 1983; Weinberg & Eubank, 1987). Although many of these studies indicated no relationship between economic deprivations and terrorism some found relationship between terrorism and socio economic conditions (Koseli, 2006). To be able to understand the root causes of terrorism Gurr (1970) reveals important issues.

Durkheim (1893; 1897) and Merton (1938) both emphasized the importance of the socio-economic factors. Many further studies used these as guidelines and revealed various findings. Looking at these findings we hypothesized that conditions that terrorism finds grounds include deprivation which includes both relative absolute one.

Reducing the relative deprivation concept simply to the poverty level may be considered as a fault because not all people with low socio-economic status feel deprivation. It is important examine the relative deprivation to understand the terrorist behavior according to Gurr (2006). However Sageman (2004) finds relative deprivation as a good explanation to conditions of terrorism but he also states that it is not enough because many people has this feeling of deprivation in their own life but very little number of people become terrorist so there should be some other issues effecting behavior towards being terrorist.

The assumptions of relative deprivation theory correspond to the assumptions of frustration-aggression hypothesis of Dollard and his colleagues (1939). Both theories assert that individual feel deprived of something they have a desire for. The major differences between relative deprivation theory and frustration-aggression hypothesis is that former assert that thinking others as having something and feeling himself as entitled to have the same thing are necessary preconditions for deprivation, whereas the latter asserts that desire for something and thinking it feasible to obtain are sufficient for frustration (Berkowitz, 1972). The conditions of absolute or relative deprivation which

might occur because of poverty, political oppression, discrimination, and low social status are provoking and these stimulates aggression against others and this conditions might turn into terrorist behaviors. But frustration does not necessarily provoke aggression against others and it might lead; depression, escape, or aggression against the self rather than against others. Frustration could also motivate the seek for options for non-violent means. Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman (2006) states that not all kinds of frustration end up with terrorism when all other means have been exhausted. Because of that other variables should be considered while examining the root causes of terrorism.

Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues (1949) was the first using relative deprivation as a provisional explanation for their findings that respondents they examined were better off in some situations whereas they were worse off in some other situations in reference to comparison groups. Starting from that study relative deprivation has attracted an enormous attention from researchers of different disciplines such as political science (Nagel, 1974; Gurr, 1968, 1970), sociologists (Davies, 1959; Merton and Rossi, 1957; and Runciman, 1966), and psychologists (Adams, 1965; Crosby, 1976; and Pettigrew, 1964, 1967).

Examining relative deprivation it is possible to classify it into four different models;

Formal model of relative deprivation is from Davies (1959) who explains that an individual who lacks certain goods and opportunities will have a sense of injustice whenever he feels that similar others have those goods and opportunities. In this explanation of relative deprivation the individual who lacks something desired should perceive that others have and have a desire for it besides having a feeling of entitlement for it. If any of these are absent than deprivation does not occur. According to Davies comparison might be inside the group or outside the groups.

Runciman (1966) added to these that individual should also feel that obtaining the desired goods and opportunities is feasible and this help individuals to distinguish realistic and unrealistic hopes and as a result if the desire is an unrealistic one than there deprivation would not occur.

Unlike Davies and Runciman's concepts of relative deprivation Gurr (1970) sees it from another perspective. He defines that individual's perception of discrepancy between his expectations and capabilities is relative deprivation. According to his explanation relative might not occur only as a result to one comparison of his condition to others but it can also occur as a result to one's comparison his/her condition with past or ideal condition which he believes or standards put by leaders.

Another explained version of relative deprivation defined by Gurr (1970) is what is called aspirational deprivation in which we do not expect a person experience a significant loss but he has no means to attain increasing or intensifying expectations so he gets angry. Gurr also defines another category of deprivation which is called progressive deprivation meaning that an increasing improvement in both capabilities and expectations also increase the level of expectation. In such cases if the capabilities stabilize or decrease then deprivation might occur and this is called a progressive deprivation. In economies which have recession can result this kind of deprivation.

The studies of Gurr inspired many academicians among whom are Samuel Huntington and many others. Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson's (1990) study also is one of them. In this study they used the data of 85 developing countries between 1973 and 1977. According to their findings unequal distribution of income is more effective than unequal distribution of land on political violence. Another study by Brush (1996) looks at the empirical evidences for relative deprivation theory and examines the studies listed in *Social Science Citation Index* and find out that during the first half of the 1970s relative deprivation theory received a considerable support but the interest declined among political scientists and sociologists during the second half of 1970s and the first half of 1980s.

2.1.2.2. The frustration-aggression

The frustration-aggression hypothesis is the idea that when people perceive they are being prevented from achieving a goal, their frustration is likely to turn to aggression. It is possible that every frustration raises some kind of aggression. Further, if a person is closer to achieve his goal, he feels more excitement and more pleasure. If he is prevented from

achieving his goal when he is closer to the achievement he gets more frustrated. Additionally surprising occurrence of frustration also increase the likelihood of aggression. On its basic, the theory hypothesizes that if a goal-oriented act is delayed or dissatisfied, people feel aggression. Frustrating conditions stimulates aggressive behavior to a degree which is related to the level of blockage of goal attainment.

Aggression is the intentionally infringement of a being or his affiliation. Aggression mostly directed to the source of frustration but it sometimes may be toward other people or objects. According to statements about this hypothesis the occurrence of aggressive behavior requires some kind of frustration, or a form of frustration leads to some kind of aggressive behavior.

According to Dollard (1939) a level of aggression depends on the reinforcement value of interfered goal response and the level of frustration besides the number of interference. What he assumes is that frustration is evolutionary process and it develops cumulatively.

Another version of aggression as Dolards (1939) stated is that aggression may be introverted and such conditions can result breaking out in a different form when the anticipated severity of punishment exceeds the anticipated fulfillment of aggression and such situations might result in covert aggression. Another reflection of frustration-aggression relationship is displacement of aggression to an alternative target.

This theory is used to be able to explain the terrorist behaviors, by the perspective of how politically motivated people reach the point where they use their energy to create violence (Victoroff, 2005). This theory first started to express the observed violence in early twentieth century in Europe as a result of studies at Yale University (Dollard et al. 1939; Friedland 1992). John Chowing Davies (1973, 251) a political psychologist saw violence as a response to frustration. Terrorist's violent behavior can also be expressed by this theory, but this studies which uses these theory has been criticized a lot. Main criticism on why many other people who lives under frustration but never turn to terrorism. We do not see Frustration Aggression theory to explain terrorism but it is not sufficient by itself. However from the reviewed literature we see think that frustration effective in some level

and we think that effect of frustration should be studied to figure out to what extent level of frustration of someone can explain the variation in the involvement level of terrorists?

2.1.2.3. Social Learning Theory

Social Learning Theory bases on the idea that people learn from one another by means of observation, imitation, and modeling. According to Bandura (1973, 1998) people learn their behaviors by observing and modeling other's behaviors. Then these became guidance for his/her actions (Bandura, 1973, 1998)). According to Bandura individuals, especially children learn aggressive behavior by observing how others behave this may be both the personal observation directly from the source and through the media and other similar sources. Albert Bandura thinks that the early childhood is important to prevent the criminal behavior of somebody If aggression was diagnosed early in childhood then a person can be refrained being a criminal (Bandura, 1976: pp. 206-208). He explains that frustration creates aggression and the hindrance produce an emotion that can be released in different forms of activities, for example when distressed some people show withdrawal while some can show some aggression.

Bandura suggests (1973, 1998) that violence go after replication of an observed aggressive model. This idea is also used to explain terrorist behaviors. Teenagers living in breeding ground of political conflict may directly witness terrorist behaviors and seek to imitate it or even more violence. Some experts on terrorism relate some of the behavior with this idea for example (Crenshaw 1992; Taylor and Quayle 1994; Kelly and Rieber 1995); the "martyr posters" on the streets of a region might trigger the younger to commit the same. Victoroff, (2005) also used the idea to explain the learned behavior in some kind of school like structure where people can be didactic, teaching of an extremist form of jihad or any other kind of violence ideology. This kind of education also affects the non-attendees via cultural diffusion. In our time the boundaries are widened and didactic learning of violent/terrorist behavior also occurs via audiovisual tapes, compact disks, books, other forms of publications and internet. Especially young people can be influenced by didactic teaching or social learning and they may act towards terrorism so social learning theory can express some part of terrorist behavior. However this theory cannot bring an explanation to the question why only a small minority becomes terrorist comparing to the

millions who exposed to the extremist publications or other means of terrorist propaganda. Taylor and Quayle (1994) explains this situation as such; “Not everyone from those communities, although subject to those same or similar influences, becomes a terrorist” So a good study exploring the root causes of terrorist should examine other factors besides the effect of social learning (Victoroff, 2005).

Not all observed behaviors learned effectively. There are some factors that affect the learning process both from the learner and the model. Related to that for an effective model of social learning, Bandura advises that some specific condition should exist. These are attention, retention, reproduction and motivation. Attention seen important because there are various factors that affects attention. To be able to learn you have to pay attention to what you are learning, some factors that are distracting your attention will result lack of attention and you will not be learning the subject. Some of the factors are related with the personal characteristics such as sensory characteristics, arousal level and perceptual level. Besides complexity, functional value, remembering what you paid attention to is also seen important factor and Bandura describe this as retention. Ability to store information is also an important part of the learning process; it can be affected by a number of factors. It is an important piece of observational learning because when you need the information you should be able to pull up the information. Then it comes to reproduction step which is related with the physical capabilities and the motivation. Cognitive processing during learning is seen important and social learning theorists contend that attention is a critical factor in learning. At the end the motivation is a critical factor because one has to be motivated in order to imitate the behavior. Reinforcement and punishment were seen important factor in motivation. Because social learning requires attention, memory and motivation the theory might be accepted as a bridge between behaviorist and cognitive learning theories.

Since the theory indicate that crime is a product of learning the values and aggressive behaviors linked with criminality and deviant behavior is learned through observed condition and aggression was acquired after through direct conditioning and modeling others' actions so this theory can be used explained the terrorism for example Coleen Ryan, Jeffrey Vanderlick, & Whitney Matthews's (2007, p.1) study states that “*terrorism*

is a learned behavior that is specifically taught through the various mechanisms that are common to any and all learned behaviors.” In this sense terrorism can be learned just as any other criminal behavior (Akers & Silverman, 2002). Saper, (1988) and Schmid, (2005) states that terrorism result from societal influence and exclusive learning experiences. We see that this idea is not new. According to Megargee (1993) terrorism is an instrumental form of violence so harming something or somebody is secondary aim of a terrorist and the primary is achieving a political goal (Hudson, 1999; Megargee, 1993; Schmid, 2005). Political ideology is more important in these activities and from this perspective we can postulate that learned ideological values are simply result to terrorist behavior (Gaynor, 2002; Nacos, 2004). Fields (1979) also alleges that social learning approach which focuses on developmental process could explain how terrorist behaviors are developed. He studied the behavior of children and found that children who exposed to terrorist behavior develop more terrorist behaviors. Currently there is no solid studies that can be prove this idea also there are other options rather than the terrorism for example if the people’s feelings of rage, frustration, and injustice channeled in a non-aggressive manner this may be a good result of social learning too.

Social Learning Theory can explain why some certain groups of people and certain geographic areas are more prone to terrorist activity, because of the idea of the group reinforcement. Terrorists are mostly bond together and they have some special forms of training activities in the organization camps. Their proximity makes them affected by each other and group reinforcement (Ryan, Vanderlick, & Matthews, 2007). Inside the group the recruitment process shows best results when the group members are isolated from other influences then terrorist actions become acceptable and justified (White, 2003). Akers (1998, p.50) states the group reinforcement stating that: *“The probability that persons will engage in criminal behavior is increased and the probability of their conforming to the norm is decreased when they differentially associate with others who commit criminal behavior and espouse definitions favorable to it, are relatively more exposed in-person or symbolically to salient criminal/deviant models, define it as desirable or justified in a situation discriminative for the behavior, and have received in the past and anticipate in the current or future situation relatively greater than punishment for the behavior”*

There are some researches shows that necessary abilities for terrorist activities mostly are learned in a terrorist camp lecturing ideological or paramilitary trainings that carry out hate and determination to inflict harm on others (Hudson, 1999; White, 2003)

2.2. Turkish Hezbollah

To draw a picture from generic to the specific, this section first identifies the main theme of the originating ideology of the Turkish Islamic Movement along with the history of it. Next, it details the basics of Turkish Hezbollah terrorist organization, such as evolution and growth, ideology, goal, organizational structure, recruitment strategy and process. This section also reviews the foundational notion of the Hezbollah ideology by identifying intellectual background, Hezbollah's method for establishing Shariah order, the Hezbollah's perception and interpretation of jihad and so forth.

2.2.1. Ideology of the Turkish Islamic Movement

For more than three decades, Turkey has been struggling with domestic revolts and terrorism on a variety of fronts (Koseli, 2003). Active terrorist groups include not only the Turkish Hezbollah, but also the Kurdish separatist group known as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (PKK/KADEK), Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi/Cephesi (DHKP/C) as well as other entities having ties to terrorist groups based in Syria, Iraq and Iran (Rodoplu, Arnold, & Ersoy, 2003). In order to understand the development of Hezbollah in Turkey, it is essential to be aware of the resurgence of political Islam and radical terrorism in a fundamentally secular country (Aydintasbas, 2000).

Most scholars agree that although Turkish Islam shares many features with other Muslim countries in the region, its uniqueness lies in growing and developing a different political and social environment (Karmon, 1997). The Turkish ideology is intertwined with Turkish nationalism, including the secularist components and European identification of Kemalism (Nugent, 2004). Contrary to other religiously motivated terror organizations in other countries, the religious based terrorist groups never attacked military or security personnel, although they lost many members in the anti-terrorist campaigns that were led by the state. In their first stages of development, only low level local politicians have been

killed by these organizations, but no top secular politicians. Besides, they never attacked western targets or acted abroad, though they have some infrastructure in Europe.

Islamic movements hold the ideology of establishing a new state ruled by Islamic Shari'a after consecutive steps of action (Karmon, 1997; Nugent, 2004). Concrete identifications and definitions of the ideologies should be the ones which are directly announced by the terrorist organizations. Therefore, the only source of the terrorist organizations consists of publications- if legal-or hand-outs. If the publications including an ideology of establishing new state under the authority of a running state are defined as illegal, this ideology is determined by the authorities depending on the interviews and the statements of the terrorist organization members. Hence, the objectives of the radical religious movements can be outlined in three stages (Council, 1997).

The first stage is the message (*teblig*) of calling people to adopt the Islamic religion into their social life. Propaganda includes suggestions that in the future they will establish an Islamic state and spread the word through the radicals to persuade the community. The second stage is the community (*cemaat*) to restructure the societies in accordance with the requirements of the first stage. The third stage is the struggle (*jihad*) to preserve the Islamic way of life called Shari'a.

2.2.2. History of the Turkish Islamic Movement

Developing subgroups with the intent of defining the Islamic movement is a complex task because each terrorist organization has different goals and strategies to establish an Islamic state and society (Karmon, 1997). Sayari distinguishes terrorist groups as traditionalists and radicals who are minorities and inspired by the Iranian revolution in 1979 (Sayari, 1996). The Islamic revolution in Iran had a huge effect on all religiously motivated terrorist organizations and opened new horizons for them. Hundreds of young Islamists visited Iran, looking to transform Turkey into Iran (Cakir, 2007). Hezbollah Muslims appeared for the first time publicly and proclaimed support for the Iranian revolution (Wagstaff, 1990).

Religious oriented terrorist activity began in the 1960s in Turkey. Between 1967 and 1973, the leaders of Hizb ut Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) were imprisoned for attempting to destroy the existent constitutional structure of state and establishing a new “Islamic ruled” one (Karmon, 1997).

Like other terrorist organizations, in 1980 the Turkish Islamic movements were heavily affected by the military coup (Karmon, 1997). With the Marxists and nationalists in conflict, the religious radicals were free to grow. Starting from 1983, the democratic regime encouraged the general Islamic trend whereas Marxists and nationalists lost their influence (Department of States, 1991). Free political space helped them to strengthen their position.

Starting in the mid-1980s, with the movement of some members of the right wing Nationalist beliefs to Islamic beliefs, a significant development occurred. Contrary to their origins, they came to believe that their movement should not tolerate nationalism. The nationalist militants were professionals in the field of terrorism and they represented a significant operational support for the Islamic movement. They organized in poor towns and villages with a large Kurdish population that was young and unemployed. They often organized themselves around Islamic publications such as Objektif, Tevhid and Yeryuzu and they followed the teachings of sheiks and Muslim scholars (Karmon, 1997).

Karmon (1997) reports the starting point of terrorist actions for religious terrorist organizations as the early 1990's. After this date a professor, journalist, political scientist and writer were assassinated by the Islamic Movement group.

The Turkish government, security authorities, press and public became uniquely aware of and shocked when Ugur Mumcu, one of the top prominent investigative reporters, was killed on January 1993 by a car bomb. This series of terrorist events prompted a sharp reaction within the Turkish public opinion. A strong press campaign and swift action by security forces against both the perpetrators and their sponsors caused huge street demonstrations in favor of the secular regime.

Additionally, for the first time, the arrests and interrogations unveiled the story behind the killings of Turkish secular intellectuals and the relationship between the Islamic Movement and Iran, which were directly involved in acts of terror against the Turkish Republic (Cakir, 2007). A turning point in the Turkish authorities' attitude toward the religious oriented terrorists occurred in March 1996. Until that date, Turkish authorities underestimated these terrorist groups and did not hinder their activities. In March 1996, the arrest of Irfan Cagirici, one of the leaders of the Islamic Movement, changed this period. From this date, Turkish security forces increased their operations annually. In 2000, the police raided a safe house of Turkish Hezbollah in Istanbul and killed Huseyin Velioglu, the head of Hezbollah, and arrested two other leaders. Many documents were seized, resulting in an unveiling of its secret relationships (Aras & Bacik, 2002; Aydintasbas, 2000; Farac, 2001). Approximately one year after the Beykoz operation, Hezbollah assassinated Diyarbakir's chief of police, Gaffar Okkan, as revenge for their leader's death (Cakir, 2001). Okkan's incident started a second crackdown against Hezbollah and nearly all of its top leadership were imprisoned or killed (Cakir, 2001; Farac, 2001). These operations limited religious motivated terror groups in Turkey for a long time. They stopped their armed attacks, at least temporarily, and entered a phase of serious internal confrontation. Cakir (2007) suggests that they continue trying to recover and it is possible that in the near future they may gain their previous power. It is clear that the decrease in the terrorist activity of radical religiously motivated groups is mainly a consequence of the determined counter action taken by Turkish officials (Karmon, 1997).

After several operations, Hezbollah decided to operate in the legal arena through existing associations and by publishing periodicals. Unlike in the past, the organization does not entrap itself in an all-out war with the Turkish State to ensure they are not washed away by a spiral of violence. They are now aiming to participate in the political arena by joining in the next local elections with independent candidates, placing its members in political parties, joining municipal elections and having a Diyarbakir centered daily newspaper (Citlioglu, 2001). Members of Turkish Hezbollah has realized to move into civil society and established various associations in the legal frame (that were closed in the past). Today, Turkish Hezbollah members gathered around the recently founded political party Rights and Freedom Party (HUDA-PAR) that provoked

a new debate whether they will be able to steal the Islamic Kurdish votes from AKP, the ruling party.

2.2.3. The Growth of Turkish Hezbollah

References differ regarding the origins of Turkish Hezbollah, but most accounts agree that the organization was formed around the time of the Iranian Islamic revolution by a small group of Sunni Kurd Islamists in southeast Turkey in the early 1980's (Nugent, 2004). Kilic (2004) claims that the groups sharing the same beliefs, ideology, and goals gathered each other under the roof of Hezbollah, which literally means "*The Way of God*". However, either the group itself or any other authorities was not naming them as "Turkish Hezbollah". Their ideology sought a strict Islamic government brought about through a multi-phased process, including the use of violence, following the example of Iran (Gorvett, 2000). In a parliamentary committee report to investigate murders by unknown assailants and human rights, the origins of Turkish Hezbollah ideologically roots back to the Melle Abdullah and his associates' organization but Turkish Hezbollah emerges and strictly in Turkey with a different purpose that revolves around termination of the PKK in the southeastern Turkey to reach their overarching goal of changing the regime of Turkey to an Islamic one. This report claims that Turkish Hezbollah was originated strictly in Turkey, the provinces of Diyarbakir and Batman (1995: 80-82). More importantly, Turkish Hezbollah was claimed to be created by the [underground extensions of] the state to neutralize the impact of the PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party) which is an ethnicity-based insurgent group employing terrorism to found an autonomous Kurdish State in the southeastern region of Turkey (along with territories from Iran, Iraq and Syria)(Cakir, 2001, 37). One of the other allegations about the creation or conniving at the existence of Turkish Hezbollah by the deep state is to eliminate the religious Kurdish scholars and authorities in the southeast of Turkey (Cakir, 2007). Many drew our attention to the Turkish State's certain unresponsiveness or inaction toward the Turkish Hezbollah due to its attacks against the PKK in the region. Yet, Cakir (2007) argues that State officials stayed indifferent toward the TH and reflected a neuter stance which invokes skepticism toward Turkish Hezbollah's creation [covertly] by the state (Cakir, 2007).

In the 1980's, the group's initial enemy was PKK, which exploits the people with its cruel methods and "endless" ideology to acquire support for its insurgency against the Turkish government. However, some of the religious and traditional PKK members joined the organization (Aydintasbas, 2000). Therefore, organization's first actions were killing PKK members (Aydintasbas, 2000; Karmon, 1997; Nugent, 2004; Ozeren, 2007). This was particularly controversial because the killings occurred in the southeastern part of Turkey where the dominant population is Kurdish. Yet, the group members are predominantly Kurdish. The group fought against the PKK because its nationalist/Marxist ideology and separatist motives were anathema to the unified Islamic state it sought to create (Kilic, 2004).

In 1987, different approaches began between the groups inside the movement on the basis of methods and tactics. The disagreement was whether the organization should initiate an increased level of action. This occurred because there were not concrete references regarding the steps toward establishing an Islamic state. The groups continued to work together from 1987 until 1991, even though disagreement occurred among the two main groups. However, in 1991 the conflicts became so great that the violence turned inward (Kilic, 2004). Since then, the organization was divided into two factions; the Ilim (Science), which appropriated the mentality of using violence to reach their goals; and Menzil (Ranger), which appropriated education on a religious basis and a peaceful harmony toward an Islamic state. It is at this time that the Ilim group renamed itself the Turkish Hezbollah (Bulut & Farac, 1999; Demirel, 2001; Kilic, 2004). Surprisingly, the leader of the organization, Huseyin Velioglu, was a student at the same university with notorious terrorist organization PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan in the late 1970's (Cicek, 2000). The split in the organization grew into outright battle.

After the Menzil group was largely silenced, attacks against the PKK intensified. The Turkish Hezbollah disagreed with the PKK ideology of separatist; separating Turkish Kurds into its own country, but lacked the Islamic religious view. Between 1991 and 1993, numerous casualties occurred due to the conflict between the PKK and Turkish Hezbollah. However, the conflict between the PKK and Turkish Hezbollah seemed to be ended (Erdin, 1999; Nugent, 2004). Turkish Hezbollah endeavored to be the voice of Kurds at

the beginning, then Islamists in order to establish an Islamic state., Nugent quotes that, Professor Michael M. Gunter, a scholar of Kurdish issues, "At the time many believed the killings were being perpetrated by a group associated with the Islamic Hezbollah to protect the unity of the Muslim Turkish state the PKK was threatening to divide"(Nugent, 2004 p: 2). As previously mentioned, certain other sources also refers to the same issue that Turkish Hezbollah was created by state forces to neutralize PKK actions in the region (e.g., Rusen ÇAKIR).

Within the following years, the Turkish Hezbollah developed like a sect, masked in secrecy, mostly gathering in the mosques to meet (Kilic, 2004). Nugent (2004) describes the Turkish Hezbollah as an organization which has smart members with an absolute obedience to secrecy. The organization in itself has a high level of counter-espionage. Leadership judges and punishes, even severely if there is any evidence about a member that exposes his real identity because of the risks placed on the entire organization such as decrypting the activities of the organization and causing arrests or police operations against the organization. The punishment gets more severe if any member collaborates with the enemy.

The geographical origination and intensity of the Turkish Hezbollah activities indicate that four cities, Diyarbakir, Batman, Van, and Mardin, constitute the majority of their activities within the southeastern Anatolia. The growth of the group has been managed within and around bookstores where the gatherings occurred. It began with ideological discussions and then turned into organized periodic meetings to spread the thoughts to more people. State reports specified that the original group gathered around the bookstore named Vahdet. However, following much diversity in the group, they were separated into two major groups (Aras and Bacik, 2000). This was not only because of ideological divergence, but also due to leadership disputes. These two major groups were named Ilimciler and Menzilciler. Ilimciler was led by Huseyin Velioglu around the bookstore "Ilim". The other group, Menzilciler, congregated around Menzil bookstore and was led by Fidan Gungor. These two factions also reflected major differences in their tactics and planning, along with leadership struggles. Within this regard, Ilimciler strategically chose armed struggles to reach their goal whereas the Menzilciler considered that they are at the

stage to deliver the messages and the mentality of the organization to the communities within the dialogue methods instead of armed struggling. The struggle between these two groups reached its peak by the disappearance of Fidan Gungor, the Menzilciler group leader in 1994. Aras and Bacik argued that Ilim members had justified their killings of Menzil members not only to delegitimize Menzil group but also to declare themselves as the true and legitimate group representing the way of Hezbollah in the southeast. Approximately 300 members of the Menzil group, the most important of whom were Fidan Gungor and Ubeydullah Dalar, were either kidnapped or assassinated in the general context of the conflict with Ilim (Kocoglu, 2000). Therefore, these two important murders and disappearances that still remaining unknown are considered to be the milestones of the conflict between these two groups.

Despite the Hezbollah in its name, there has been nothing found to identify its tie to popularly known Lebanese Hezbollah (Aras & Bacik, 2002; Department of States, 2000). However, it has been claimed by the mass media in Turkey that there has been support from Iran, even though it is considered limited. The perception of the group in certain areas, such as Kurdish parts of Iraq, is that Turkish Hezbollah is comprised of Sunni Kurdish people surviving in mountainous areas in between Iran-Northern Iraq and South-east part of Turkey with the name of Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah (Ozeren, 2007).

The major impact of the group has been the assassinations and disappearances of prominent people along with the opponents of their ideological views (Aras & Bacik, 2002; Cicek, 2000; Citlioglu, 2001). Turkish Hezbollah's most brutal attacks and activities were mostly against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). That is how the Turkish Hezbollah became known for its broad daylight assassination style executions (Aras & Bacik, 2000).

All of this is considered high-profile terrorist incidents. In 1999, it is estimated that the Turkish Hezbollah accommodated 20,000 adherents, some –nearly 4,000 - of which were armed militants (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003). The members of Hezbollah can be somewhat deemed as insulated -both economically and socially- from the mainstream society. The member profile patterns reflect low-income and unemployment that is in line with the socio-economic conditions of the southeast region where they originated. Yet, almost one third of its members only have an elementary school education (Akyol, 2000).

Hezbollah tactically began to get organized also in the western cities, such as Istanbul and Ankara. In the late 1990s, one of the major reasons for this tactical change was the harsh dispute with the PKK in southwest Turkey. However, western cities are not as fertile as their southwestern counterparts for Hezbollah organizational development and most terrorist efforts by the group have been prevented. Hezbollah cells have been raided by police operations in early 2000. Among these operations, one has resulted in the death of Huseyin Velioglu, the Ilinciler group leader. In the same operation, two of the top lieutenants were arrested, Edip Gumus and Cemal Tutar.

2.2.4. The Iranian Connection

There is considerable discussion that the Turkish Hezbollah may be supported and funded by the Iranian Secret Service. The correlation between Iranian influence and Turkish Hezbollah is unveiled especially after the Beykoz operation in Istanbul in 2000. Many of the documents that were seized after the operation provided evidence that many radical religious groups, especially Hezbollah, had an “official” connection with Iran (Aras & Bacik, 2002). An Iranian Intelligence and National Security agent ID card with the name of Huseyin Velioglu was a part of that documental evidence (Cakir, 2007). It is alleged that Turkey identified a list of Turkish Hezbollah members who received support of weapons, training and funding from Iranian sources (Ozeren, 2007).

After providing strong evidence about Iranian involvement, for the first time a Turkish official on the ministry level (Interior) stated that radical religious organizations had months of military and theoretical training in Iran, participating in attacks on Turkish citizens and Iranian opposed militants (Karmon, 1997). Contrary to allegations, Iranian officials denied any involvement in aiding or training the Turkish terrorist organization. They stated that inspiration of the Iranian regime to commit terrorist activities in Turkey does not mean that Iran has created them (Ozeren, 2007).

2.2.5. Ideology and Goals

Turkish Hezbollah’s ideology is based upon dividing the world into two camps, literally the good and evil. They are grounded on the notion of “ultimate truth” or good and

insulated themselves from the evil side of life. They created an image of “unjust other” to represent the evil and they were committed to destroy this ‘unjust other’ (Aras and Bacik, 2000). Such an ideology has led them to oppose every group that is not pursuing these two ideals, including many other Islamic movements and organizations.

Moreover, Hezbollah’s brand of radicalism follows from ‘the threat of the Modern Kharijites’ (O’Brein, 2002). Kharijites, transliterated meaning of ‘Hariciler’, followed the same way of separating the world into two and went against them. Their separation was based upon believers and nonbelievers. They basically declared a jihad against all nonbelievers and apostate Muslims and raised infidels by using every available means of resources and tactics when struggling (Akyol, 2000).

Turkish Hezbollah also used the tactic of developing civic organizations and unions to attract people into their ideology and organization. The important ones are the Union of Kurdistan Religious People, Union of Kurdistan Imams, and the Kurdistan Islamic Movement (Rodoplu et al., 2000).

2.2.6. Strategic Structuring

It is observed that Hezbollah Terrorist Organization supports Islam and Muslim people, faith and faithful people; while it opposes to polytheism and polytheists, profanity and profaners; and it aims at implementing a sharp and strong ideological language and discourse.

According to Hezbollah, Muslims are the “‘friends of Allah (Shu’ara 9)”, while the polytheists are the “‘enemies of Allah” (A’raf/30), Muslims are “‘Hezbollah” (Al Mujadilah/22), while the polytheists are the “‘enemies of Hezbollah (Hizbushaitan)” (Al Mujadilah/19). Muslims are the way (Al An’am 117), color (Al Bagarah 138), the rope (Ale-Imran), and the glory (Al- A’raf 157) of Allah. Positions of Muslims and polytheists in fact are as follows; Searching for the right way and guidance (An- Nahl 36), glory and cruelty (Ibrahim 1), truth and batil (Al Isra 81), for the afterlife dwellers of Fire and Paradise (Al- A’raf 44), believers and disbelievers (Al-Araf 76), attestators and disbelievers (Al-Qiyamah 31). Allah, who is an enemy to the disbelievers and polytheists

(Al-Bagarah 98), is without any doubt is not the arbitration but the party in this ideological, psychological, cultural and symbolic struggle (Al- Hajj/ 38) (Güler, 2002).

However, while evaluating this discourse it is necessary to consider and evaluate the verses of Quran by taking the boundaries defined by Hezbollah and its method of perception into consideration. This discourse arising from the first ideological reasons of the jihad and war environment and determining the class and parties, declares others as profane and factious people within a country in which the 99% of the population are Muslims and believe in Allah, and it aims at revolution and orders the goodness, and regard the group as ‘preventing the evilness’ (Al-‘Imran: 104).

The main motto of the organization is "Jihad until shahada". Success is not the target in this ideology, what makes sense is the way in which the person dies. Therefore, the blood of a militant never goes down the drain.

Shahada that is deemed as the most virtuous ideal is the only way for independence.

The symbolic name is the grandson of Prophet Muhammad, Hussein. He fought against Umayyad Khalif Yazid in Karbala though he knew he was going to die and he fell martyrdom. His path is the path for all Hezbollah militants (Atalar, 2002).

Hezbollah phenomenon is a subsidiary product of Political Islam in Turkey. It is a typical example of how the invisible connections and two different structures between sharia biased Hezbollah parts which are organized in structures described as traditional Islam and Political Islam transformed to each other following "Iran Islamic Revolution".

Hezbollah terrorist organization is an illegal organization that has performed its activities since 1980's up to now and that comes to the forefront with its Islamic discourse, slogan, theme and identity

It adopts Jihad (Armed Struggle) and blesses violence. Although Hezbollah is on a social, political and religious basis, it does not accept the phenomenon of classes and races with its Community- Ummah- Unification dimension (Güngör, 1997).

Hezbollah terrorist organization tries to pursue a supra-communities policy (Cakir, 2001) What bears importance is devotion and nationalist movements endanger Islam by dividing Ummah. Therefore, those people who abide by nationalism and treat people according to their origin, language and color and who declare war also declare war against the verses of Allah (Kilic, 2004).

When the connection of religious faith (faith) is entrenched, all Muslim people are brothers even if there is not communal or blood relation between them. Nationalism is a religious faith and a lifestyle. Nationalism, color or land nobility are the signs of backwardness and inferiority. Allah describes racism as rankness due to the bad and disgusting smell it emits. The selected nation of Allah is Islamic Ummah in which various nations, colors and countries exist and which exists under the shade of Allah's flag.

The nationality of the Ummah is Religious faith, its country is the place of Islam (Darü'l Islam), its judge is Allah and its constitution is Quran (Kilic, 2004).

Asr and Hucurat surahs constitute the principles that the organization tries to entrench in all its activities. From the documents which were acquired in the house of Mehmet Beşir Varol who is assessed to be one of the recent epoch leaders of the organization and from the documents which were published by him to the organization, it is stated that this issue is emphasized and the member of the organization are obliged to comprehend and experience the concept of call for goodness (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

Quran separates political environments in the earth that conflict with each other and that are polarized as " Hezbollah and Factions" As the ally of the devil (evliyaüşşeytan), Factions describe the factious people as the supporters of the devil (hizbushaitan) (Korani, 1992).

It aims at establishing an Islamic state in the country which is based on sharia laws by demolishing the current constitutional order with jihad (armed struggle). The aim is not to establish a "Kurdish Islamic State" in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian Regions.

Hezbollah deems democratic and secular Turkish Republic as an enemy and aims actually at Turkish Republic rather than PKK (Citlioglu, 2001).

The actual aim is to establish an Islamic state within the region that will encompass entire Turkey by creating a rebel zone resembling "Medina Period" of Prophet Muhammad. The eventual aim of Hezbollah terrorist organization is to make the judgments of Allah sovereign on earth by reviving the first Islamic model which is known as "the Century of Prosperity" (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003). Hezbollah terrorist organization is not different from other terrorist organizations, but it has more advantages when compared with other organizations as it predicates its propaganda on religious basis by evaluating its conjuncture and using ethnic identity (Citlioglu, 2001).

It completely adopts the main strategy of spreading Islam, namely the phases of "communique, community and jihad". Hezbollah terrorist organization is a total leader organization with its structure and implementations. The single religious and political leader of the organization is Hüseyin Velioğlu. While Velioğlu pursues policies in parallel with Iran, he criticizes the decreasing support of Iran to Hezbollah groups in Iran after the death of Ruhollah Khomeini and criticizes the rise of Persian nationalism and the Shi'a community and in the final head he rejects the leadership of Iran with his opinion of "Islamic law and model peculiar to Turkey" (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

By evaluating the current conjuncture, terrorist organization leader Hüseyin Velioğlu prefers forming notification and community phases by executing them together with the jihad process. At this stage, he promulgated the armed propaganda process which he describes as "active communique" by asserting the conflict environment of PKK. With this method, so as to reach the targeted consequence, he predicates the strategy which he regards as a guide on the hardline opinions of Khomeini regarding revolution.

2.2.7. Commanding the Goodness, Preventing the Evilness

By being entrenched to quite simple bases, Hezbollah ideology is able to reach the parts to which it advocates. These are uneducated parts of villages, towns and cities. Despite its Islamic opinion, this ideology is based upon the principal of separating everything as good and bad (Taheri, 1990).

The organization which deems itself as the "Soldiers of Allah" and believes to be appointed so as to establish the Islamic order adopts the following surah as its main principle: "Let their arise out of you a group of people inviting to all that is good (Islam), enjoining Al-Ma'ruf (i.e. Islamic Monotheism and all that Islam orders one to do) and forbidding Al-Munkar (polytheism and disbelief and all that Islam has forbidden). And it is they who are the successful (Al-'Imran: 104)."

There should be a staff which will pioneer the movement so as to create an Islamic society. The movement should both communicate and prevent and deter the evilness. An organized and efficient power is required in order to actualize these aims. It is not possible to reach a conclusion with an intellectual society that wastes the time of life. This power should assume the role of being the center of authority, conveyance and administration, and when necessary, it should protect the movement and dispose the intervention of profanity, fraud and its intrigues and conspiracies (Güngör, 1997).

A community in which the common feature is "to call for the goodness and to prevent from the evilness" from the verses of the surah following as "You [true believers in Islamic Monotheism, and real followers of Prophet Muhammad and his Sunnah (legal ways, etc.)] are the best of peoples ever raised up for mankind; you enjoin Al-Ma'ruf (i.e. Islamic Monotheism and all that Islam has ordained) and forbid Al-Munkar (polytheism, disbelief and all that Islam has forbidden), and you believe in Allah. And had the people of the Scripture (Jews and Christians) believed, it would have been better for them; among them are some who have faith, but most of them are Al-Fasiqun (disobedient to Allah - and rebellious against Allah's Command)." (Al-'Imran:110) and a society in which people exist from all classes should perform this task, and this community is Hezbollah (Güngör, 1997).

This impetuous stance of radicalism and its putting the blame on traditions make declaring a war obligatory and this contracting situation prompts Hezbollah to politicize the religion and to make the surah a slogan. Therefore they face the opposition of all religious parts including traditionalist Islamic structuring and they represent the most extreme revolutionary line as becoming more marginal day by day (Cakir, 1990).

Surah Al-i Imran/104 is a significant feeling of duty and responsibility attributed by Islam to the individuals and society. Within the verse, all people are called for a continuous responsibility intra their own interests and authorities. Islam assesses everything which it orders, deems allowable and legitimate as good. The duty of Muslim people is to abstain from evilness and bad things and to perform goodness and good things that are the orders of Allah.

This duty does not come to a conclusion by abiding by orders and prohibitions; endeavoring so as to entrench goodness and philanthropy into the society and to struggle so as to demolish evilness that endangers the society are also among the religious duties. However, the actual duty of the scholar and expert assuming this responsibility is to advise, preach and show the true way and to propose plans, programs and solutions for the people who are interested.

"Invite (mankind, O Muhammad) to the Way of your Lord (i.e. Islam) with wisdom (i.e. with the Divine Inspiration and the Qur'an) and fair preaching, and argue with them in a way that is better. Truly, your Lord knows best who has gone astray from His Path, and He is the Best Aware of those who are guided (Al' Nahl:125)." orders Allah. Allah orders goodness and does not assert violence for the people while preventing evilness. Therefore, governments that are entrusted with providing public order are responsible for suggestion of goodness and its prevention from evilness.

The responsibility for maintaining the order and safety of the society is vested in the state authority. It is possible for the individuals to order goodness and prevent evilness in their circles only by teaching the truth, suggestion and education.

However, on the authority of Abu Sa'id (May Allah be pleased with him), who said that the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: "*If any one among you acts gracelessly, let them change this with their hands, if they are not strong enough, let them change by means of their speech. Let them hate at heart if they are not strong enough again. That is the weakest level of Belief*" (Karaman, 2000).

2.2.8. Violence-Based Revolution

It is possible to separate terrorist organizations that carried out and still carry out activities in Turkey into three groups. These are described as ideological revolutionaries, ethnic separatists and terrorist organizations with radical religious theme.

Although themes of these organizations are different, their general strategies significantly correspond to each other (Bal, 2003).

Just like other terrorist organizations with religious themes, Hezbollah starts from the assertion that jihad (armed struggle) is an indispensable condition for "making the judgment of Allah sovereign" by using Islamic propaganda and regarding western, secular and democratic regimes as profane regimes.

They interpret some parts of the verses of Quran in accordance with their own ideologies and make them slogans, and in organizational saying they predicate their fatwas on the Holy Book.

While the members of the organization are encouraged towards violence, so as to entrench the reason for violence, they were made believe that the people who believed in this case and who struggled with this purpose in mind constitute a selected, special group.

In this respect, each and every member of the organization believes to be "Hezbollah" and to have been selected privately so as to actualize the jihad.

A Muslim person who struggles for implementing the provisions of Allah is more devoted than a person who just sits without considering anything. Because the person doing jihad pursues Allah on the way to fulfill the responsibilities of jihad and "ordering goodness (emr-i bi'l-maruf) and preventing evilness (nehy-i ani'l-münker)" (Al-'Imran: 104).

Beyond any doubt, Allah makes the one doing jihad superior to the one who just sits about. A person doing jihad further renounces his desires to Allah in comparison with the one who just sits about (Korani, 1992). Islam is a prerequisite for jihad so as to resist against its enemies and it is the most eminent value for a Muslim person. Interpretation of the elucidative verses of Quran that elaborate on the privacy of desires, the sharpest points of minds and therefore trigger them so as to fight against their enemies, the implementation of Islamic law provisions to the contemporary conditions, and hadiths should correspond to the resistance of Prophet Muhammad and the people around him against their enemies and to their stances during jihad. Beyond any doubt, children should be provided with doctrines, ablution and ritual prayer lessons as well as the culture of jihad. All activities which serve as a tool for spreading the culture of jihad into the ummah such as any lesson, sermon, speeches from the Assembly or the chair, brochures, audiotapes, march, films, books etc. are the activities on the way to resistance and Allah (Korani, 1992).

It adopts the idea that the fundamental condition for establishing an Islamic Republic shall be achieved by weakening state mechanism by means of attaining enough power and staff with using violence. The method of “Active Communique” chosen by Hezbollah Terrorist Organization fully corresponds to the “armed propaganda” chosen by left wing organizations aiming at revolution. Formally, active communique is a guerilla fight. Terrorism has transformed this military war strategy into a tool for political struggle. In a sense, it is the “Islamic discourse” of China-type, Soviet-type and Cuba-type rural and urban guerilla movement (Ozdemir, 1999). The urban guerilla warfare which will be administered by the Ulema is a content which is proposed for the agenda so as to develop the rebels against the current state and which makes these spontaneous rebels conscious and organized. Committed violence will either force the people to the other party (therefore, the “other” will be defined), or incorporate them into the organization. It is the prevailing opinion that the more the violence is challenging and oppressive, the more the organization base becomes extensive.

As a result, during this period which we may regard as the war for leading struggle, the task of the organization is to resolve problems “abolish the heretics” by defining the issues which are regarded as the Freudian slips of the society and to make the masses be

aware of “the devil states” and to bring them to the process of people’s war by means of armed struggle.

2.2.9. The Leadership of Ulema (Pioneer Staff)

Muslim people who have not gained authority and have not become a center of power are disorganized and disordered. Division of labor cannot be established among them, and therefore they cannot gain strength, so they form unconfident large and small communities. That is what profanity expects and demands from people. In cases where legitimate imamate cannot be substituted, Islamic movement is liable to resolve its administrative problems. This problem shall be resolved by attributing tasks and responsibilities to those people who are among the most efficient Muslims (Güngör, 1997).

The method of gaining authority is being searched in accordance with the declarations that aim at making people who will pioneer the movement with such a fanatic approach as “On the day of judgment, those three groups demand intercession from Allah. And Allah decrees intercession for them. Prophets, then ulema and martyrs. If the blood of martyrs are compared to the ink of ulema on the Day of Judgment, the ink of ulema is preferred to the blood of martyrs, ” (Hadith) superior to the other masses. The first stage of the Islamic movement is to educate few Muslim people by paying particular attention and effort. These people constitute the future staff that will assume the role of being pioneers. In other words, a leadership consisting of intellectuals and ulema is an organization which calls for goodness and detracts from evilness and a power which will eliminate complots and cruelty of the profanity. Leadership should enable the staff it will educate to gain remarkable characteristics and abilities. The first and significant task of Islam is to warn, frighten for the day of reckoning and to explain Islam to the people (Güngör, 1997).

In Islamic countries, the function of the ulema in the massive struggle by means of Islamic organizations or bodies or against the nationalist, democratic or non-Islamic administrations which are under the leadership of ulema, namely in the struggle so as to establish the Islamic authority with the Hezbollah methods is to lead the movement. This task is necessary for every obligated Muslim person whether the leader who has succeeded

declares himself/herself as the khalif or as the lord leader. Jihad is a religious duty within the scope of defense so as to rescue the Islamic lands that are occupied by the profane enemies and abrogate profane laws, and for this purpose, fatwa is granted to the ulema so as to exclude the enemy and demolish the profane state. From educating masses to gain the victory, each and every step should be taken under the leadership of the ulema (Korani, 1992).

According to Hezbollah view, the leader should have a strong personality and merit, should be brave, should be an interpreter of Islamic law and should be fair (Güngör, 1997). This leadership should strengthen itself among current Muslim people by eminent people and it should gain arbitrariness (increase in qualification) (Kilic, 2004). Hezbollah leaders should always be in contact with people so as to be able to direct the public towards mutiny. This relationship is in the form of personal negotiations, correspondence, communiques and the distribution of the cassettes from revolutionary sermons. Before and during revolution, ulema should be in contact with rural and urban parts. The method which was applied by Khomeini when he was making Iran Islamic Revolution should be adopted as a guide. Continuous resistance should be offered and mistakes about the regime should be assessed by the leaders of the movement, the cruelty of the regime against the Islam and Muslim people should be brought into the fore and then the reaction from the Muslim people should be imposed on. Ulema make use of this so as to agitate emotions, feelings and desires of the people and to trigger Islamic society. ‘’ Thank God who has made our enemies foolish’’, the stronger and clearer becomes the cruelty of the profane enemies, the stronger will be the counter energy. If the cruelty of the enemy results in the death of Muslim people, this effect will become stronger. Because, the productiveness of the martyrs’ blood is abundant. Therefore, the organization has searched for the ways to tie people with blood by increasing violence continually (Korani, 1992).

2.2.10. Community (Mass Structuring)

Community is the second stage comprising the strategy of Hezbollah terrorist organization. It is the stage in which new members of the organization are organized hierarchically so as to gain the ability to cooperate within a certain system. It is a situation that goes beyond the staff and an important stage while passing to the Islamic society. It

is the stage in which the staff that will assume the responsibility of communicate is educated and goes public and invites them to the Hezbollah struggle, and in that sense it is the stage for forming the base. It is envisaged in this stage that the people participating in the movement should be spiritually and mentally educated towards the Hezbollah path by means of communicate and invitation (Kilic, 2004).

The organization gains its members by means of propaganda, and benefits from these members actively during the organizational activities. Hezbollah terrorist organization includes closed and open propaganda periods so as to reach the required number. First of all, it carries out the closed propaganda period and gains members.

In the course of these lessons, the name of the organization is never mentioned. The primary aim is to form the basis for religious philosophy in students without frightening them and to provide them with such organizational characteristics as patience, discipline and obedience (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

An accountant leads each lesson group or circle. Organization and supervision of these lessons belong to this person. Lesson and culture member closely follows each person's interest in the lessons and attendance; and interim reports regarding these issues are periodically submitted to the related accountant. The accountants, on the other hand, submit charts and reports concerning status of students within their lesson groups in the mosque to the mosque representative during accounting meetings held on certain days (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

In general, during these accounting meetings chaired by mosque manager in organization houses, interest of students who attend lesson circles in lessons and mosque during course period, their status of attendance and comprehending levels are monitored, proficiency of lesson and culture staff is discussed, current deficiencies and problems are determined. Accountants organize such social activities as picnics, visits to cemetery and sport contests so as to increase the interest of especially tender-aged students in mosques and lessons and to ensure their cohesion. As of the end of lesson period, accountants submit the chart and written report to the mosque manager indicating the students' in their own groups interest, status of attendance, skills and tendencies to the case. According to these reports,

students who are going to receive second stage education are determined. Curriculum vitae reports are obtained at this stage from the students who are going to participate in the second stage education programme. Reports have to be compiled regularly weekly, every 15 days and monthly (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

Moreover, notification is given concerning the sincerity and accuracy of the answers given in Curriculum vitae reports. At this stage, communique and invitation are sent to the students who are accepted as candidates. In cases where the person does not accept the invitation, this person is warned so as to forget about this offer and proposal, not to tell anybody anything regarding this issue, and that he/she will be monitored by the organization for some period of time, he/she and his/her family will be punished in the event of an otherwise movement. Namely, the candidate is pushed towards a sort of silence (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 1998).

People accepting the invitation get in contact with some organization members so as to be subjected to the second stage education by the mosque manager. Second stage education is provided within mosques, prayer houses or cell houses and student houses belonging to the organization. This education is generally in the form of special care. Maximum one or two people are appointed so as to deal with the candidate at this stage. In addition, these people who are subjected to special care are sometimes accepted for the religious/political meetings held in organization houses. Books written in Hezbollahi style are read and interpreted together. During these education; people aiming at Allah's sovereignty, victory of Islam and the establishment of a sharia state convene together and demand the indoctrination of Islamic view to all Muslim people in the region starting from this community and immediate surroundings and the organization of these people around the community, or at least ensuring their leaning towards the organization. Ways and methods of communique and invitation are taught. Pursuant to this stage, people who are regarded as successful, hardworking and effective in addressing are accepted into the organic structure upon being appointed in political wing, namely as lesson or culture staff in a mosque structuring (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

Some of these people receiving second education are assigned in military wing and receive special military education so as to be used during armed actions. In the course of this education, the candidate is impacted with such ideas as that Hezbollah is the one who fights for this struggle, Hezbollah is a union formed by people who believe in Allah's soldiers and Muhammad, people out of Hezbollah are Hizbusheitan who are the servants of the Demon and who believe in polytheism and denotation , fighting against Hizbusheitan is the most eminent and honorable of all, and the ones who die for this struggle will reach the degree of martyrdom while the ones who participate in this struggle will be veterans.

2.2.11. Organizational Structure

The organizational structure of the Turkish Hezbollah (see Figure 1) reflects a three stage structure with specific functions assigned. These are hierarchical to each other vertically and called leadership, top council (Sura) and lower-level (city) council.




Figure 1 Organizational chart of Turkish Hezbollah (Ozeren, 2007).

2.2.11.1.Leadership

It constitutes the top level of this hierarchy of Turkish Hezbollah and is divided into two leaders; one is spiritual and one is political. The spiritual leader has no operational power or influence on the decision-making; he is responsible for the religious motivations of the group members. The political leader, on the other hand, has all decision-making power over any activities of the group (Citlioglu, 2001). Huseyin Velioğlu is the political and the spiritual leader of the organization. He was an exception because he has the capability to serve in political and spiritual way (Ozeren, 2006).

Religious leader has a determining effect on the political activities and structuring of the organization, and has a significant role in the creation of the organization's idea plan and in its moral shaping (Citlioglu, 2005). While a religious leader is not detected in Hezbollah terrorist organization which is the only prevailing power in Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian Regions, Hüseyin Velioğlu (Guide) is granted with the authority of religious leader. Organizations that are named as leader organization result in monopolized political and military leadership. Velioğlu is of the opinion that it is not possible to raise the awareness of public by means of agitation and communique (propaganda); armed struggle is indispensable for determining the political direction. In this respect, it is obligatory for military and political leadership to assemble under the same roof, and the movement should continue in accordance with the orders of a single leader. In line with these principles, religious leader is the single decision maker and spiritual leader of the organization (Kılıc, 2004).

In Hezbollah terrorist organization, the leader is the only lord of the organization and is the only one who has the authority to administer the organization and give fatwa in organizational meaning. Hüseyin Velioğlu has all the capacities himself and has administered military and political wings alone. He has been able to audit and manage even mosque structuring which is the lowest unit of the organization (Kılıc, 2004). Each organization member within the organization structure is accountable to his/her superior and absolute obeying and accounting are obligatory for the subordinate. In short, head orders the feet.

Staff structuring determined during the Istanbul-Beykoz operation dated 17 January 2000 which was devoted to the Hezbollah terrorist organization is as follows: Edip Gümüş (imprisoned), İsa Altsoy (escaped from prison), Sülhattin Ürük (captured dead), Hacı İnan (imprisoned), Mehmet Sudan (imprisoned) (Kılıc, 2004). It is stated that Turkey added İsmail Altsoy into the list of wanted terrorists and demanded him from Germany, Ministry of Internal Affairs in Germany neither positively nor negatively responded to this demand, and this person is administered and directed by German secret intelligence service BND (Kılıc, 2004).

Pursuant to Hüseyin Velioğlu's being captured dead, credentials committee tried to administer the organization and it is stated that Sülhattin Ürük was the Council leader (organization leader) during this period. Following the death of Sülhattin Ürük during Adana- Tekir Plateau operation, Council member (code Melle Mizgin) Mehmet Beşir VAROL was appointed as the organization leader until the establishment of the next Council (Kılıc, 2004). The leadership cadre of the Hezbollah were released from prison in 2011 without any charge on the ground that their court cases was not completed in 10 years' time which is a threshold and expiration for a criminal court case to be finalized.

2.2.11.1.1. The Portrait of Huseyin Velioğlu

We think that it is necessary to mention especially about general situations of Hüseyin Velioğlu and Fidan Güngör who are in group leader positions while considering the formations.

One of the main reasons for future problems is "the leadership conflict" arising from the personalities and positions of these two people.

It is a known fact that Menzil Group Leader Fidan Güngör is an iron monger and his economic condition is fairly well (Ozeren, 2007).

He is described within his environment as an intellectual who is well-informed about religious issues, and his characteristic of being a significant rhetorician and his success in

influencing people are the indicators that show he has more advantages in the path towards "being the only real leader of the structuring" than Hüseyin Velioğlu.

While evaluating his personality, Hüseyin Velioğlu is known as a person who is authoritarian, egocentric, and who does not make concession from his opinions, who is closed to discussion and is venturesome (Ozeren, 2007).

While defining his culture, Abdulaziz Tunç describes Velioğlu as an intelligent, brave, quick witted and fairly charismatic leader.

Hüseyin Velioğlu who does not like gushy people but who is pleased with being glorified³⁸⁸ is affected by the power of KONGRA-GEL in the region and he is jealous of the leader of the organization, Abdullah Öcalan, who dominates this power.

Therefore, he compares his organization with Abdullah Öcalan's organization and does not let anyone having eye on his place to run close to him.

For this reason it is stated that there is not a successor for him.

It is also stated that Hüseyin Velioğlu who is in the center is fond of technology, is pleased with making use of the advantages of technology, who follows publications concerning the organization and who has archived all news.

Although they have different characteristics, both two groups have carried out their activities shoulder to shoulder, pursued their efforts towards the idea of "establishing a state which is based on sharia principals", and have continued to direct their groups by their books and journals in this regard (Kılıc, 2004).

Fidan Güngör and Hüseyin Velioğlu went to Iran with the religious leader of Menzil, Mullah Mansur Güzelsoy, and conducted common negotiations with some circles.

While he was a student, Hüseyin Velioğlu (Durmaz) was of the opinion that an Islamic state could be established by means of legal party fight carried out political activities within National Union of Turkish Students, youth branch of National Salvation Party in the Raider Association and at the same time he attended religious and political

communions that were held around İkra Bookstore and in houses with his close friends Edip Gümüş, İsa Altsoy, İhsan Yeşilırmak, Süleyman Direk, Hasan Dalgıç and Burhan Başçı (Citlioglu, 2001).

Hüseyin Velioğlu who was the founder and the leader of the organization entered into Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences in 1974; however, he suspended his education for a while.

Velioğlu was a student in Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences during same period as the leader of PKK/KONGRA-GEL organization, Abdullah Öcalan and he graduated from the department of Finance Economics of the faculty in 1979- 1980.

In 1977, he published a politics themed journal in English called " Ummah" as the chief clerk and owner of the journal.

During this period, he stayed in touch with those people Ali Bilici, Ekrem Baytap, İhsan Deniz and Şefik Polat who would later on become the founders of an organization which would be established under the name of Islamic Movement Organization (Citlioglu, 2001).

In the meanwhile, he becomes a candidate for the branch presidency of Petroleum Workers Union within Turkish Petroleum Corporation. Although he does not work for this institution, he is of the opinion that he will win the election with the votes of "Nationalist Sanctity" supporters, however, the result is not as he expected. As a result of this he "immigrates!" to Diyarbakır.

Upon altering his surname " Durmaz" as "Velioğlu" as appropriate to his so called position in the community, Hüseyin Velioğlu also altered his date of birth 1952 as 1955.

It is understood from the statements of organization members that Velioğlu, born in Batman, is married and his two sons were students in a school in Tarsus with their fake identities Abdullah and Zahit during 1992-1993 school year, while his other children were educated near his family by members of the organization.

Hezbollah Science group under the leadership of Hüseyin Velioğlu has spread its organization through all Southeastern Anatolian Region by means of Selam Bookstore opened in Batman in 1988 and other bookstores opened with different names in different provinces and districts ((Kılıc, 2004).

Visiting individually all Southeastern Anatolian Region, its provinces, districts and villages; Hüseyin Velioğlu was able to gather Hezbollahi groups which were disorganized in the region under the single roof of Hezbollah-Science.

2.2.11.2.Top council

The top council is the committee coming second after leadership in hierarchy. It is created among the responsible, ranked members either from the political or the military wing of the organization to discuss the strategy of the organization in decision-making (Demirel, 2001).

2.2.11.3.City-level council

The city-level council is the local structure of the organization. The city-level council has the same hierarchical structure as the organization itself. At the local level, there are military and political wings. The military wing execute the armed operations, whereas the political wing is responsible for propaganda and new recruits in its district (Demirel, 2001).

The military wing includes up to three operation units composed of two to six members each. These units are the last units of the structural organization and have no connection with each other or any other members in terms of the secrecy policy of organization (Ozeren, 2007).

The political wing is led by a leader who is assigned by a member of the top-level council, divides itself in units depending on the numbers of the schools (middle schools, high schools, universities) and mosques they have in their responsible districts. The Turkish Hezbollah Organization strategically assumes the schools and the mosques are the targets

for propaganda and new recruits. These units have no effective role in decision-making or planning armed operations (Kilic, 2004).

2.2.11.4. Political Wing

Political wing consists of three sub-units each encompassing three or five people who conduct communiqué and invitation activities of Hezbollah and Islam case and who have received political education. This is the section that elaborates on religious theme, stirs up the sharia desires of the religionist and conservative section, protects religious customs and traditions, and conducts communiqué and invitation activities. This wing is based on mosque, school and district structuring. Manager of the political wing is Council member (Ozeren, 2007).

2.2.11.5. Military Wing

Armed unit is the unit that will actualize jihad. Military wing consists of teams which are wholly armed. It executes the action decisions which are taken by the Council. This wing is also used against all elements that will constitute a barrier for organizational activities. It is founded on the basis of action units which are established on province or district basis. Manager of the military wing is Council member ⁶²⁸. Military wing units that are structured according to the cell system are not entitled to conduct independent actions. All organization militants for whom conducting organizational political activities in public is prohibited are males, females cannot be in charge of military affairs (Ozeren, 2007). All organization militants consisting of the military wing units hail from the basis of the organization, namely from the mosque structuring. During mosque structuring, organization members about whom the seniors are notified by responsible people attain their organizational identities according to their characteristics. It is understood from the investigated case files and organization militants' statements that while some of them continue their activities within political wing, the most eminent members among them are taken into military wing activities (Kılıc, 2004). Characteristic of being political of the military unit members who take office in this organization is eliminated. They are made up of the ones whose activities within political wing are evaluated and military features come to the forefront.

It is the structuring that assumes the duties related to the activities concerning armed struggle within the hierarchy-based organic structure of the organization. Elected people should have such features as complete commitment to the organization, ability to keep secrets, ability to absorb the concept of obedience (which is a concept that requires obedience to orders without question), sportiveness, being uncommunicative and merciless. No one shall be admitted to the activities in military wing unless they have gone through the filter of the organization. People shall be subjected to some actions and instructions by means of some tests and they shall proceed with the actions in accordance with their status of success.

Unit members having being entitled within the military wing are not authorized to ask questions or make comments to their unit officer about the causes or the results of the action that they have conducted or will conduct. They only perform the order which is identified in the closed note or which is given verbally by the unit officer, and they submit their written action report concerning the action, or in cases where they do not have this opportunity, they verbally submit their action reports (Kılıc, 2004).

These unit members who, in a sense, have been isolated from all other units within the organizational structure have implemented Hüseyin Velioğlu's instructions of "Abduct, or kill" (Farac, 2001). Military wing members stay in separate organization houses, and their financial needs including house rent are met by the organization. Military wing members who are not employed in any job receive 150-200 million Turkish Liras in average from the organization for monthly expenditures. Base for living of the unit members entitled to military affairs within the organization in which uncompromising discipline is the main rule is programmed by the leader of the organization, Hüseyin Velioğlu(Kılıc, 2004).

Military affairs are among the most significant affairs of the community. They are the most powerful elements that establish the idea that Hezbollah is a power among their enemies whom they proclaim as heretics. Pursuant to the effective actions of this unit during the armed struggle, Hezbollah has ensured dominance over the region, and has become the nightmare in the region. The organization educates their militants within

military affairs in such a way that they will comprehend the significance of the action they are in and it indoctrinates the sense of responsibility before Allah to the militants.

Military affairs are delicate in the subject of context along with significance. Military affairs are completely separated from political affairs. Mistakes made in other affairs may not bear vital importance. Their results may not cause significant damages and these mistakes may be repaired. However, organizational actions shall not be evaluated in such a way. Even the least important false step will undoubtedly bring substantial damages together. If its results are not apparent at that time, they will absolutely give their fruits in future.

An action should be implemented within a certain order and schedule so as not to be idle, aimless and simple. An action without a plan, order and rule will never achieve its goals and make progress. In cases where schedule, order and rules are already obvious but not abided by, the action will not only fail to make progress but it will also regress. As a result of these reasons, community has set out some principles for military affairs. These principles represent information and experience, and moreover, it is the fundamental rule for all military wing members to conduct specific performance of these principles so as to achieve success.

Military wing members who are isolated from all parts of the social life including the political activities of the organization should regularly read books and make their interpretations. Books to be read should be especially recommended by the community and names of these books should be stated in activity reports at the end of the month.

Unit members of the military wing should perform fasting two times a week, perform prayer together with the community, read and listen some part of Quran every day. Members who are not acquainted with Quran should immediately learn Quran.

Military wing members who stay together should study lessons together every day, and during these lessons they should follow the books which are recommended by the community.

As empty, unnecessary and natter talks contain lies or betraying secrets, organization members are asked to abstain from such dialogues. The requirement that sunna of the Prophet Muhammad should be applied during the speeches and the idea that it is not possible to betray secrets while talking slowly and being uncommunicative are engrained in organization members.

Public should be kept at a distance and empty talks should be prevented. Communicate activities of the military wing members are prohibited, because these demands are the de facto communicate elements of the community.

Spouses of the military wing members should not be acquainted with themselves.

The organization conducts all its activities within a programme. An activity without a programme shall neither be executed nor actualized. Disorder and chaos may damage the organization in long term. Programme should not only be included in its own Islamic activities, but also in all other activities such as home traffic and meeting the demands of the house. As a result, all activities should be arranged and adopted according to the significance of the activity. Obliviousness, negligence and disregard are among the mistakes which will not be tolerated by the organization.

Keeping secrets is the most important part of military affairs. Each and every of organization members should perform these work for the sake of Allah and comprehend the significance of the works. Betraying a secret is not only telling what a person has done.

Therefore organization security system is applied here and measures that will prevent the disorganization are taken by the organization in advance.

2.2.12. Security Structure of the Organization

2.2.12.1. Privacy

There is not an independent revolutionary principle called privacy. Privacy is a method that shall be applied in accordance with the service of organization members to the struggle and it can be expanded or restricted according to the circumstances. What forces the organization to adopt the privacy method is the armed forces of the government which

they regard as enemy powers. Privacy results from not being able to attain power. Organizations will lift the privacy lid off when they attain the power they desire.

The fundamental condition for ensuring the security of the organization against state forces is to establish absolute and central domination over the organization to the full extend. Assurance is to perform organizational relations in accordance with the rules. The programme such as who will talk to whom, and to whom they will submit reports (action, activity, intelligence) is determined within the organization. All kinds of relations otherwise are accepted anomalous.

Illegal organization is a significant element that ensures the sustainability of terrorist activities. Disorganization is easier to occur in organizations in which privacy element is regarded, or left deficient without reaching a certain level (Dilmac, 1997).

Adnan ÖZDEMİR states that the assessment of Prof. Dr. Mahir KAYNAK “Police may perform indiscipline, soldiers may perform indiscipline; however, a terrorist can never act in an undisciplined way” means an inevitable ending for the annihilation of organizations which are undisciplined and which breach the rules (Ozdemir, 1999). Intra-organizational discipline is the basic principle for the implementation of intra-organizational rules. It means that an undisciplined behavior of the organization member will cost both himself/herself and the organization a lot. Therefore, the organization shall never make concessions to the principle of privacy and discipline.

Privacy in Hezbollah terrorist organization results from the gradation approach of the Islamic movement method. The first stage of the Islamic movement is the education of few Muslim people as a result of special efforts. Their studies during this period shall not be realized easily in order for them to be trained in the subjects of education, ethics and action and not to be subjected to oppression. It is also an advantage that enemies of Islam shall not be aware of this kind of a preparation for a long time. This results from the pressure of the regime against which there is a struggle during the period in which an experienced staff of inviters is formed. Privacy is an obligatory element for the process of forming staff. Privacy is regarded as a necessity for the process of forming staff whether there is an oppressive environment or not (Güngör, 1997). Privacy of the organization is

preserved including the period of open invitation. The tendency of the organization leader to keep the truth from his relatives, and even the tendency of the people to abstain from telling the truth to each other aim at ensuring the security of community. No one knows where others are. Fathers and their sons, husbands and their spouses shall not be aware of the other's position or what they do within the organization. Organization members have to conceal their identities from all kinds of positions (Kilic, 2004).

The main issue is privacy against the state. Privacy shall not occur in intra-organizational political issues, their propaganda for the masses, and intra-organizational ideological and political views. Privacy within Hezbollah terrorist organization which has a totalitarian structure forestalls intra-organizational individual rights and is in the condition of a pretext for avoiding audit in a sense. The organization should ensure the concept of privacy, which should be applied so as to provide continuance of it, in ensuring the privacy of communication methods and procedures, organizational archive, actions, decisions, bases and all activity fields of the organization.

The organization is entitled to audit the lives of all people who have once become a member of it. As the person joining the organization is now attains an organizational identity and therefore private life ends for him/her. The organization members who completely obey the organization are no more granted with the initiative of living as an individual during later periods, taking decisions in personal issues and directing their lives, they are forced to live within the rules identified by the community. It is understood from the documents obtained that organization members have to get the permission from the organization about marriage, military service, education, visits, job changes, opening work place, move, taking exams of an official institution, in short, all demands of people and all activities they want to carry out; and the people who act otherwise will be questioned and punished (Citlioglu, 2001).

As per the principle of privacy, single organization members who ask for marriage shall be married to people determined by the organization. Marrying to a person outside the community shall never be permitted as it may reveal the organization (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Teror Orgutu Davası)*, DGM 1998).

2.2.12.2. Privacy of the Organization and Staff

In addition to tasks and responsibilities, especially the prevailing staff is private within the organization. Privacy of the ulema results from the fact that organization leader and shura members are overshadowed by sharia law. It is believed that as everything is done for the sake of Allah, the Guide is the executive and instructor of these laws (Korani, 1992). Privacy stage does not arise only in an oppressive environment. It also results from the necessity of forming an experienced staff that is able to resist the cruel authority (power), convey its case to the aggrieved people, and represent the core of the first Islamic society. Privacy is regarded as a necessity for the process of forming staff whether there is an oppressive environment or not (Guzelsoy, 1996). Privacy does not mean the privacy of the movement. Mansur Güzelsoy asserts that abiding by the principle of privacy in community is only required for the prevailing staff and he interprets the situation as follows: “I would like to emphasize the point that while we assert it is necessary to exceed the stage of privacy and get to the open invitation stage, that should not mean the revelation of the Islamic movement’s administration. Because, the administrative mechanism assumes the role of being the movement’s mastermind. In the event that the brain is damaged, all other organs will become paralyzed” (Guzelsoy, 1996).

Within the organization, all members submit regular activity, action and account reports to their seniors regarding the students in lessons or groups or responsibilities attributed to them by the organization, and then these reports shall be conveyed to the top leader of the organization. Organization members shall not be acquainted with upper seniors of their senior, they may predict them (Kilic, 2004). The organization is organized in accordance with the compartment method just like private intelligence agencies. It is known that Iranian private intelligence agency Savama underlies the reason for the establishment of the organization on this structuring. It is understood from the organizational documents and statements of organization members that prevailing members of the organization went to Iran with Hüseyin Velioğlu between 1988-89 which is the foundation process of the organization and received the education required for the organization including organization model, community, keeping secrets within the community, obedience, bringing people, hiding themselves, tactics of security forces and military and political

education (Citlioglu, 2001). It is observed that all illegal organizations after 12 September 1980 preferred MOSSAD style structuring taking the experiences before the military intervention into consideration. Hezbollah is organized just like a bunch of grapes, and every single grape is tied to the bunch with a stem, however, these grapes are never able to reach the stem that ties the bunch to the branch, namely they can never reach the managers who tie them to seniors.

The organization will have losses no matter how perfectly the privacy is implemented. Because, privacy is for pre-military and political actions. The action is completely open itself and has the possibility of endangering. Betrayals inside the organization and coups of the security forces before and after the action should be taken into consideration. Privacy is a defense shield the risks of which shall be calculated beforehand.

2.2.12.3. Intra-Organizational Communication

The organization does not use wired or wireless tools for communication; it has established a communication network by means of courier system. Closed notes are conveyed to organization members by means of courier and the organizational communication is established in this way (Kilic, 2004).

In addition to this, the organization has not used any media organ so as to give message to its base or make propaganda. On the contrary, it has prohibited the sales of some certain media organs assuming the spokesman ship of the organization within the region so as not to reveal the organization (Cakir, 2001). The organization has developed “Report System” so as to provide the internal supervision and communication. Using mobile or fixed phones is absolutely prohibited except for the senior authorities and administrators permitted Hüseyin Velioğlu.

Organization members who wish to use such communication tools as mobile phones submit their written applications to the organization and act in accordance with the order that will be given from authorities (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Teror Orgutu Davası)*, DGM 1998). Phone calls are not wanted during organizational negotiations, members who have phones in their houses are asked to cancel their phones. It is stated

that in recent periods the organization has permitted the organization members who have to make organizational phone calls to use public phones, and make cipher conversations on internet (Kilic, 2004). However, this is an exceptional situation and its implementation shall be rarely permitted.

2.2.12.4. Written Report

The system of writing reports, which is developed so as to keep the organizational ties sound and ensure the internal audit, includes the principle of conveying all kinds of hierarchical relationship about the activities carried out, behaviors and other organization members to the leader.

Every militant within the organization submits the report he/she prepared in details to the seniors pursuant to the task attributed to him/her. Reports that are written on onion skin paper shall be conveyed to their addressees by means of camouflage. Reports that are gathered in a certain center according to their activity areas shall be conveyed to the organization's archive by means of private courier service. Each organization member shall notify the organization about demands or desires regarding personal issues with a written report. It is not possible for a militant who has once taken place within the organization and has been acquainted with some organizational secrets to leave the organization and turn back to normal life; the punishment shall absolutely be death (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

By means of these reports the organization has participated in all kinds of events within the region. It is observed that when a citizen from the region asks the community for assistance due to any subject, the organization tends to get included in the events and resolve the problems with methods peculiar to it. The tendency to become a party to the incidents has the aim of defending its own community or gaining supporters and strengthening the masses. However, when the actions and organizational solutions for the problems of the organization are examined, it is seen that Hezbollah terrorist organization which asserts that it performs armed struggle with the principle of spreading Islam brings oppressive or violence-based solutions to all problems. That, in a sense, makes it apparent that the organization takes a form of revenge in which punishment prevails.

As a result of the fact that the methods of the organization for bringing solutions to the problems include violence, the solutions are concluded in a simple and short way, aggrieved person rapidly resolves the damnification for that time; all social problems between the people in the region are submitted to the organization. It is observed that as well as the organization members who act in accordance with the organizational rules, the people who are aware of the existence and power of the community also prefer ways for bringing solutions to their problems by means of resorting to the community rather than solving the problems by resorting to the state. It is possible to give thousands of examples resembling this incident, which can be evaluated as the deficiency of security and legal system of state within the region makes it easier for the organization to gain new members during this period in which this deficiency is felt in every field(Kilic, 2004).

2.2.12.5.Request, Complaint, Problem and Suggestion Forms

These reports that are written in accordance with the words of organization members who request for something are also written on half onion skin papers. First of all, the essence, namely the summary is written in these reports, and then the explanation is asked to be stated in detail. They include requests of the organization members. These requests include organization members' requests for joining military affairs, information they have received (the information may be about Security Forces, PKK, Menzil), deficiencies they detect within the community and all kinds of news from the region as well as personal issues related to the organization members. Therefore it is an obligation to stick the documents onto half onion skin paper and classify and submit them rather than throwing them away (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Teror Orgutu Davası)*, DGM 1998).

These reports have vital importance for the organization. Every kind of information has a value and has to be submitted to the top level authorities of the organization in accordance with the rules so as to be evaluated. None of the organization members has the initiative of failing to respond to a question or delaying the respond.

2.2.12.6. Curriculum Vitae Reports

The person appointed by the organization as the mosque manager (seyda), prepares a report that includes information about the students to whom he/she teaches Quran, Islamic law, and life stories of religious men (Siyer) and who are not acquainted with the organization. This information includes name, surname, address, family, intelligence level, stance and behaviors during lessons, discipline, and the benefit of the students to the organization. These reports shall be submitted to the mosques manager, district manager and provincial manager respectively. Provincial manager evaluates these reports and then incorporates them into the ‘‘ Interest (Alaka) Group’’ so as to follow the person closely who may be regarded as candidate and evaluated within political or military wing. Mosque manager tries to politically form an organizational infrastructure from the people incorporated into the interest group within the organization structure by means of individual negotiations. Whether or not these people are experienced enough is conveyed to the senior managers by means of the interest reports (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

Pursuant to the long maturation period, any person who is invited to the organization on the date determined and certified by provincial manager shall be invited to any house deemed safe by the organization. Following religious conversations in which provincial or district manager also appears, 22th verse of the Surah Al Mujadilah and 56 of Surah Al- Ma’’idah are read for the person, and upon giving its meaning in Turkish, how Hezbollah represent themselves is explicitly declared to the person. They read the 19th verse of Surah Al Mujadilah on the grounds that their duty is to fight against Hizbushaitan. An open invitation for being a member of the organization is sent to the person. If the person responds positively, then he/she is asked to swear sharia oath without sticking to certain text, and then he/she is informed about the task, senior manager to whom he/she will account for, and the code name. Moreover, a curriculum vita of the person is submitted in his/her own handwriting (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003). As of that moment, the person is a member of the organization and attains an organizational identity.

Just as all other organization reports, Curriculum vitae reports that are obtained from the organization are also submitted to the organization's archive and transferred to computers by means of registrar's writing or scanning. The archive of the organization that was captured after the operation against the organization in Mardin in 1998, forced the organization to restructure its archiving method. For this reason, Hüseyin Velioğlu instructed the disc or CD formatted delivery of personal reports to the archive of the organization. It is observed that provincial managers have submitted the Curriculum vitae reports taken from organization members to the record-keepers in computer environment as a result of this new structuring.

It is seen that while some CV reports captured in organization's archive were archived into the computers by means of scanning, CV's of the members who have joined the organization recently are transferred to computers by writing. CV text is composed of some standard questions sent by Hüseyin Velioğlu to all regions in advance. The person has to answer these questions accurately, explicitly and in detail(*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

The general template of CV reports is as follows (Citlioglu, 2001):

- Name, Surname, Age,
- Code Name,
- Identification Details (Date and place of birth),
- Place and date of participation,
- Education. Achieved courses,
- Tribe,
- Life before joining the community, whether he/she joined other groups or not,
- If he/she left other groups, why?
- The reason and means for joining the community,
- With whom he/she studied lessons upon joining the community, mosques in which he/she carried out studies, books he/she read,

- Marital information, economic conditions of the family,
- Whether he/she has had any problems with police or military forces,
- Military affairs he/she has conducted.

2.2.12.7. Identification Tag

Identification tag reports are kept by mosque managers, craftsman managers and school managers. These reports are kept for all people receiving Islamic education within the mosques, schools and craftsman of the organization without considering whether they are members of the organization or not. Two aims are pursued while keeping identification tag reports: first one is to carry out final situation assessment by submitting a CV to the organization, following the organizational activities (military, political) of the people within the organization. Organization members about whom identification tag reports are kept shall not be aware of these reports. They are kept by senior managers as senior activities reports (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

The second aim of preparing identification tag reports is to keep reports about people whom the organization identifies as a result of the lessons it organizes, although they do not submit CV's to the organization.

Since militant is conditioned by organization, in advance, that he will be exposed to torture when he is caught, each organization militant reports to organization that he is deadly exposed to torture. With a view to assuming high level missions in organization, organization member caught by the state states in his custody report that he did not release any information concerning organization and its actions even though he was exposed to gravely tortures (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Teror Orgutu Davası)*, DGM 1998).

In the end, Turkish Hezbollah is popularly known with its torture and killings of individuals subsequent to their abduction. These are identified based on forensic investigations that most killings are conducted after torture (from the findings of the buried corps)

2.2.12.8.Intelligence Activities

Hezbollah terror organization has some dramatic features with its intelligence collection methods. It is estimated that organization has established an intelligence net that is unfamiliar to security forces. Task of everyone joining to Hezbollah is to report any kind of event. In Hezbollah terrorist organization, each organization member is an intelligence member in fact. As writing a diary, each organization member reports any event he witnesses or hears, all people he knows or meets in workplace, school, street without regarding their political views (whether they live their lives in accordance with Islam or not, they are from PKK or MIT, they are agents or police or soldiers) to organization. He/she notes his/her view yet making judgment about them is his/her seniors' responsibility. Everyone must obey this rule regardless of his/her mission, education, age or sex and must write and report information about family, job, friend and even himself/herself to organization (Kilic, 2004).

According to organization *“news should all be regarded as a detail in archive. News that is not used instantly can be used as an intelligence data in base period (long period, for development of main sources). Intelligence including collection and analysis news and information is first need and starting point for any kind of work and each step to take.”* and it archives any kind of information reported by its members since it might be of importance. Things done, things to do, things that could not be done and their reasons are conveyed to organization.

Hezbollah collects intelligence in any field but they can be classified into groups. They can be divided as intelligence information that is collected among people organization continues its establishment activities and intelligence activities collected against the state for revolution. Organization involves almost any field of social life and thanks to information gathered from public and among organization it is a kind of security organization in the region where it carries out activities. By reporting intelligence information to organization, it is envisaged that organization would strengthen organizational relations, establish a self-control system, collect all important organizational information (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Teror Orgutu Davası)*, DGM 1998).

The intelligence scope of the organization is information which it gathers inside the government. The organization accesses to this information via the civil servants who are working for the government but also proponent of the organization. Whatever position he is in every organization member, communicates any of the information or document to the organization and the organization archives them. The organization particularly gives important to the information about security forces or information gathering from these fields. The realized or foreseen activities of the soldiers, police and National Intelligence Agency(IT) on the regions, the keeper villages and the structure of the population of these villages, the number of the lodging buildings and police stations of the police and soldiers with their places and sketches, existence of the international organizations in the region (the existence of representatives of United Nation, Red Cross foreign press or tourists), the maps of stable and dynamic elements of the military units in the rural side and police in the city center, the list of the people whom the organization call informer and MIT agents should be followed and these information should be communicated to the organization.

Every organization which targets the revolution will absolutely want to capture this information which we give just few examples. However, there are some deductions that Hezbollah terrorist group use these information for different purposes. It is stated in the bill of indictment that “*when the findings in the hands of the organization are analyzed, this organization works like an organization which conducts espionage activities rather than a terrorist organization and it sells these information to country which supports such organizations, in order to use these information for its benefit by following irredentist policies for Turkey*”. Director General of Public Security Gökhan AYDINER states that information they got about Hezbollah when he was on the office of the governorship of the state of emergency of region makes them to think that “*The organization Hezbollah provides a certain country and for the return that country safeguards it*”. These deductions which were done without giving a country name may refer to an entity in Iran through the organic relation among Hezbollah considering the findings. This issue in this point became a very desperate situation on which should be cogitated deeply. In spite of all things the senior cadre of the organization trained with professional education but it does not seem like an organization which operates under the control and orientation of Iran

such as Islamic Movement and Tevhid Selam (a.k.a. Al-Quds Army). It should not be ignored that it is an independent organization in terms of its strategy and activity targets (Kilic, 2004).

2.2.12.9. Archive

Hezbollah terrorist organization attached great importance to the archives system that it created in order to preserve the structure it had and to dominate the organization. The Organization which exactly abided by all terms of the secrecy, maintained this secrecy in the archive operations, as well. Hezbollah created a big structure in terms of archive by dwelling on even the smallest detail regardless of considering the content and the importance of the reports. Although the archive of the organization is not accepted and it is subject matter of conspiracy theories; it is stated that it archived any information and while creating this archive it worked so sensible and it is a product of a genius mind which gathered all subjects together that the organization interested.

Organization member who is to work in organization archive leads a life absolutely isolated from other units of organization. Archivists are usually formed by those who have assumed significant tasks within organization; then who are wanted by the state after being uncovered and know organizational structure quite well. Archivists, whose outside connections are fully terminated, meet with their families once in almost four months – organization decides date and time—and in a safe organization house which is determined by organization. As long as they work in archive, their personal needs are met by organization through special couriers who are employed by organization (Cakir, 2001).

In archive establishment process, any kind of prepared report is collected by province head and conveyed to organization archive within the prescribed time. Archivists transfer conveyed reports to computers without losing time and prepare them to be classified. Then these reports are summarized and presented to head of organization. Head of organization usually dwells in a different organization house in a city where main archive locates. Head of organization gets informed on archive through special and ever-changing couriers (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

After reviewing reports, head of organization makes analysis on reports. Analysis by adviser is as fatwa for organization and what fatwa says absolutely ought to be done. Analysis is conveyed to its acceptors through organization courier who brought reports before. While head of organization reviews organizational documents, couriers are not permitted to go anywhere and they are stayed in a different organization house. It is quite clear that Huseyin Velioglu, head of organization, produces solutions reviewing even the tiniest detail and he does not vest initiative in nobody (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003). However, it is stated that head of organization charges province heads for analysis concerning issues which are less significant issues, as organization grows and number of conveyed reports increases, and he only reviews analysis and results he receives. Head of organization deals with only military works (kidnapping, questioning, and killing) and manages financial structure of organization (Cakir, 2001).

Up till now, four different archives of Hezbollah terrorist organization have been found. It has not been found out how much information these archives have. Its reason is that first three archives were regional ones and that head of organization Huseyin Velioglu and Cemal Tutar who was responsible for archive then tried to destroy main archive of organization during an operation by security forces against organization in Istanbul / Beykoz on 17 January 2000. Cemal Tutar stated in his testimony to trial that they destroyed 99 percent of documents which had 15 million pages, during the conflict, and number of documents in security forces was 150.000 (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003). An official declaration concerning this issue has yet to come and whether these numbers given by organization members are true or not will be found out through ongoing operations.

2.2.12.10. Organizational Conversations and Meetings

Organizational meetings are held in strict confidence. Meetings in course chains, house meetings, visits, meeting on actions (pre or post) within mosque organization are all defined as organizational meetings in mosque structures are held in certain hours when people do not come to mosque for worshipping. These are meetings held under political wing activities.

Archive and documents of organization should be destroyed. In operations by security forces against organization, head of organization Huseyin Velioglu tried to destroy computers, in which archive of organization was recorded, with a gun and he was captured dead; second head of organization Edip Gumus and archivist Cemal Tutar gave themselves in (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003). Sulhattin Uruk, who was then identified as last period head of organization, burnt archive of organization in an operation organized in Adana – Tekir Plateau and he was captured dead after hot conflict. Thus they tried to develop a strategy to cause inflict casualty to other side during bust-. Organization applied shift system in cell houses, developing it. Accordingly, armed organization members stand guard in each cell house, taking operation possibility into consideration. And consequently, first attack comes from organization members or they respond immediately when security forces launch an operation or call on them to “give in”(Kilic, 2004).

2.2.13. Actions of Organization

Terrorism agrees upon some specific issues as introducing itself nationally and internationally and attracting supporters by creating fear and terror in accordance with its final objective. It needs actions that would create chaos in society, make its name and effect known with a view to achieve its special purpose. Its method to observe tension among public is its vital point. Expectations from actions are various for terror organizations. While action is sometimes a tool it is sometimes an objective. Terrorist actions which are organized in parallel with growth net of terror organizations are defined as a “*communication strategy*” (Bal, 2003).

Action types of religious terror organizations can be grouped in 11 main headings (Kilic, 2004);

- a. Armed assault,
- b. Battery / abuse,
- c. Injury with chopper

- d. Arson
- e. Torture with nitric acid
- f. Bombing
- g. Taking hostage and questioning
- h. Choking with rope
- i. Suicide action
- j. Actions for propaganda
- k. Forestalling

As terrorist actions, TH used to hold armed assaults against mostly PKK members, other religious group members, and businessman. Kidnapping and torturing them till death are another favored actions of the TH organization. They hogtie up the victims before torturing. Some of the victims even buried up alive and left to die (Morris, 2000).

2.2.13.1.Purpose of Actions

Terrorist attacks, organized by terror organizations in parallel with their growth net, developed a “*communication strategy*”. Through these attacks, terror organizations ensure that their attacks are regarded as a communication means by huge masses they target and they improve, diversify, and reorganize action targets in accordance with their violence messages (Bal, 2003).

Provided that terrorism is not unreasonable and irrational; it has a purpose. In order to understand this purpose, one should think as a terrorist and adopt the logic behind tragic irrationality of violence action. Terrorism fact is filled with some ideas and purposes, and within this context, it should not be regarded as unreasonable and irrational. They endeavor to create impression that they are much stronger, more dramatic, and more shocking in actions organized to eliminate managerial power in target structure. Thus, choreography of each action is drafted in order to create the most advertisement effect. Choreography is not for victims but for audiences (Ergil, 1990). First purpose of actions

is propaganda. Actions which can be considered advertisement are terror organization's method to market itself.

Another purpose of terror organizations' actions is to create impression that organization which organizes such a shocking action is much stronger and more effective than it really is. Belief that if an organization looks stronger; its social roots become deeper and popularity of the action it represents is more widespread gains more importance. Thus, the more terrorists and their actions are exaggerated, the more possibilities they will have to increase their power to pressure and black mail. Terrorist organizations should pay regard to their losses in actions. Should organization lose its supporters in conflict; its vendetta would be that merciless. It is less important to take revenge for terror organizations which have more supporters. These kinds of organizations which have no difficulty to attract supporters regard their losses as war losses (Ergil, 1990). While terrorism chooses target, its reason for that action is always already determined. Revenge should be gotten in any and all field in actions which are usually a political vendetta; otherwise losses might bring into fall in popularity of the organization. Hence Hezbollah made its members believe that all murders are Islamic and they are organized for only Islam. Reason for each murder is put forward for members and such reasons are on hand for any works carried out by organization.

2.2.13.2.Setting Targets in Actions

Terrorist organizations may set a target that symbolizes a state, ethnic group, ideology, financial system, religion or idea that is contradicting with their ideals and that does not belong to them, for the purpose of attack. In fact, setting target constitutes the focal point of plans of terrorist organizations, which allocate most of their time for planning activities. Initially, evaluation of the selection of potential targets and whether they would politically serve for the case, takes place. The target should be defined and proclaimed by the terrorist group and its proponents as 'enemy'. Punishment of the 'enemy' should naturally be justified and essential, or 'profitable' when taken as hostage. As the threat risks intended against them increases and security measurements intensify, terrorist organizations are inclined to aim at soft targets that are undefended people. The increasing acts against such

people in terrorist activities are not coincidence but a maneuver. This is because terrorism can attain the political result by killing a prominent and undefended person with fewer risks than destroying a well-protected site (Ergil, 1990). The phase of setting targets in acts, which is also defined as 'Expansion Strategies', a concept developed against democracy by terrorist organizations (Bal, 2003), differs in Hezbollah terrorist organization in a variety of aspects.

It has been observed that Hezbollah primarily struggles against legal and illegal formations which it regards as rival, and have waged war against the state right after security forces' intervention against this organization. The difference of Hezbollah terrorist organization's distinctive strategy hereof is that the violence, panic and fear that this organization brings forth effect people and groups, primarily in the area confined by the organization. Therefore it attempts to keep active communiqué (armed propaganda) effective, yet restricted to give notice in certain 'confined areas'. The distinctive strategy of the organization is considered as expansion, in which the organization holds the control of activities without encountering major populations (Bal, 2003).

Key point of Hezbollah struggle is determination of the enemy and focusing the attention on it. Dismantlement of organizational circle, freedom granted to work for the Ummah and promotion of related initiatives, amassing whole energy for resistance focus of the enemy are among particularities of Hezbollah culture (Farac, 2001). With regards to target determination, Hezbollah terrorist organization can readily identify parties by using the verses of Qur'an as motto. Since Qur'an specifies profaners, factious', Jews, Christians and polytheists as enemies of Islam and Muslim community (Korani, 1992), Hezbollah promulgates all of them as enemy and target. The grudge against the enemy is the noblest aspect of battle against them. Targets set are subjected to an order of precedence in the eyes of the organization. In order to actualize the revolution, the organization aims at its targets in a manner to eliminate them one by one.

The organization adopted a profound and long-term strategy, sorting its targets incrementally and in line with its aims. It is considered that in this period the organization attempted to gain relative sympathy of security forces by waging war with PKK, appearing to stand by security forces with the purpose of keeping its identity secret (*Turkish*

Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası), DGM 2003).

This situation, which is also reflected in the criminal charge, is interpreted as that the organization did not hide its principal aim. In fact, Hezbollah conceals its principal aim as a matter of confidentiality principle and appears as a supporter of security forces; in other words engaging in political self-defensive deception. Rather than the message given, the perception of the situation by security forces is crucial in this context. It gives the impression that they are 'Muslim people who struggle to defend themselves against the pressure and violence of PKK'. Within the scope of their communication strategy, terrorist organizations take into account the response of counter parties, evaluating their success accordingly and planning future acts in line with the data acquired. Top priority target population for terrorists is definitely innocent, large masses of people (Bal, 2003).

The major power to be eliminated in the region is PKK, thus Hezbollah set initial targets of dissolving the base and narrowing down the activity area of PKK in order to become a power in the region. The Hezbollah targets against PKK were directed at personalities esteemed by PKK proponents and the leader cadre, that is to say, at the symbols. Moreover, PKK militants and sympathizers, media, distributors and their personnel advocating the Kurdish issue, party members politicizing the Kurdish issue formed the target range of Hezbollah with regards to PKK (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003). One may ask 'Why Hezbollah terrorist organization did not consider security forces as a priority target and directed at KONGRA-GEL, Menzil and other Muslim communities'. A presumption for this question would be that terrorist organizations rank security forces in the secondary plan according to their area expansion strategy. The attacks against civil society does not threat the confidentiality of the organization and while the organization holds the whole initiative about the place, person and uniform to be attacked, the situation is ambiguous for security forces, thus giving the organization the opportunity to act before the state. Nevertheless, attacks that have been carried out entirely against civilians (and terrorist activities such as assassination of Çetin Emeç, Turan Dursun, Bahriye Üçok, Uğur Mumcu, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı and attacks against civilians) naturally mobilize the security forces. Therefore, the terrorist activities don't necessarily be carried out directly against security forces of the state, in order that

security forces take certain measurements and track terrorists (Bal, 2003).

To create a liberated territory, Hezbollah's secondary target groups of attack are Hizbollahi groups and communities. The first and the foremost of these groups is Menzil and its obedient, Fecir. Intolerant of any potential rivals or alternatives, Hezbollah directed its power against these targets by 1993, in the aftermath of its battle against PKK (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullaha Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

After bringing Muslim communities to heel in East and Southeast regions as a secondary phase of action, Hezbollah immigrated to west and proceeded organization activities there with a view to eliminate their west extensions and secure obedience of their leaders. Adopting the ideal 'If you are not a part of the solution, you are a part of the problem', as well as the opinion that nobody can be innocent or impartial, and regarding that any non-proponent persons or groups would approve the established order in favor of the sovereign, Hezbollah directed its powers against the leader cadres of these groups. Cakir claimed that in this period called 'Immigration Period', Turkish Hezbollah's most critical attacks against Muslim communities and persons were abduction and murder of Islamist feminist writer Konca Kuriş and the president of Zehra Foundation İzzettin Yıldırım and 7 of his directors (Cakir, 2001).

In the west, the organization generally adopted activities called confined acts rather than open acts, including activities of abduction and interrogation secretly, thus endeavored to maintain its confidentiality. Carrying out the designated phases successfully, the organization expressed that after 1995 it set intellectuals known as Kemalist-Secular as target and was preparing for attack against these people (Demirel, 2001). Hezbollah terrorist organization did not achieved the success in the 'Immigration Period' attacks which were carried out or planned against Muslim communities, as much as it achieved in East and Southeast region. In the operations launched to rescue president and managers of Zehra Foundation, the organization leader Hüseyin Velioğlu was captured dead and the date 17 January 2000 turned out to be the death knell of Hezbollah which managed to survive in the east of Turkey.

Hezbollah terrorist organization's target groups were imams who did not allow the

organization's activities in mosques, teachers who were inhibiting their school activities, reprobate or a PKK member, establishments and owners selling alcohol in activity regions of the organization, women considered as prostitutes, people regarded as morally corrupted and agents. Abduction acts to generate income were carried out, as well (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

Until the operation against the organization which took place in İstanbul / Beykoz, no attack against the state security forces had been recognized. However, with the loss of the most prominent element of the member, the leader, the organization started off acts against the state and symbols of the state which was considered as the responsible for their loss (Demirel, 2001). Hezbollah, which traditionalized taking revenge, waged a war against the state and government officials as it sustains against PKK, transforming the situation to a 'political blood feud'. After serial operations conducted by security forces, the organization remained silent for a while, whereas it brought up its name to the agenda again on 24 January 2001 with the assassination of Diyarbakır Chief of Police A. Gaffar Okkan, in an attempt to take revenge of Hüseyin Velioğlu (Alkan, 2002).

The fact that Hezbollah directed terrorist attacks at PKK/KONGRA-GEL and Menzil group it declared as profaner and factious, and Islamic communities while merely engaging in gathering information about state security forces, Jewish targets, USA and the UK, has always been at the top of agenda. This position is interpreted as that the organization is protected by one of these powers. Yet another significant point to be taken into account is that although terrorist organizations aim at much more powerful targets, their objectives have a meaning; they use a particular strategy to achieve these objectives and this strategy contains a target schedule. What's more, if Hezbollah set the state as target instead of PKK/KONGRA-GEL and acted accordingly, the organization could have been perceived as a threat by security forces and could have lost its confinement and be brought down. Detecting this danger well, Hezbollah chose PKK/KONGRA-GEL as target.

The conflict between PKK/KONGRA-GEL and Hezbollah is regarded to aim eliminating PKK/KONGRA-GEL, but in the current situation it is observed that both of the organizations fight for possessing the base in the region by suppressing the activities of

the other. It is also observed that the violence PKK/KONGRA-GEL exerted in the region spontaneously generated the basis for the potential counter group, thus Hezbollah did not experience any problems to organize this populace. Particularly, the security problems of the region in early 1990's prompted population of the region to set up a shield to ensure their security and to participate in a preformed organization. In the period, Hezbollah provoked community members to fight against PKK/KONGRA-GEL, and engaged in efforts to protect those people and their families from any threats that may arise from outside. In this period, people of the region were torn among powers; being killed by PKK/KONGRA-GEL when they resort to state help, and being outlawed when they helped the organization due to their fear. The crisis of the period generated between security forces and PKK/KONGRA-GEL became a dread lock with inclusion of Hezbollah to the circle in the region.

In the pursuit of Hezbollah - PKK/KONGRA-GEL conflict, the organization began to exert pressure to Islamic communities of the region initially, and then nation-wide to recognize and join Hezbollah, which constituted the most dangerous dimension of the terrorism it engaged in. Hezbollah, which formed a confined area by dominating the country's eastern groups such as Fecir and Menzil, institutionalized the western Islamic communities by means of incorporating them, consequently embodying a potential man power in a short notice. Accordingly, the organization with an estimated number of 20,000 memberships (both sympathizers and militants) would fold its power and potentiate its impact area to hundred thousand or even millions. The fact that Islamic communities possess a member potential from every segment of the society suggests that the organization aims to encompass the state grassroots in a sense, and this idea should be evaluated as a conclusion of the targets set rather than an imaginative notion(Kilic, 2004).

2.2.14. Characteristics of Armed Assaults

2.2.14.1.Attack Decision

After determining the target to be attacked, Hezbollah terrorist organization decides on

the unit, the method and the time to carry out the attack. The proposal to carry out an act may be suggested by a member responsible for province or province army, as well as directly by the leader of the organization. Nevertheless, whether the proposal is given by a provincial unit, an attack is not launched by any means until the leader cadre instruct accordingly. Provincial units communicate the proposal for attack to the leader cadre of the organization through activity reports. When the leader cadre decides on an attack after evaluating reports, the decision is conveyed to interlocutor units under the title of 'resolutions (fatwa)' (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003). Random attacks and attacks in the unit's own initiative are prohibited and no random, usual or adventurous acts are carried out.

2.2.14.2.Action

The duties of organization militants who took part in the activity are as followed;

- Order of attack: The attack instruction is given by the militant responsible for province and province army.
- Target Demonstrator: The organization member who collects information, demonstrates the target during attack.
- The gunman: It is the organization member who attacks with a gun and uses the gun. More than one gunman may take place in an attack.
- Protection: He is armed. He is the organization member who protects the gunman during the attack, and assists to finalize the attack by interfering in if any fault occurs.
- The watcher: The person responsible for the group is usually assigned as the watcher. He is armed. He aims to eliminate possible interventions during the attack and to distract crowds and security forces who gather around the crime scene, paving the way for activists' escape (*Turkish Hezbollah Case (Hizbullah Terör Örgütü Davası)*, DGM 2003).

2.2.15. Financial Structure

The main financial source of Hezbollah terrorist organization is its members. The

responsibility of collecting money under the name of alms is administered by organization members under the title of alms group.

2.3. Terrorism and Fundamentalism

This section first discusses the prominent recent terrorist events that drew world's attention and lays out specific responses to those events by the respective states. Then it is followed by the terrorism definitions done by different legislations and authorities around the world. It then discusses the history and the contemporary of the terrorism as well as the causes of terrorism. Finally, it argues the fundamentalism, extremism and radicalism and Islam's approach to help better understanding of dynamics.

2.3.1. Recent Terrorist Events

Four recent terrorist events have shaped our perspective and reactions to terrorism;

September 11

Madrid train bombings

London Bombings

Mumbai attacks

The attacks on September 11 were different from previous terrorist acts as it was the first time that commercial airplanes were used as a weapon to conduct such suicide attacks. On the day four commercial airplanes were hijacked by terrorists who were members of Al-Qaeda, and a coordinated attack was conducted upon the United States. The targets of the attack were Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York and Pentagon in Washington DC. One of the planes also had an attempt to go towards Washington DC, but crashed into a rural area in Pennsylvania. All the passengers and many others lost their life in the attacks. Total of 2974 victims lost their lives together with the 19 hijackers.

The United States was quick to respond to the attacks by initiating a "War" on terrorism. This was maybe the first war to be launched against a non-state organization. Other countries responded in many different ways as well. Some reconstructed their anti-terrorism laws and updating their crisis management organizations. Al-Qaeda and Taliban

in Afghanistan was in the center of the War on Terrorism. All these events led to the military operations in Afghanistan by the United States to overthrow the Taliban from the government, ultimately to dissociate Al-Qaeda. Presence of American soldiers in Afghanistan was not the only military action taken by the United States; also Iraq was invaded in 2003.

Of course the attacks on September 11 had impacts in economic and social life as well. There were considerable losses in the stock market within couple of weeks. Also many small businesses together with American airline industry were affected heavily from the events.

Although many Muslim organization in and outside the United States condemned the attacks and started charity events to help people recover, many Muslims and middle easterners were abused or blamed because of the events. From this perspective some middle easterners and Muslims were also the victims of the attacks.

To this day War on terrorism to which The United States have been the driving force, still goes on. American forces still operate in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Since the September 11 attacks, many were subject to the negative impacts of terrorism.

On 11 March 2004, in Madrid another terrorist attack was conducted killing 191 people and wounding more than a thousand. Ten explosions happened in four trains during the rush hour on the day.

Although a direct link was not established with Al-Qaeda, according to the Spanish Judiciary the terrorists were inspired by Al-Qaeda.

One important note about the attacks may be the announcement of European Strategic Intelligence and Security Centre after the attacks which says that this is the first so called Islamic terrorist attack in the history of Europe where International so called Islamist terrorists collaborated with non-Muslims (Jenkins, 2009). This is an important remark as it highlights the ever changing dynamics of terrorism and how complicated it is in the new era.

London bombings or 7/7 bombings in 2005 is another recent event that had an impact in our perspective of terrorism. These suicide attacks were conducted by the British Muslims in the London underground and one bus nearby Tavistock square, London. In that morning there were three bombings in the London underground. These were coordinated suicide

attacks as the events took place within the same minute. Two of the bombs were in the circle line, one in the westbound around Edgware Road, and the other eastbound around Liverpool Street. The third explosion was on a train on Piccadilly Line Southbound between King's Cross St. Pancras and Russell Square.

Most of the people who heard the terrorist attacks through televisions and newspapers will remember the pictures of the double deck bus with the roof ripped off. The explosion destroyed almost half of the bus and also injured some of the people passing by.

In total 52 victims and 4 suicide attackers lost their lives in the attacks and around 700 people were injured.

All communities in UK and around the world were united in condemning the attacks. It was later revealed that Al-Qaeda was responsible for the attacks. A year after the attacks, on 6 July 2006, a video statement by one of suicide bombers Shehzad Tanweer was broadcasted. In the statement he says;

"What have you witnessed now is only the beginning of a string of attacks that will continue and become stronger until you pull your forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq. And until you stop your financial and military support to America and Israel (Svanandan, 2006)".

In his statement he defines one of the driving forces behind the attacks as the events in Afghanistan and in Iraq. These tapes were a part of the propaganda wars after the terrorist attacks.

By many these attacks have been identified as the second 9/11. London bombings have been one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in Europe's history.

More recently the attacks in Mumbai shocked everyone by its scale and the way it was conducted. The attacks were coordinated assaults on the civilians by shootings and bombings. The events started on 26 November 2008 and lasted on 29 November 2008. Total of 173 people were killed and many wounded. According to the confessions of an attacker it was announced that the attacks were carried out by Lashkar e Tobia, a terrorist organization based in Pakistan.

The attacks were conducted in different locations; at Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, the Oberoi Trident, the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower, Leopold Cafe, Cama Hospital, the Orthodox Jewish-owned Nariman House, the Metro Cinema, and a lane

behind the Times of India building and St. Xavier's College. There was also an explosion at the Mazagaon docks, in Mumbai's port area, and in a taxi at Vile Parle (Jenkins, 2009). One striking aspect of the events was the duration of the assaults and the media coverage during the events. People all around the world watched the events almost live and many blogs were opened on the internet to share information regarding the events. The information was spread quickly all around the globe.

The events had an impact globally but mostly to the Indian people and government which reacted by reorganizing its armed forces and by updating the homeland safety forces. In an international level the Pakistan and India relations were also affected by the events.

After each of these events the world came together both to condemn terrorism and to show their support to those who have suffered the consequences. All these events have shaped our understanding of terrorism in the new era. Media exposure and the high number of casualties in both of these attacks appear to be a turning point in how we look at terrorism. One critical aspect of terrorism is the spread of the ill message and generation of fear and terror in the public. Now these can be spread globally faster than any period in the history. These events showed us that terrorism in this century will use any means to be a global threat rather than a local one. Terrorist organizations and networks are now multinational and multicultural. So the counter measures should be global as well as local. Also in this century the tactics and weapons used by the terrorists are numerous. As a result all the counter measures should also be extended too many areas from social organizations to economic and military measures. To maintain a global awareness and unity to stand against terrorism, there should also be a globally agreed upon definition.

2.3.2. Definition of Terrorism

The term Terrorism is difficult to define. Although there are many different definitions in the literature there is no single, internationally agreed upon one. The disagreement on a definition or set of definitions has been an obstacle in forming an international consensus to take countermeasures.

World organizations such as the United Nations as well as academics and scholars all over the world, work on the topic, as there is urgency in defining the term if tangible solutions are to be implemented.

The United Nations has attempted to find consensus with an internationally accepted definition but it has been unsuccessful. The United Nations list four proposed definitions for terrorism in their report (United Nations, 2005). These are;

League of Nations Convention (1937):

"All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public".
This was the first attempt at consensus of an internationally agreed upon definition made by the UN.

UN Resolution language (1999):

"1.Strongly condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whosoever committed;

Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them".
(GA Res. 51/210 Measures to eliminate international terrorism)

Short legal definition proposed by A. P. Schmid to United Nations Crime Branch (1992):

Act of Terrorism = Peacetime Equivalent of War Crime

Widely proposed Definition:

"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used

to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought" (Schmid & Jongman, 1988).

In another document again published by the United Nations in 2005 the term terrorism is defined as *"Any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act (United Nations, 2005)"*.

In the same report the United Nations stresses the importance of agreeing on a definition. It is clearly stated in the report that the inability to do so hampers the strength in condemning terrorism by the United Nations.

Another indirect definition which highlights the main threat areas of terrorism is also present in the report. It says *"Terrorism is a threat to all that the United Nations stands for: respect for human rights, the rule of law, the protection of civilians, tolerance among peoples and nations, and the peaceful resolution of conflict. It is a threat that has grown more urgent in the last five years. Transnational networks of terrorist groups have global reach and make common cause to pose a universal threat. Such groups profess a desire to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and to inflict mass casualties. Even one such attack and the chain of events it might set off could change our world forever (United Nations, 2005)"*.

Two other important documents about terrorism and methods to prevent terrorism have been published by the United Nations in 2006. The first one is a report of the Secretary General titled *"Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy"*. In this report, the United Nations very clearly condemns all terrorist actions and defines one key task as reducing the appeal of terrorism among potential constituencies. To achieve this, the United Nations call upon civil society and all religious and political leaders (United Nations, 2005). It is a fact that the appeal of terrorism cannot be reduced just by constitutions and academic studies. It may still be a huge leap forward in tackling the problem but all parties and individuals in the society needs to contribute.

There is a responsibility for each individual in community as well as leaders in areas from religion to politics to act and condemn any action related to terrorism

The second document is a resolution adopted by the general assembly. This is a very important document as it presents “*The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*”. This document defines methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments. In the Annex of this document the plan of action is presented which are;

Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,

Measures to prevent and combat terrorism,

Measures to build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard,

Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism (United Nations, 2005).

This resolution is a key document in this subject as it presents tangible solutions together with the root causes of terrorism. Going through as many definitions as possible will assist in establishing a clear understanding of the term terrorism.

The term was defined by the French revolutionists as regularly applying violence to gain political aims (Atran, 2003). The dictionary definition acknowledges the political aims as well. According to The Penguin English Dictionary the term terrorism is “*policy of using violence and intimidation to obtain political demands or enforce political authority* (Garmonsway, 1979)”. Although this reference is quite old it is still relevant and valid. Of course more recent definitions cover a wider spectrum of consequences and causes as well as the ideology behind terrorism.

Moreover, Dictionary of American Criminal Justice, Criminology & Criminal Law highlights the psychological impact of terrorism in the society or in the eyes of public in

their definition. According to that dictionary terrorism is a political weapon which is generally used or applied by the weak, threatening with violence to suppress certain groups and demoralize and crash the will of the society.

Wardlaw also highlights the psychological aspect and/or impact of terrorism in his work. He describes terrorism as an instrument for psychological warfare. Of course this definition can be expanded to highlight methods of political terrorism. In a terrorist attack there are individuals or groups who are directly affected by the violence and there are those who are psychologically impacted by the act of violence. This psychological impact intimidates the people and pushes them to act in favor of their political goals. Stohl's interpretation of the 9/11 event can be used as an explanation or example of Wardlaw's definition of terrorism. He says;

“The most important thing to remember about what happened on September 11 is that as horrific as the carnage was, those victims and all that destruction were not as important to the perpetrators as the audience around the world that viewed the destruction that is, the victims of the attacks were not the targets of those who planned and carried out the acts – the targets were the rest of us. It is how we, individually and collectively, in the United States and around the world have reacted and continues to act that will determine the impact of the attacks. It is always the case that how the audience react and the political effects of the reactions and response to the acts are the core of the process of terrorism. The victims are the instrument of the terrorist (Stohl, 2003)”.

Within the same line Poland simplifies and combines different definitions. According to him terrorism is producing dread and intimidation via planned, intentional, organized slaughter, turmoil, and frightening of innocent people to attain some kinds of political ends. He simply presents two aspects of terrorism, fear and political goals.

According to Taylor terrorism is a psychological warfare method aiming to impact the political process through violent behavior (Taylor, 1988). It is important in here to highlight that Taylor distinguishes ‘Terror’ and ‘Terrorism’. Literally ‘Terror’ means very great fear (Garmonsway, 1979). To further explain the distinction between these two terms we can use some examples. Any event or crime can cause fear, anxiety and intimidation

in the people. There is an element of terror in every robbery, kidnapping, slaughter etc. but it does not necessarily mean that these crimes or actions should be assessed as terrorism. There are terms in everyday language such as 'football terror', 'traffic terror' or 'street terror'. A group of hooligans can cause great fear, anxiety and intimidation in the public, or the way a traffic accident happens may trigger same reaction from the public. These may be classified as traffic terror, street terror or football terror. It is important to realize the distinction in between terror and terrorism. In a robbery the main goal is to steal money, trade goods or gold. The way the robbery is conducted can cause terror but it does not necessarily mean that such an act should be classified as terrorism. Under these circumstances the definition made by Taylor is important as it distinguishes between acts of terror from terrorism.

Another important work in this topic is published by Howard and Sawyer. Their definition and approach is very detailed. According to them a terrorist is a violent thinker who would do anything and pursue any plan to reach his or her political goals. Their detailed definition tries to highlight the differences of terrorism from any other violent offence or crime. Howard & Sawyer define terrorism through five statements as:

Grounded absolutely in political goals and motives

Involved in violence and or intimidation

Intended to attain consequences impacting beyond the initial sufferers or targets

Directed and controlled by an organized group which has a chain of command or a cell structure

Committed by a subordinate group or an informal structure (Howard & Sawyer, 2004).

Jenkins brings another dimension to the discussion by introducing the implications of moral judgment by the use of the term Terrorism. Labeling a group as terrorist indirectly indicates the political and moral point of view that group as well, and persuades people to attach to the political and moral values of the other group. According to him this critical notion brings the high political stakes in the task of making a definition. The reason for

the phrase “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” is again the difficulty in presenting an objective definition. Jenkins tries to tackle this problem and makes an objective definition of terrorism through the quality of the acts. He says;

“Terrorism can be objectively defined by the quality of the act, but not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of their cause. All terrorist acts are crimes, and many would also be war crimes or “grave breaches” of the rules of war if we accepted the terrorists’ assertion that they wage war. All involve violence or the threat of violence, sometimes coupled with explicit demands. The violence is frequently directed against civilian targets. The purposes are political. The actions are often carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The perpetrators are usually members of an organized group. Their organizations are by necessity clandestine, but unlike other criminal, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. And finally – the hallmark of terrorism – the acts are intended to produce psychological effects beyond the immediate physical damage (Jenkins, 2003)”.

Jenkins’s description of the term is quite broad. Although it develops its arguments on the quality of acts, it highlights the motives and the goals of terrorism at the same time.

Hoffman also discussed the subject from a similar point of view. Instead of trying to make a definition straight away Hoffman starts his argument by firstly describing what terrorism is not. It is important to realize that terrorism is different from guerilla warfare. Terrorism does not operate in a military basis like guerilla warfare. Terrorism is also different from other forms of crime as it is not committed under peculiar circumstances such as stress, isolation, depression etc. Although some may think the acts of terrorists or terrorist organizations are irrational, most of the time they have a goal and those actions are planned for a period of time. For people who carry out these kinds of terrorist activities or support them, these activities should be considered as acts to claim their freedom or independence. In some other cases these acts are seen as justifiable because they are to protect lands or religions. In a sense some universal values are presented as the ultimate goal of terrorism. This brings the famous dilemma of “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. The way Hoffman approaches the dilemma is quite stimulating. He tries to take the whole discussion to another platform where the acts would be detached from

the ideology that the act is trying to promote. This will enable the clarification of the definition because the act will be discussed rather than the ideology (Hoffman, 1998).

Hoffman's approach is especially important in an era when religion and terrorism are discussed together. The detachment of these two terms is important if terrorism is to be understood more clearly. This will be discussed in detailed later in the context of this study.

Another detailed description of terrorism is made by Kegley in which he tries to update the old definitions while highlighting the differences. This description lays out the fundamentals of terrorism in the new age. According to him the new age of terrorism is;

Global, in the sense that with the death of distance borders no longer serve as barriers to terrorism

Lethal, because now terrorists have shifted their tactics from theatrical violent acts seeking to alarm for publicity to purposeful destruction of a target populated entirely by civilian noncombatants, to kill as many as possible for the purpose of undermining an enemy's entire society and culture

Novel, in the sheer size, destructiveness, and professionally coordinated planning of the September 11 attack

Waged by civilians without state sanction in ways and by means that erase the classic boundaries between terrorism and a declared war between states

Reliant on the most advanced technology of modern civilization to destroy through those sophisticated technological means the modern civilization seen as posing a threat to terrorist's sacred traditions

Orchestrated by transnational non-state organizations through global conspiratorial networks of terrorist cells located in many countries, involving unprecedented levels of communication and coordination

Pursued by fanatical extremists to annihilate through maximal bloodshed rather than to

convince or persuade, by carrying out crimes against humanity by suicidal methods that require the terrorists to sacrifice their own lives, in acts that cannot be deterred or prevented through negotiated compromise

Outside established moral and legal norms that were universally accepted and shared for centuries

Predicated on the realpolitik principle that the power to destroy is equal to the power to change and control

Driven by hatred of the target – by terrorists’ desire to make the target suffer for what the target is, what it does, and the values for which the target stands (Kegley, 2003).

One important aspect of Kegley’s work, especially in the 20th century is the underscoring of the globalism of terrorism. Kegley further discussed the four types of terrorism defined by Mickolus in 1970s. These are *international* (terrorism conducted by people controlled by a sovereign state), *transnational* (terrorism practiced by autonomous non-state actors, but not necessarily with the support of sympathetic states), *domestic* (terrorism involving the nationals of only one state) and *state terrorism* (terrorist tactics practiced by a state within its own borders, such as the genocide performed by Nazi Germany). Of course today it is almost impossible to draw such borders between terrorist acts. Almost all terrorist activities today have international consequences.

Another more up to date categorization is made by *Federal Research Division* of the *Library of Congress* in their report named “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes A Terrorist and Why?” The classification in the report is according to terrorist group’s ideology and background. According to the report terrorist activities can be classified in four groups. These groups are; nationalists – separatists, social revolutionary, religious fundamentalist and new religious. Because all terrorist groups are different in their background and ideology sometimes these classifications may not be enough to fully describe their motives. Irish Republic Army (IRA), Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna—ETA), the Palestinian terrorist groups, and The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) all have strong nationalistic goals and

motivations and all of these terrorist groups may be classified as nationalists - separatists. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) are all examples for social revolutionary terrorist groups. Al-Qaida, Hizballah (Party of God) and Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) can be given as examples to the religious fundamentalist groups as they are motivated by religious beliefs. Although Aum Shinrikyo is again motivated by religious beliefs it is classified as new religious groups. More information on each of these terrorist groups can be found in the report "The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?" prepared by *Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress* (Hudson, 1999)).

As discussed above it is very difficult to come up to an internationally agreed upon definition. But I believe it may be useful to go through some official definitions. Nikbay₂ in his work on terrorist suicide bombers, summarized definitions made by different countries. Several formal definitions of terrorism by different countries can be seen in

Table 2 (Nikbay, 2005).

Table2. Definitions of terrorism

<i>Country/Entity</i>	<i>Definition</i>
United Kingdom	Any kind of severe violent behaviors against individuals or their possessions with the intent of attaining political, spiritual, or ideological ends
Germany	The permanently performed struggle to gain political ends by means of attacks (specifically harsh attacks) on life and belongings of other people (as cited in Martin 2003).
United States	The U.S. has several official definitions of terrorism accepted by different agencies:
FBI	“Unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” 97.
State Department	Identifies terrorism for statistical analysis and policymaking intentions as “...premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” 97
Defense Department	“Terrorism is the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”

<i>Country/Entity</i>	<i>Definition</i>
U.S. Congress	<p>“[A]n activity that: involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws” of the United States or any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping” (U.S.Congress 1984).</p>

Turkey	<p>Any actions taken by the individuals or groups belong to an organization with the intention of: changing one of the basic characteristics which are addressed in the constitution and political, legal, social, secular, economic systems of the republic, separating the national wholeness of the lands and the community of the state, endangering the existence of the Turkish Republic and Government, weakening, destroying or intruding the governments’ authority, destroying basic human rights and freedoms, ruining the interior or exterior security of the government, public order or public health, by using one of the suppression, force, violence, fear, coercion, intimidation or threat methods (T.R.Congress (1991, as amended: 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010)).</p>
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T.R. Congress 2006; FBI 1996;98; Martin 2003)

As this study will focus on Turkish Hezbollah, it is important in here to highlight some definitions made by Turkish scholars which are quite similar to those reviewed above. But still the importance of these studies is the cultural insight that they may pose. There should be three aspects so that a terror crime exists according to Turkish Anti-Terror Law;

Ideological Aspect- Having an intention and purpose to destruct the unitary structure of the state and abolish the constitution.

Illegal Organizational Aspect- Consisting of an illegal organization created by at least two persons.

Operational Violence Aspect-Causing fear, deterrence and suppression.

According to Donmezer terrorism is the use of violence in an illegal manner to give rise to fear, chaos and clash between members of different races, religions, social groups and nationalities. It is not very difficult to conclude that Donmezer mainly focuses on the history, strategy and ideology of terrorism in Turkey while making his statement. His definition focuses on the acts of terrorist groups which are mainly active in Turkey (Donmezer, 1977).

Senel describes terrorism as being hostile to the political authority and being alienated from every democratic notion. This description tends to give us some insight about the organizational justification of terrorism as well (Senel, 1997).

Dilmac is another important scholar who argues that terrorism is historically and characteristically different from other crimes. He also states that terrorism can vary characteristically according to the time and environment but the systematic and mentality stays the same. According to him the most important notion that differentiates terrorism from other crimes is the ideology. In this context ideology is a must for terrorism. ideology determines the type of actions, the goals and the organization of the group (Dilmac, 1997). This does not necessarily mean that certain ideologies lead to terrorism. As discussed above the ideology and the acts should be detached if a clearer understanding of terrorism is to be established. What Dilmac tries to express in this context is that terrorism is different from other crimes as it is made in the name of some universal human values. Just like Hoffman, Dilmac also concludes that the terrorists (either as individuals, organizations or as governments) mainly try to justify their acts through human rights and

freedom. But again the real dilemma in here is they violate every notion of human rights, freedom or universal moral values to reach their goals.

Some other definitions also focus on the fear factor and the rise against the authority of the State. The definition made by the Turkish Language Society's dictionary says that, terrorism is the acts giving rise to discourage and fear. Erdogmus defines terrorism as the behavior which includes a variety of actions aiming to over throw the public order through weakening the authority of the State (Erdoğan, 1987).

It is very likely that the problems associated with coming up with an internationally agreed upon definition will go on for a long time. Many definitions are discussed and summarized in this study but it should be noted that every definition may be insufficient if analyzed alone. One other important aspect is that the definitions change quite fast and according to the background and cultures of different scholars'. The main aim of this part in summarizing and discussing as many definitions as possible was to present the full spectrum of ideas and works on the topic.

Especially after the attacks on The World Trade Centre, and the launch of War on Terror by the United States Government, this topic is discussed more publicly. It is now a global issue, which should also be resolved globally.

2.3.3. Early History of Terrorism

Looking at the history of terrorism can help in many ways. The tactics and the methods may have changed and evolved over the centuries, but the fundamentals are the same. And also it is inevitable that the methods will go on evolving.

Terrorism existed since the discovery that people may be influenced by intimidation. The first examples of terrorism date back to 66 – 70 AD. Jewish Nationalists known as the Zealots, conducted a terror campaign against the Roman rulers of the east Mediterranean (Livingstone, 1982). Zealots trained dagger men (Sicarii) to carry out their attacks. The tactics of the Sicarii were quite unorthodox as they attacked during broad daylight and preferably when crowds gathered on holidays in Jerusalem. The main focus point of their attacks was other Jewish men who collaborated with the Romans. The main aims of the Zealots were quite clear, to provoke a crisis in the society and to send the message that all Jewish men who collaborate with the Romans will be killed (Weinzierl, 2004).

Assassins in the eleventh and twelfth century, represent another example of early terrorism. Assassins were a radical Shiite Ismaili sect, who claimed to be the ones to purify Islam. Their impact at that time was insignificant, but according to Weinzierl the legends of Assassins deeply impressed contemporaries and subsequent generations (Weinzierl, 2004).

Realizing that all leaders of all world religions condemn terrorism or any act related to it, is of the most important issue while discussing religious terrorism. It is also extremely ridiculous to associate the true message of any religion with the acts of terrorism committed by groups claiming to be acting in the name of any religion.

As discussed above the roots of religious terrorism goes back to the first century. The Jewish Zeolat sect represents the first example of terrorism and religious terrorism as well. Their actions like the Assassin sect in the eleventh and twelfth century included suicide attacks.

According to Paul Wilkinson one of the most notorious examples of terror in the name of religion was the Spanish Inquisition which was established by the Pope in the 15th century. The Spanish Inquisition used torture and confiscation as weapons of terror on the people who were accused of sorcery and witchcraft. According to the estimations there were several thousand burnings at the stake and 170,000 Jewish who refused to be baptized were expelled from their land in Spain (Wilkinson, 2003).

The main turning point the history of terrorism was in the late eighteenth century. The French Revolution can be a good example of state terrorism but it cannot be compared to that of Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia.

Unlike early examples, French Revolution was not legitimized in the name of God through religion, but in the name of the people. Weinzierl states that in this concept, the motivational foundations for terrorism changed dramatically (Weinzierl, 2004). It was no longer only a religious phenomenon but a predominantly secular one as well.

Early examples of modern non-state sponsored terrorism can be seen in the late nineteenth century in Russia. The first guide for a model terrorist *Revolutionary Catechism* which would be used by the generations to come was also published in Russia by Michael Bakunin and Sergey Nechayev.

The terrorist group Narodnaya Volya or the People's Will, which was formed mainly by middle class students, started a campaign of terror in 1878 against the Russian Czarist regime which ended up with the assassination of the Czar Alexander II in 1881. This assassination only clogged the possible routes to a political solution. One result of this terror campaign was a more repressive czar (Borcke, 1982).

2.3.4. Contemporary Terrorism

It is a fact that terrorism has resurfaced in the late 20th century. Terrorist found new paths to pass their message with the advances in communication technology. A terrorist act can be heard or even viewed by millions of people in today's society. Selecting the 1972 Munich Olympic Games and the 1978 Football World Cup Tournament in Argentina as the main stage for terrorist acts was not simply a coincidence. The terrorist wanted to reach to as many audiences as possible (L. Weinberg & Davis, 1989).

This may be a cause in the resurfacing of terrorism in the late 20th century. Unfortunately terrorism is more effective today than ever before. The World Trade Centre attacks and the events in Mumbai are the latest examples. It is possible to say that the events were both covered live. The flow of information regarding the events through internet was faster compared to that of traditional media. As Wardlaw says the victims appear to be the instruments for terrorism, the main target is the rest of the people who are watching (Wardlaw, 1989). The impact or the so called success of the terrorist acts will be determined according to the reaction of the individuals (Stohl, 2003). It is not difficult to state that the mass media coverage of any event and the fast flow of information in the 20th century is a big factor in the resurfacing of terrorism. If the rest are the target as Wardlaw says, then today there is a possibility to reach billions through the advances in the communications.

Ideologically one distinct feature of contemporary terrorism is the emergence of religious or extreme right terrorism. Although religious terrorism is widely associated with the Muslim world, religious fanaticism and terrorism is not exclusive to any religion. In his work Wilkinson gives a brief history of extremism in the Christian and the Jewish world. Bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma by Christian extremists, the attempt to bomb the Dome of Rock in Jerusalem by the Jewish extremists in 1984 and the assassination of

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 are just some examples(Wilkinson, 2001). The roots of fundamentalism will be discussed in detailed in the following sections.

The main concern over contemporary terrorism is the possibility of the use of weapons of mass destruction. Biological and chemical weapons pose a threat as considerable as a nuclear one. Such an attack would be appealing to some terrorist groups as it would give a very high publicity, effectiveness and power. In combating such threats nations should work together in areas such as safety, homeland security and intelligence.

It is very difficult to guess what the future holds for terrorism. And also it is a fact that the methods and tactics of terrorist organizations to achieve their goals are evolving and using the advances in science and technology as well as communications. It is a historical fact that contemporary terrorism has been more lethal than ever before. The fear about contemporary terrorist organizations using weapons of mass destruction can be a reality. On the other hand the international bodies as well as individual states should triumph over terrorism in both short and long run to prevent the here and now effects of terrorism. Of course this is an enormous task because there exist no common understanding of ethics and history to reach a workable definition of terrorism (that states reach a consensus over it) to enforce sanctions over noncompliant actors (Ramraj, 2011).

2.3.5. The Causes of Terrorism

The title of this section is “The Causes of Terrorism” but it will help us not only to realize the causes or motives that generate terrorism but also to further discuss the definition of terrorism.

To analyze the reasons for terrorism it should be assumed that the terrorists behave rational. This assumption is only valid if it is also accepted that the terrorist organizations possess an internally consistent sets of values and regularized procedures for decision making. It is possible to say that the terrorist organizations engage in decision making calculations that can be foreseen or guessed by analysis (Kegley, 2003).

One of the most important studies in this area is made by Martha Crenshaw. In conclusion or as a summary she argues that;

“...terrorism is an attractive strategy for groups of varied ideological persuasions who challenge the state’s authority. Groups who want to dramatize a cause, demoralize the

government, gain popular support, provoke regime violence, inspire followers, or dominate a wider resistance movement, who are weak vis a vis the regime, and who are impatient to act, often find terrorism a reasonable choice. This is especially so when conditions are favorable, providing opportunities and making terrorism a convenient and economical option, with immediate and visible pay off”(Kegley, 2003).

Another important study is made by Richard Rubenstein. In his study the motives or causes that generate or end up in terrorist actions are;

“To publicize the activists’ cause, provide evidence of its supporters’ intensity, and force both enemies and potential allies to take it seriously;

To awaken the masses, who have been bribed or coerced into silence, by performing acts of “heroic”, sacrificial violence that will inspire imitation;

To expose the state, which hides behind norms of legality and democracy, as a brutal and oppressive force requiring violent opposition or overthrow?

To mobilize and activate neutrals or passive sympathizers by catching them in the “cross fire” between the state and the terrorist fighters;

To eliminate or incapacitate leaders or organizations that might otherwise be effective opponent of the terrorists’ cause and,

To make territory ungovernable or governable only at an unacceptable cost, thereby forcing the withdrawal of foreign occupiers or a change of regime”(Rubenstein, 2003).

Martha Crenshaw further goes on to discuss the causes of terrorism in a personal level. She raises some questions in her study such as, what sort of characteristics would make an individual suited for terrorism? What are the role requirements of a terrorist? Why would an individual join a terrorist organization? Why he or she would continue to be a part of that organization? And what are the internal dynamics of a terrorist group especially in terms of group interaction and bonding?(Kegley, 2003)

First of all she discusses the element of personal danger and high levels of risk. In a terrorist activity the individual is well aware of the risks and consequences of the action. Some individuals may be ignorant about the dangers associated with the activity or even may disregard the risks. According to Crenshaw the risk is tolerated because of the intensity of the commitment to the particular cause. The high level of commitment may exceed the worries associated with the risk. Again it is this intense commitment which

over shadows the rejection of the society. Also the nature of the commitment can act as a factor which cuts off an individual from the society. This kind of isolation generates a suitable environment for the enhancement of faith in the cause imperative, self-righteousness, sense of a mission and shared beliefs(Crenshaw, 1981).

Another important variable in Crenshaw's work in discussing the individual motivation and participation is the group psychology. As terrorism is a group activity it involves some intimate relationships within a small group of people. Instead of psychological predispositions the interactions within that group may be the determining element in behaviors of the individuals(Crenshaw, 1981).

A further common emotion which motivates individuals for terrorist action is vengeance. This is mostly triggered by unjust persecution or realization of past suffering(Crenshaw, 1981).

Guilt may also act as an element which leads to engaging in terrorist activities. Furthermore shared guilt may act as a bonding constituent in a terrorist group. This is most of the time a result of being morally uncomfortable(Kegley, 2003).

Martha Crenshaw's work provides an insight to why individuals engage in terrorism. Another striking suggestion about individual engagement in terrorism is made by Richard Rubenstein. In his opinion the effects of capitalism's global expansion on the mental and emotional lives of people should be analyzed to have a better understanding(Rubenstein, 2003). His suggestion may be a preliminary factor which triggers the growth of personal attributes discussed by Crenshaw. Also alienation from any democratic notion which was argued by Senel can also be considered as a path through which individuals tend to engage in terrorism(Senel, 1997).

All the factors discussed above could well be correct for not only individuals but also for small groups. As long as terrorism is an attractive way to raise attention in many levels of social life, it will encourage people to engage in it.

2.3.6. Fundamentalism

In this section, the term of fundamentalism and its interpretations in the religions, specifically in Islam will be outlined followed by the foundational information for the Turkish Hezbollah terrorist group.

Defining the term fundamentalism is a challenging task. Our perception of fundamentalism is quite diverse. Each individual has his or her view and opinion on the subject. The term seems to evolve and change continuously. It is important to state that all the images that are associated with fundamentalism pose a threat or a negative concept.

The daily usage and concept of fundamentalism in the minds of modern man is completely different. The reason for this deviation may be the events of recent times.

In his book *Beyond Left and Right*, Anthony Giddens answers the question “What is fundamentalism?” by saying “It is, so I shall argue, nothing other than tradition defended in the traditional way – but where that mode of defense has become widely called into question. The point about traditions is that you do not really have to justify them: they contain their own truth, a ritual truth, asserted as correct by the believer (Giddens, 1994).” According to him the point where fundamentalism poses a threat is its not being open to any form of dialogue or discussion. This strict attachment to tradition leads to some kind of isolation and also may lead to violence. He also states that fundamentalism arise not only from religion but also from ethnicity, family, gender etc.

As Giddens discusses fundamentalism is conceptually traditionalist in a way, but the irony is fundamentalism offers and performs new and unorthodox practices and actions in praising the good days of the past. Although fundamentalists would deny coming up with new interpretations and concepts, their actions and state of mind is novel to even their own community.

One other definition made by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby describes fundamentalism “*as a generalized tendency, a habit of mind that may inspire a variety of specific activities* (Marty & Appleby, 1984)”. For any modern man today all these specific activities are summed up and summarized as terrorist activities. Religion and/or religious thought and/or practices of religion are portrayed as the ideal basis for such a specific state of mind and specific activities leading to fundamentalism, namely religious fundamentalism. It should be stressed in here again that religion in its very basics defies and dismiss any act to spread any form of discomfort. The discomfort that is associated with the specific activities in the definition of fundamentalism may be the root cause to why fundamentalism as a term has a negative image and is closely affiliated with terrorism.

Another root cause of this resemblance with terrorism is the irrational commitment to the ideology and fanaticism of fundamentalists.

The irrationality in the commitment to the ideology and fanaticism is the base of radical and religious fundamentalism. It may be easier to try to explain the term by going through some examples of radical fundamentalism to which there are many.

2.3.6.1. Fundamentalism in Different Religions and Cultures

According to Karen Armstrong *“Fundamentalism is a global fact and has surfaced in every major faith in response to the problems of our modernity. There is fundamentalist Judaism, fundamentalist Christianity, fundamentalist Hinduism, Fundamentalist Buddhism, fundamentalist Sikhism and even fundamentalist Confucianism. This type of faith surfaced in the Christian world in the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century (Armstrong, 2001)”*. Although there are many examples from the Christian communities in the United States, examples of fundamentalism can be seen all around the Globe within different forms of faiths and ideologies.

One of the most significant examples of fundamentalism is the events that took place in 1990s. It started with the murder of a three month old infant. A secret society called the Order of the Solar Temple or simply The Solar Temple was responsible for this horrible act. Later that year suicides and mass murders took place in remote areas of Switzerland. In these mass murder / suicides total of 78 people died. Most of them were drugged and had clothes resembling rituals. Mass murders / suicides took place also in Quebec, where 5 members of the Order of the Solar Temple died in a burning house.

The main aim of the Order of the Solar Temple was to establish order in the world for the resurrection of Jesus as a solar god. This would also include unification of all the Christian churches and Islam (Premier, 1975).

Another incident which has many similarities was conducted by the cult named Peoples' Temple. It was founded by Jim Jones who preached a form of religious communalism. In his sermons he was quoting Marx and portraying Jesus as a communist. The whole ideology was to bring people to enlightenment – socialism.

With the arranged healing ceremonies the church grew fast economically as well as attracting a lot of attention. Later the church started to become more demanding, asking people to spend more time within the community rather than the blood relatives.

Peoples Temple started its big project in Guyana in 1974 namely the Peoples Temple Agricultural Project. In 1977 it had approximately 50 members. Among many the premises were known as the Jonestown. One of the main reasons for this move was the so called oppression of the United States. It was a community for many where they experienced the benefits of a socialist lifestyle. Also there were no inspections by the media or the authorities.

Because of charges and claims of former members, there were a lot of pressure on Jones and in 1977 he decided to leave the United States for Guyana. Of course he asked the followers to do the same. The population of Jonestown in 1978 was over 900.

Later that year the congressman from San Francisco, Leo Ryan travelled to Guyana to have an insight on the claims and accusations. Some of the members wanted to leave with him and on November 18, a day after the congressman's arrival. Just before the arrival of the group, security of the temple opened fire killing Leo Ryan together with three journalists and one of the ex-members who wanted to leave.

That evening Jones ordered the members to drink poison and in all 918 people died. Jim Jones also found dead from a gunshot. Till September 11, it has been the greatest single loss of American civilians in an incident (Hall, 1998).

Although all these examples can be grouped as fundamentalism in Christianity, fundamentalism has many examples which are rooted from many different cultures and religions. Some examples of fundamentalism in Islam were already underlined in the beginning of this chapter. The assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 may be an example of fundamentalism in Judaism. The assassin Yigal Amir admitted in his confession that he has performed the killing through the will of the God.

Another example of fundamentalism may be the release of the sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995. The attack was organized and implemented by a religious cult named Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth). In the attacks total of 12 died and more than 5000 people were injured.

All these examples clearly show that fundamentalism can be rooted in any culture or any religion and they have mainly two common characteristics irrespective of where they come from. First the disappointment to the negative outcomes of the modern life and second the fear that the secular establishment will wipe out religion. Hence the instinct of survival is triggered and fundamentalists see the only way out through fighting (Armstrong, 2001).

One important thing is how the perceptions change and evolve in relation to these incidents. Stereotyping members of a particular religion or a group of people is a big pitfall in responding to these incidents. It should be very clear that some people try to justify their actions through the will of God or through the very universal facts of humanity such as justice. However none of these will ever validate the actions and the consequences. An example to this may be the picture which portrays Islam as a threat to the world peace or as a threat to what the western civilization or modernity stands for. This approach towards Islam or towards Muslims can only make more damage to the dialogue which needs to be strengthened to identify and eliminate the root causes of fundamentalism and terrorism. On the other hand there are no evidences historically, theologically or scientifically to portrait Islam as a threat to peace, but only the ill actions of a minority which claim to be Muslims.

Islam is just one of the examples. Similarly we cannot hold all the Christians accountable for the perverted behaviors of the members of Ku Klux Klan who started to engage in many criminal actions including killings against black people or the members of other ethnic minorities. Another example may be the distorted actions of the members of Jewish Defense League. According to the statistics supplied by FBI, the members committed 15 attacks in the United States to protect Jews from harassment and anti-Semitism (Hoffman, 1995).

One reaction which should be inherited and accepted by all members of the public against such ill actions and attacks should be judging the situations mindfully. Stereotyping may lead to isolations of some individuals with specific religious, ethnic or cultural background from the society, making them a part of the problem rather than a part of the solution.

As highlighted from the examples of fundamentalism, it has a very large base in almost every culture and religion. There are also many other examples belonging to each period

of the history and different parts of the world. Some of the recent examples were already discussed in the Literature Review.

To be able to judge how irrelevant the actions of so called Muslim terrorists to Islam, an outline of the basic Islamic beliefs may be a guideline and helpful information. Also the term Jihad and some arguments of the extremists in reference to Qur'anic verses will be discussed in detail to have a better understanding of the situation.

2.3.6.2. Islam

Islam is one of the world's greatest religions. It is the second largest religion in the world after Christianity. The population of the Muslim world is estimated to be around 1.5 billion. Islam is a source of peace and comfort for its followers all around the world. Tolerance to differences is a fundamental value in Islam. Through centuries it has encouraged people to live side by side in peace although their differences in race and belief. Through the history of Islam it is quite obvious that it has inspired a great civilization which served to the enrichment of the whole world. The civilization presented many great artworks in almost every discipline from literature to architecture, achievements in sciences from social theories to mathematics and many more.

It is important in the context of this study to start with some very basic knowledge about Islam. The suicide attacks of September 11 have painted a picture of an enraged Islam and today unfortunately it is a challenge to wipe out this image.

Islam literally means submission. In a theological context it means submission to the will of the God. Islam is also the name of the religion which originated in the seventh century from the prophet Muhammad (570 - 672) in the Arabian Peninsula. But according to its followers who are called Muslims, Islam is not originated in the seventh century, it is as old as the history of mankind. Because Muslims believe that God has revealed to man before Prophet Muhammad. God revealed to other prophets like Adam, Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Moses, David and Jesus before Prophet Muhammad. If Islam is the obedience to God's will then there were Muslims before Prophet Muhammad.

Islam is monotheistic just like Judaism and Christianity. There are innumerable similarities between all these three Abrahamic religions. There are many figures respected and honored in all three religions. Both Jesus and Moses are regarded as prophets in Islam as

well. In all three religions God is the ultimate and only source of creation. Furthermore both Muslims and Christians believe in an eternal afterlife.

In Islam Qur'an is regarded as the Holy Scripture. Muslims believe that Qur'an is revealed to Prophet Muhammad by God, and it can never be considered as a work of Prophet Muhammad himself or any other man, it is a divine creation. It is believed that through Qur'an God is talking to humankind and there is no interference. Therefore it is the most important foundation in Islam. Muslims also believe that God revealed his message to earlier prophets, guiding them to the true path. But according to the perspective of Islam, the authentic message has been corrupted and ignored. Muslims claim that the books of Jews and Christians, the Torah and the Bible has been corrupted by human interference and changed. From the Muslim's view the only Holy Scripture that has not been changed and preserved is the holy Qur'an.

In Islam the primary source is the Qur'an and the secondary source is the sayings and the actions of Prophet Mohammad. Muslim way of life together with all the practices is learned from the example of Prophet Mohammad.

For all Muslims all over the world Prophet Muhammad is a tremendously important figure. The importance of the Prophet Muhammad is not only on a spiritual level but also on a daily basis as well. Prophet Muhammad is regarded as the perfect model for humankind through whom the Qur'an is revealed. The example of Prophet Muhammad is known as the Sunnah and it presents humankind a way through which the religion can be totally fulfilled. The life of Prophet Muhammad is called the Sunnah, which literally means the "trodden path".

In Islam there are five essential practices which are called the "Five Pillars of Islam".

They are namely shadah, salah, zakat, fasting and hajj.

Shadah which means "I testify that there is none worthy of worship except God and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of God" is a testament which is closely related with all other practices of Islamic belief. It is also a requirement to recite the Shadah to convert to Islam.

Second pillar of Islam is the Salah or the daily prayer. It must be performed five times a day. In all prayers Muslims face the Kabba in Mecca. Salah is compulsory upon every

Muslim. Through Salah Muslims express their worship to God. The call to Salah is called the Adhan.

Third Pillar of Islam is Zakat. It is the practice of spending minimum 2.5 per cent of one's wealth to help the poor and the needy. It is again compulsory for each and every Muslim who has the wealth to do so.

Fourth Pillar of Islam the fasting during the holy month of Ramadan in which the Qur'an is believed to be revealed. Muslims in this month do not eat and drink from dawn to dark as well as trying to avoid any sinful act. It is a practice to strengthen and discipline the body and the soul. It is a social practice as well as individual due to the celebrations and activities organized during the holy month.

The fifth and the final Pillar of Islam is the Hajj or the Pilgrimage to the Holy city of Mecca. There are also certain rituals to perform the Hajj. It is compulsory to every capable Muslim.

2.3.2.1.1. Jihad and Extremism in Islam

One of the most discussed terms in Islam is Jihad. Literally it means struggle, specifically it means struggle to realize God's will. The true description of jihad can be summarized as both the inner and outer struggle against the unfavorable circumstances that any individual can find him or herself in any time. Mehmet Ozalp summarizes jihad as “... *endeavor to positively influence the circumstances, which are adversely affecting the well-being of the individual and the society or overcoming the barriers that may exist in the way achieving this goal* (Ozalp, 2005) “So in a wider perspective jihad is the struggle to achieve harmony and coherence which will ultimately lead to full submission to the will of God.

Ozdemir also presents a collection of passages where jihad is described in many different contexts in Qur'an. These are listed in his work as:

Recognizing the Creator and loving Him above anything other (Qur'an, 9: 23-24)

Resisting the pressure of relatives, peers and the society to do wrong (Qur'an, 25: 52)

Staying steadfastly on the straight path of faith and equilibrium (Qur'an, 22: 78) (Qur'an, 3: 142)

Striving to do righteous deeds (Qur'an, 29: 69)

Having the courage and steadfastness to convey the message of Islam (Qur'an, 41: 33)

Defending Islam and the community (Qur'an, 22: 39-40) as well as helping allied people who may not necessarily be Muslim.

Removing treacherous people from power (Qur'an, 8: 58)

Gaining freedom to practice Islam as well as to educate and convey the message of Islam in an open and free environment (Qur'an, 2: 217)

Freeing people from tyranny and oppression (Qur'an, 4: 75)

All these definitions are extremely important as the source is Qur'an. Today the meaning of Jihad seems to be reduced to only military exertion but in fact it is a far more broad term. Prophet Muhammad have described two aspects of jihad, lesser and greater jihad. Greater jihad is the jihad of the mind and the hearth. It is the struggle to purify one's heart and mind to fully submit to the will of God. This is also the path to intellectual and spiritual enlightenment despite all the challenges both from within and outside. This is called the greater jihad as it is always valid. The lesser jihad is encouraging others to follow this path. This form of jihad consist military form of struggle as well, but it is much broader as a term. It includes social activism of each and every individual to move forward to the universal causes of Islam. It may be beneficial to express two examples in relation to the two aspects of jihad. Once Prophet Muhammad advised a man who was wishing to join the military, to start his jihad by serving his parents (Sahih Al-Bukhari). On another event Prophet Muhammad described a better form of jihad to a companion as "a word of truth in front of an oppressive ruler" (Sunan Al-Nasa'i). Today in the light of examples such as this and the meaning of jihad in its entirety, many scholars believe that the call for jihad should be the call for intellectual and spiritual enlightenment and jihad should be done with the pen rather than the sword.

Jihad must be considered in its totality, not just as the military struggle. The duty of a Muslim is not just to live in seclusion and try to gain a high spiritual post but also to promote the truth of Islam, through being examples themselves. There should a balance of both. If one lives in seclusion to gain spiritual maturity then this reduces Islam to mere mysticism.

In other words jihad is a balance of internal and external strife. Reaching spiritual perfection and helping others do so are points of consideration. Attaining internal perfection is the greater jihad; helping others attain it is the lesser jihad. When you separate one from the other, jihad is no longer jihad. Indolence is born from one and anarchy from the other

Islam is neither an aggressive religion, nor a supporter of it. Islam is not a passive religion either. Islam guides the individuals to finding a middle path between being overly submissive and aggressive. Jess Hollenback further discusses this fine line between being

passive and aggressive. His work is quite important as it develops the argument with reference to Qur'an. He argues that Qur'an does not justify aggressive warfare but only defensive warfare in conjunction with the declaration of Qur'an 2:256, which says "*There shall be no compulsion in religion: the right way is now distinct from the wrong way.*" Another important passage he cites from Qur'an is 2:190 regarding the same argument. He only cites the last sentence of the passage but it may be more beneficial to look at the whole passage for a better understanding of the argument, which says; "*You may fight in the cause of God against those who attack you, but do not aggress. God does not love the aggressors* (Hollenback, 2004)" Also it should be noted that war can only be declared by nations, not individuals. And jihad can not include any struggle for personal and nationalistic goals. If there is any injustice or any oppression, it is the job for authorities with public legitimacy to resolve the conflict, not the individuals.

Military warfare may be necessary as a last resort for self-defense. There are clear guidelines and regulations in Qur'an regarding the conduct of war. All issues such as who is to fight and who is exempt (Qur'an 48:17, 9:91), when hostiles must cease (Qur'an 2:192) and how the prisoners must be treated (Qur'an 47:4) are described in Qur'an. In any conflict peaceful options must be explored and in the event of war, any chances to bring the war to an end should be chased. This is also through the statement of Qur'an which says "But if the enemy inclines towards peace, then you must also incline towards peace" (Qur'an 8:61).

There are many examples in the history of Islam and in the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad when these guidelines and regulations were successfully applied and set a high standard. Prophet Muhammad has signed treaties with the non-Muslims and has defined the rules and regulations to make sure that Muslim and non – Muslims live together in harmony. He honored these treaties even when the terms were not really for the benefits of the Muslims at that time. His clear message was to explore the resolution of the conflicts in a peaceful manner. The Constitution of Medina which constituted a formal agreement between Prophet Muhammad and all of the significant tribes and families of Yathrib (later known as Medina), including Muslims, Jews, and pagans (Ahmad, 2003) and the treaty of Hudaibiyyah between the state of Medina and the Quraishi tribe of Mecca (Hariri, 1996) are just the two examples. Also the victory of

Mecca was a diplomatic one rather than a military, as Mecca fell to Muslims without any fights. Salahaddin in the later history of Islam set another example by honoring the right to live and pray of the Jews when Jerusalem fell to Muslims. Salahaddin permitted the Jews to resettle in Jerusalem and the Jews of Ashkelon, a large Jewish settlement, responded to his request (Rossoff, 1998). This list may be extended looking at the history of Islam.

Although Prophet Muhammad in an occasion described the Muslim as the one whom others are sure no harm will come from his hand and words, today there is a negative image of Muslims, and Islam is reconciled with violence and terrorism. One reason is taking a minority or a small group's actions as a reference to the values of Islam. Majority of the Muslim around the world in any way agree with the actions of terrorism or violence. From another perspective, the word "Muslim" and the word "terrorist" mean completely opposite things, hence a Muslim can never be a terrorist.

One of the main problems is the irrational efforts to rationalize the acts of violence through Qur'an and Sunnah. It is very clear from the history of Islam that Muslims have been tolerant to the non – Muslim minorities living under their rule. Some radicals cite the Qur'anic verse 9:5 which says; "When the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever you find them and take them and confine them and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush...". This verse is cited and used to justify the violent acts of some extremists. Of course this does not make any sense as the whole passage should be examined in context. If only a part is cropped and analyzed without the whole passage, the intent of the message may be misinterpreted. The whole Qur'anic verse 9:5 is; "When the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever you find them and take them and confine them and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush, but if they repent and perform prescribed prayers (salat) and give charitable alms (zakat) then let them go in their way, for God is the Oft – Forgiving and Most Merciful". This Chapter (Chapter 9) was revealed one year after the peaceful fall of Mecca to the Muslims. This also ended the organized aggression of Meccans towards Muslims and later the Muslims legitimately held power all over the Arab Peninsula. However there were still aggressions towards Muslims which can be classified as terrorism. These actions were carried by some who refused to accept the victory of the Muslims and acted against the treaty. The first verse

of this Chapter says “An ultimatum is herein issued from GOD and His messenger to the idol worshipers who enter into a treaty with you (Qur’an 9:1)”. This Chapter is an ultimatum to those who act against the treaty and aggressors and tells them to stop the acts of violence. The Qur’anic verse 9:4 tells Muslims to act in line with the treaty and says, “If the idol worshipers sign a peace treaty with you, and do not violate it, nor band together with others against you, you shall fulfill your treaty with them until the expiration date. GOD loves the righteous (Qur’an 9:4)”. Verse 6 tells Muslims to grant safety to those who ask for it and says; “If one of the idol worshipers sought safe passage with you, you shall grant him safe passage, so that he can hear the word of GOD, then send him back to his place of security. That is because they are people who do not know (Qur’an 9:6)”. Looking at the whole passage from verse 4 to verse 6 and considering the context in which the Chapter was revealed, it is only logical to conclude that “slaying the idolaters” mentioned in verse 5 only refers to those individuals who are carrying acts of terrorism against a peaceful Muslim society and a legitimate government (Ozalp, 2005). This verse just like some extremist claim can never be understood to justify any aggression against non – Muslims.

Mehmet Ozalp gives an example to further explore the danger of analyzing texts without conceptualizing. He quotes Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew; “Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to turn a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter in law against her mother in law. A man’s enemies will be the member of his own household (Matthew 10:34 – 36)” Of course looking at this passage it is not valid to conclude that the teachings of Jesus were violent. If considered in the context it will lead to the understanding that Jesus was talking about the unavoidable conflict between the believers (who believed in him) and the non-believers (Ozalp, 2005). Just like this example Qur’an should also be read and analyzed in context.

All in all Islam neither permits nor tolerates terrorism or any act of violence. Even in the literal meaning of Islam there are implications of peace. The word literally means submission, submission to the will of God. The word Islam comes from root word *seleme* which means peace. So a Muslim should be on a path to find peace within and peace with the social and natural environment (Ozalp, 2005). The actions of a minority in the name

of Islam can never be reference to what Islam is. Such a perception will lead to the dissolution of the required dialogue and violation to what one of the world's greatest religions is.

Chapter 3 – Methodology

Studying terrorism involves some methodological issues. Silke (2001) pointed out specific key problems while building upon Schmid and Jongman's (1988) earlier work on terrorism research. Accordingly, if the aim of research in any field is to develop from one level to the next level of understanding, namely from the exploratory level to the descriptive and explanatory levels, terrorism researches have failed to achieve such aim. In Silke's (2001) opinion, the reason for this failure is that terrorism is not a topic that is easily researched. The clandestine nature of terrorist networks makes key actors (or terrorists) hard to access, at least in a systematic manner. According to Schmid and Jongman (1988), only 24 percent of those terrorism researchers whom they surveyed indicated that they had obtained information from interviews with terrorists.

Silke (2001) attempted to make a similar analysis to that of Schmid and Jongman (1988) by reviewing scholarly articles published between 1995 and 1999 in two academic journals, *Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. His analysis revealed that only in 22 percent of articles did researchers use some type of interviewing, a result not different than that achieved by Schmid and Jongman (1988) after a decade. The proportion of structured and systematic interviews is even less. Only 1 percent of all articles used systematic interview. Further, of all the researchers interviewed, 97 percent indicated that they used opportunity (convenient) sampling. In opportunity sampling, however, the researcher has no way to know whether he or she is studying the population of interest. In other words, in most studies they reviewed, sampling bias was likely.

The quality of research is not limited to method of data collection. According to Silke (2001), only 20 percent of articles provided new knowledge over and above what was already known. Moreover, only 3 percent of the articles he reviewed used inferential statistics. Besides, terrorism researches rarely use statistics and when they do, they are five times more likely to use descriptive statistics. On the other hand, in forensic psychology and criminology, two similar areas to terrorism studies in terms of subject of interest, the use of statistics is more than 60 percent with the majority being inferential

statistics. Finally, Silke (2001) denotes that the reason for statistics being so uncommon is that terrorism researches need extensive efforts but existing studies were hardly the production of collaborative efforts.

That being said, this study was exploratory in nature because it attempted to explore the motives that may have an effect on terrorists' differential involvement in terrorist activities. As seen in the literature review section, a study with this specific focus has not been conducted yet. Most profiling studies have been conducted to find out the motives of terrorists before they were channeled into terrorism. Studies of this type, however, contributed to terrorism literature only to a certain extent in terms of understanding what makes a person a terrorist. Today, we know little about true motivations of terrorists beyond their demographic characteristics.

This study utilized terrorist autobiography as the data source. Surveying autobiographies is a well-known data collection technique in terrorism studies, but the major problem is the availability. Further details regarding how autobiographies were collected will be provided in the data collection section. Finally, this study was distinctive in the sense that it used inferential statistics in an effort to extend its findings beyond the simple description of a typical terrorist.

This study adds to the research literature base, helping the world to understand that those who are of high rank in terrorist organizations pick who goes into the military wing of the organization based on the available characteristics. In other words, research will determine if any of the variables included caused an individual to be selected for the military wing of the terrorist organization.

3.1. Research Questions and Hypotheses

This study addressed the following research questions and hypotheses;

- 1. What are the social characteristics that have impact for individuals to join the TH?**
- 2. Do any of the social characteristics have impact on joining military or political wing within the TH?**

As indicated in the Introduction Chapter, the first question identifies the social member characteristics of an individual have impact to join the TH; whereas the second one examines factors that effect on taking military position in Turkish Hezbollah. In order to answer these questions, following hypotheses were developed. To test hypotheses, bivariate correlations, cross-tabulations and logistic regression analyses were used.

- H1. The probability of involvement in military wing increases as joining age decreases.
- H2. Men are more likely to assume military positions compared to women.
- H3. Married TH members are more likely to assume non-military position.
- H4. As education level increases the probability of assuming military positions decreases.
- H5. Working TH members are more likely to assume political positions compared to non-working TH members.
- H6. Economic status of the families is not related to the position in the organization.
- H7. TH members who lost a family member or a friend to terrorism are more likely to assume military positions.
- H8. TH members who have a family member in relation with TH are more likely to assume military position.
- H9. Those TH members who join the organization for political reasons are more likely to assume non-military position as opposed to those who join the organization for personal reasons.

- H10. The way how one becomes a member of TH is not related to the position in the organization.
- H11. Whether a TH member moved from hometown is not related to the position in the organization.
- H12. Those TH members who attended mosque studies of the organization are more likely to assume non-military positions.
- H13. Having a deceased parent is not related to the position in the organization.
- H14. Those TH members who come from crowded families are more likely to assume military position.
- H15. Those TH members who have an arrest record are more likely to assume military position.
- H16. Those TH members who have a religious lifestyle are less likely to assume military position as opposed to those who have a more non-religious lifestyle.
- H17. Those TH members who have a religious family are less likely to assume military position as opposed to those who have a non-religious family.
- H18. Political affiliation of TH members is related to the position in the organization.

3.2. Conceptual Model




Figure 2: Conceptual Model for Position in the Organization (adapted from Yilmaz (2009))

Ross (1996) stated that there are different processes in a typical terrorist life such as joining a terrorist organization, involvement in terrorist activities, assuming a position in a terrorist organization and quitting terrorism (Figure 2). The literature review showed that the process of becoming a terrorist or joining a terrorist organization has been addressed many times (Berko & Erez, 2007; Florez-Morris, 2007; Hassan, 2001; C. Russell & Miller, 1977; Sageman, 2004; L Weinberg & Eubank, 1987; Wells III & Horowitz, 2007). The process of assuming a position in a terrorist organization has rarely or never been addressed before (J Victoroff, 2005).

As shown in figure, terrorists have different motives and these motives may have an influence in different processes of a life of a terrorist. In general, these motives can be divided into two categories; individual and organizational factors. Individual factors can be anything related to individual terrorists, whereas organizational factors are mostly related to the instructions and rules of an organization. Organizational factors leave no room for individuals to act freely and there is no point in studying individual factors where organizational factors are the main motives. However, there is no strict line between individual and organizational factors that may influence one's motivation. In other words, in a terrorist organization where individual terrorists have their own reason whether to join, act, and assume different positions, examining only organizational factors can be a flaw. In addition, organizational and individual factors are not mutually exclusive. Terrorist leadership generally takes individual factors into account when assigning a terrorist to a position in the organization.

In this model, terrorists are assigned into different positions in the organization. According to positions taken in TH, terrorists assume two different kinds of positions; military and non-military. Those who assume military positions spend most of their times in planning and plotting violent terrorist activities such as killings, executions, assaults, bombings, kidnappings, arsons, robberies, throwing Molotov cocktails and etc whereas non-military members never take a place in any terrorist violent activities. Instead, they engage in propagandist and administrative activities. Compare to non-military members, military members are more likely to join the organization at a younger age, not married, less

educated, have arrest histories, have non-religious lifestyles, and have their personal reasons to join the organization rather than ideological reasons.

3.3. Data

This study used a dataset that was obtained from Turkish National Police Records (TNP) upon request. Dataset ($N=521$), was drawn from terrorist autobiographies. Autobiographies that were used to construct Turkish Hezbollah dataset were written by terrorists from Turkish Hezbollah during their membership process before they were confiscated by the police in counter-terrorism operations that were conducted against terrorist cells in Istanbul in 2000. Since data involves personnel information, the cases were numbered to provide confidentiality.

Using secondary data presents many benefits for the researcher. In this research, autobiographies were filled out by real terrorists; therefore, participants come from members of terrorist organizations. Generally thought, reaching terrorists is difficult in real life and it wants extensive time and effort. Hence, using secondary data saves money, time and effort and makes easier to obtain data for the researcher.

In general, autobiographies offer valuable information about terrorists' demographics, motivations, and family backgrounds. Terrorist organizations ask their recruits to write their autobiographies as part of a membership procedure. The reason for asking autobiographies is two-fold: First, terrorist organizations want to know the motivation of the new recruits. Second, they ask new recruits to write about their references such as family members, friends, and relatives so that they can check their backgrounds and know the applicant better. Terrorists write their autobiographies in essay format. However, this does not mean that they are totally free about what to include. The fact that most of the information was common to most autobiographies indicates that terrorists write their autobiographies as a response to a standard set of questions. In this sense, autobiographies were authored in a similar format to a semi-structured interview. In this research, based on autobiographies, survey type of data was obtained. In surveys, individuals form the units of analysis; and in this study terrorists are the units of analysis.

Before entering the variables into the dataset, the researcher first determined what variables to extract from terrorist autobiographies. In general, there were two types of variables in terms of the way they were obtained. First, data relating to gender, marital status, and education status were all clearly indicated in most autobiographies.

Second, data regarding the age (*age*), economic status, lifestyle of self and lifestyle of family were not directly drawn from autobiographies, but from other variables. For instance, age was calculated by subtracting the date of birth from the date of joining. Economic status was defined based on father's occupation, occupation of self, or the property he or his family owned (such as home, car, and land ownership). In terms of lifestyle of self and family, TH members did not define themselves as coded in the dataset, but they mentioned about their lives such as the extent to which they obey to religion, whether they regularly do their prayers (five times a day), whether they avoid the sins as instructed in Quran and Hadiths of the Prophet and etc. Further details on how these variables were constructed are provided in the measurement section.

3.4. Sample

The population of interest for this research are all terrorists who have an affiliation to Turkish Hezbollah. Indeed, there are no statistics showing the actual size of Turkish Hezbollah. Still, officials from TNP intelligence estimate the number of TH as approximately 20,000. This figure reflects the number of population that are sympathetic to the ideology of the Turkish Hezbollah including family members (constitutes the bulk of the population) as well as all of the line and foot soldiers of the organization. Since terrorist organizations act clandestinely, terrorists who act on behalf of a terrorist organization can be considered a hidden population. Therefore, selection of samples was accomplished based on the information available in official records. As mentioned, this study utilized terrorist autobiographies as the source of data. These autobiographies were collected from official achieves. In TNP achieves, there were almost 5,000 autobiographies belonged to TH members, which constituted sampling frame. These autobiographies had already been entered into digital archives at the time of data collection. Individual autobiographies as the units of analyses are randomly selected out of the sample frame of all achieved autobiographies. Due to the fact that the sample frame

(5,000 autobiographies) not reflects any specific segment of the population such as all arrested, incarcerated or killed, but it does the entire organizational members, it is considered that randomly selected cases are generalizable to the overall TH

Sample size calculator was used to determine the number of cases in order to get results that reflect the target population (<http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm>). First, sample size was determined as of 536 at 95% confidence level. Second, systematic random sample was applied, which consists of picking every n th case from a list of cases. The list is not numbered in regular way in order to avoid biasing sample (United Nations Children's Fund, 1995).

The entire population was numbered. Population size (5000) was divided by sample size (536). The result was 9.3. As a result, every 9th number was selected to constitute the sample. Of 536 cases, 15 of them had missing information; therefore, 15 cases were removed. Then, the researcher had 521 autobiographies. The number of samples was high enough in a research like this where the researcher is conducting a research in an area that allows one to access research subjects with serious limitations.

Owing to random selection, this study can be considered not biased toward any of the subgroup of terrorists from TH. On the other hand, this study is still biased toward those who had written autobiographies and whose autobiographies were seized. TH members turn their autobiographies in before being admitted to the organization. TH leaders in applicants' region verify whether these applicants tell the truth and perform background checks. Aforementioned earlier, TH organization has structuring at mosque, school, and neighborhood level. By the means of this kind of structuring, TH leadership can verify applicants' background (Citlioglu, 2001). Therefore, it may be thought that applicants' autobiographies reflect the true information regarding their background. Moreover, every applicant should turn his autobiography in before being admitted to the organization and this seems a must in TH organization. However, it is also likelihood that some applicants might not have written autobiographies. Assumingly, there were more than 20,000 TH members. Yet, 5000 autobiographies were seized in Istanbul cell of TH organization. Therefore, only 5000 autobiographies were used as a sampling frame. Given the nature of terrorism studies in which researchers mostly lack the opportunity to create a sampling

frame that is representing the whole population, this limitation is tolerable. Furthermore, since a sample (not the entire sampling frame) was analyzed, sampling error can happen. In order to overcome this issue, the researcher selected cases in an unbiased way and draw a large sample for the estimates to be accurate. To avoid bias, random sampling was also used, which guarantees that all autobiographies in the target population have a chance of being analyzed (United Nations Children's Fund, 1995).

3.5. Measurements

3.5.1. Dependent Variables

POSITION

As noted earlier, research question asks what factors have an influence on taking a position TH. The dependent variable, *POSITION*, measures whether the individual terrorist operates in political or military wing. The variable is measured as a dichotomous variable ("0" indicating terrorists who operate in military wing and "1" indicating terrorists who operate in political wing). This variable is constructed based on the information regarding whether the individual reported any military activity he/she involved in his/her autobiography. Military activities are those involve any killing, assaulting, kidnapping, bombing, threatening, arson, and etc. On the other hand, political activities are non-military activities such as organizing mosque studies, taking part in propaganda groups and other organizational and administrative duties. Those who take part in political activities never engage in military activities, whereas those who take part in military activities sometimes engage in political activities such as attending mosque studies and propaganda activities.

3.5.2. Independent Variables

In general, independent variables can be categorized as information regarding demographics and personal background, families, and methods of and reasons for recruitment. Demographic variables are joining age (*AGE*), gender (*GENDER*), education level (*EDUC*), marital status (*MARITAL*), job status (*JOB*), economic status of family (*ECON*), moved from hometown (*MOVED*), lifestyle of self before joining TH (*LSTYLE*),

political origin before joining TH (*POLITIC*), whether attending mosque studies (*MOSQUE*), and having an arrest record (*ARREST*). Variables regarding families are number of siblings (*SIBLING*), having a deceased parent (*DEATHPAR*), lifestyle of family (*FSTYLE*), having a family member in relation with TH (*FRELATION*), and losing a family member or a friend to terrorism (*FLOST*). Variables regarding methods of reasons for recruitment are how becoming a member of TH (*HOWMEMBER*) and reasons for becoming a member of TH (*WHYMEMBER*).

AGE

TH members did not report their exact age when they wrote autobiographies. Instead they indicated their dates of birth and the dates of joining to TH. Joining age was calculated by subtracting date of birth from the date of joining. Joining age is measured in ratio level.

GENDER

In their autobiographies TH members clearly indicated their gender as male or female. Thus gender is measured as dichotomous variable (“0” indicating male and “1” indicating female).

EDUC

Education is measured as the highest degree obtained at the time of report. According, there are primary school graduates, middle school graduates, high school graduates, and university graduates. Those who dropped out were also measured as primary school dropout, middle school dropout, high school dropout, and university dropout. Other than graduates there are dropouts and students by the time of the autobiographies. Educational categories of students and dropouts are determined according to the latest degree they obtained. Education is measured in 4-category ordinal measure (“0” referring primary school, “1” referring middle school, “2” referring high school, and “3” referring university).

MARITAL

Members indicated their marital status in the autobiographies as married or single. Thus marital status is measured as dichotomous measure (“0” single, “1” married).

JOB

In most autobiographies, TH members clearly indicated their employment status. Job status is defined using a 3-category nominal measure (“0” working, “1” not working, and “2” students). In this study, this variable is as a categorical variable even though some researchers such as Dickerson et al (2004) and Liao (1994) treated as an ordinal measure. Despite ranking among the categories, this variable cannot be treated as an ordinal measure because the differences between the categories cannot be considered same.

ECON

This variable refers to the economic status of family. TH members did not indicate the economic status of their families as indicated in this measure. Instead, they reported their economic status (of family) as “poor”, “normal”, “good”, and “wealthy”. Accordingly, those who reported that they did not have a regular work and income and needed financial aid from others are categorized as poor; those who have a job and income, but not have any property such as car, home, and land are categorized as normal; those who reported that they have a regular job and income and also have some properties are categorized as good; those who reported that they have a regular job and income and have considerable amount of properties (more they needed) and involved in trading are categorized as wealthy. Obviously, the construction of economic status of family is weak in some respect because measurements are done on an arbitrary basis. However, terrorism researchers such as Berrebi (2004) used similar methods to determine the economic status of suicide terrorists from Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). He inferred the poverty level of PIJ terrorists from occupation, foreign travel history, car and home ownership. Thus, this variable is measured in 4-category nominal measure (“0” poor, “1” normal, and “2” good and “3” wealthy).

MOVED

This variable refers whether the family of TH member moved from their original hometown. The regarding information is mostly reported by TH members. This variable is measured as a dichotomous variable (“0” No, “1” Yes).

LSTYLE

This refers to life style prior to joining TH. The question regarding the life style of TH members is deliberately asked by TH leadership to find out how religiously they were raised and lived before they joined to TH. Since TH is religiously motivated, it has a legitimate interest in learning how religious their members are and how much they practiced the religion before TH. Accordingly, four categories of life style are determined based on how much the person practice religion and avoid sins (as defined in Quran and Hadith). Those who had a religious education local preachers, practice religion completely and have a negative attitude who do not so are defined as conservative (“0”); those who try to practice religion, but who don’t have a negative attitude against those who do not practice religion are defined as religious (“1”); those who rarely practice religion but do not care about the sins from which Muslims should avoid are defined as traditional (“2”); those who do not practice or accept religion all together, and commit sins openly are defined as opposite to religion (“3”). In fact, these categories of lifestyle are culturally constructed and reflect the general life styles of Turkish people when religion is taken reference.

POLITIC

This variable refers to political orientation of TH members. Most TH members clearly reported their political orientation prior to joining TH in their autobiographies. Accordingly, political orientations of TH members are measured in three categories; those who have a religious orientation but opposes violence as a means of religious propaganda are defined as right (“0”); those who have no political affiliation at all are defined as neutral (“1”); those who have no religious orientation and deny religion as a means of life are defined as left (“2”) (The political affiliation variable is created based on its most

generic sense in which right wing represents conservatives, religious and nationalist views whereas the left wing represent social-liberals, social-democrats. Civil-libertarians).

MOSQUE

This variable refers whether TH members had attended to religious conferences held by TH in local mosques. Mosque studies are organized as a propaganda method among the target population. Attendants of mosque studies are taught TH strategies as well as religious lessons. Therefore, these studies are mostly held in secret. Those who reported that they have not attended such studies are defined as not attended (“0”) and those who have attended as attended (“1”).

ARREST

This variable refers whether TH members have an arrest record for their illegal activities on behalf of TH. This question is clearly indicated by most TH members in their autobiographies. Those who did not report such an experience are defined as not arrested (“0”) and those who reported that they have such an experience are defined as arrested (“1”).

SIBLING

This refers to the number of siblings that TH members have. TH members mostly reported their siblings by their names and ages in their autobiographies. This variable is measured in real numbers or ratio level.

DEATHPAR

This variable refers whether TH members experienced a parental death. TH members mostly reported on this experience. Accordingly, those reported who did not have such an experience are defined as alive (“0”) and those whose one or both parents deceased are defined as deceased (“1”).

FSTYLE

This variable refers to the life style of families of TH members. This variable is measured in a similar fashion to *LSTYLE*.

FRELATION

This variable refers whether TH members have family members associated with TH before and at the time of report. Most TH members provided information about their family members' and relatives' relationship with TH. Those who reported they did not have such family members or relatives are defined as no ("0"), otherwise as yes ("1").

FLOST

This variable measures whether TH members have a personal loss from family and friends either in counter-terror operations or fight with opposite terror groups (particularly the PKK). TH members mostly report if they had such an experience. Those who did not have such an experience did not even mention about it. Assuming that the question regarding this was asked every TH members who write an autobiography, the variable was measured in two categories; those who did not report such an experience are defined no ("0"), otherwise as yes ("1").

HOWMEMBER

This variable refers to information regarding how individual TH member was recruited first. There were four categories in terms of the way TH members were recruited first into TH; friends ("0"), family members or relatives ("1"), publications ("2") and propaganda (through organizational communiqué in interactive environments) ("3").

WHYMEMBER

This variable measures why individual TH members have chosen to join in TH. This was almost common to all autobiographies. There were four reasons as to why TH members have chosen to become TH member; ideological closeness (“0”) which refers to the ideological ties to TH; sympathy (“1”) which refers to the sympathy to the organization itself and its members rather than their ideology; injustice (“2”) which refers the unjust or discriminatory practices of government officials against the people of a region where TH predominantly operates (namely southeast Turkey); personal reasons (“3”) which refers personal reasons such as family or friend association to TH.

Table 1: Variables in Datasets and Measurement Levels

Name	Label	Values	Measurement Level
Position		0 Military 1 Politic	Dichotomous
Age			Ratio
Gender		0 Male 1 Female	Dichotomous
Educ		0 Primary School 1 Middle School 2 High School 3 University	Ordinal
Marital		0 Single 1 Married	Dichotomous
Job		0 Working 1 Not working 2 Student	Nominal
Econ	Economic Status	0 Poor 1 Normal 2 Good 3 Wealthy	Nominal
Moved	Ever moved from hometown	0 No 1 Yes	Dichotomous
LStyle	Life style before joining	0 Conservative 1 Religious	Nominal

Name	Label	Values	Measurement Level
		2 Traditional 3 Opposite to religion	
Politic	Political affiliation	0 Right 1 Neutral 2 Left	Nominal
Mosque	Ever joined to mosque studies	0 No 1 Yes	Dichotomous
Arrest	Ever been arrested	0 No Arrest 1 Arrested	Dichotomous
Sibling			Ratio
Deathpar	Parents deceased	0 both alive 1 one or two deceased	Dichotomous
FStyle	Family life style	0 Conservative 1 Religious 2 Traditional 3 Opposite to religion	Nominal
FRelation	Have a family member associated to a terrorist organization	0 No 1 Yes	Dichotomous
FLost	Family member lost to terror	0 No 1 Yes	Dichotomous
Howmember	How did become member	0 Friend 1 Relatives 2 Publications 3 Propaganda	Nominal
Whymember	Why did become member	0 Ideological closeness 1 Sympathy 2 Injustice 3 Personal reasons	Nominal

3.6. Research Design

According to Smith, 2009, research design can be categorized into four groupings; 1) quantitative or qualitative, 2) experimental degree, such as experimental versus quasi-experimental, 3) hierarchical progression from exploratory to descriptive to explanatory, and 4) based on the data collection strategy, such as cross-sectional or longitudinal. In order to obtain quantitative data, terrorist autobiographies were used. In fact, these terrorist autobiographies represent qualitative part of data. This research moves the terrorism body of knowledge of Turkish Hezbollah from descriptive to the beginning levels of explanatory research. According to Silke (2001), this kind of research will be one of very few studies to move the field in that direction.

The cross sectional research design was used to identify collected data measured at a single point in time on all appropriate variables (Olsen, St. George, 2004). This design type is suitable for studies that entail collecting data on many variables. It is also appropriate for studies on large groups of subjects, from wide geographical area (Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2000). These issues made a cross sectional design suitable for this study.

Cross sectional study approach to this study helped to ensure that the appropriate information was collected and that the data analysis was correct (Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2000). Researcher with different interests and models often can work with data from a single cross sectional study, and many researchers can look at the same issue from different points of view. Additionally, the cross sectional design allow researcher to investigate relationships among numerous variables (Nachmias, & Nachmias, 2000). A well implemented multivariate analysis demonstrates the influence of many factors that are controlled in an experimental study.

This study is both descriptive and explanatory in nature. It is descriptive in the sense that it attempts to describe the factors that may have an effect on terrorists' taking part in different positions. It can also be a beginning level of explanatory research because these factors may lead to explain the reason of TH members' participation in military wing of organization. A review of literature reveals that a study with this specific focus has not

been conducted yet. This project adds to the existing knowledge base of profiles of TH members (Dogan, 2008).

3.7. Data Analysis

Step 1: Acquire the final dataset of 521 cases and text format of the sample autobiographies.

Step 2: Conduct data coding random checks to ensure accuracy in coding and data entry.

Step 3: Recode data as necessary to ensure variables are dichotomous (e.g., yes, no), or interval in preparation for logistic regression.

Step 4: Develop a conceptual model demonstrating how one is channelled into the TH and then how one assumes a position in the organization.

Step 5: Conduct bivariate analysis to determine which characteristics vary significantly between those in military and those in political wings.

Step 6: Conduct logistic regression analysis to determine that whether bivariate relationship holds in multivariate analysis and that the degree to which independent variable has a higher impact on taking a position in TH.

The statistical analysis used in this study is three-fold. First, the analysis plan will use descriptive statistics gleaned from quotations from the autobiographies for triangulation. Second, bivariate analyses will be used to test bivariate hypotheses. Bivariate testing of research hypotheses is needed because this study is a descriptive one. Hence, the relationship between the DV and the IV should be examined on a one-to-one basis before it is tested in a multivariate setting. Finally, logistic regression analysis will be used, which will develop a probability of being selected based on the known characteristics. This technique examines more than two variables simultaneously. Therefore, it will be used to refine the findings of bivariate analysis.

3.8. Multivariate Analysis: Logistic Regression

In this research for multivariate analysis, logistic regression method was used because Logistic regression is basically an extension of multiple regression in situations where the dependent variable is not continuous or quantitative variable (Mertler and Vanetta 2005, 313).” The dependent variable, namely position in the organization, measures whether the individual terrorist operates in political or military wing. Since the variable is measured as a dichotomous variable (“0” indicating terrorists who operate in military wing and “1” indicating terrorists who operate in political wing), logistic regression method will be used.

Logistic regression results are interpreted based odds ratio, or probabilities. The odds ratio in logistic regression is symbolized by $\text{Exp}(B)$. There is also alternative interpretation method through $\text{Exp}(B)$ instead of the regression coefficients. According to Mertler and Vanetta (2005, 320), $\text{Exp}(B)$ indicates “the increase (or decrease if $\text{Exp}(B)$ is less than 1) in odds of being classified in a category when the predictor variable increases by 1.” As Mertler and Vanetta (2005) stated, logistic regression determines the probability of the outcomes for each case (e.g., “pass” and “fail”). In this research, logistic regression procedure will determine the likelihood of whether a case will fall into one category (e.g., “military wing”) or the other (e.g., “political wing”). In logistic regression, the probability values range from 0 to 1, which of them are positive values.

In logistic regression, Cox and Snell R square and Nagelkerke R square measures are used, which indicate the proportion of variability in the dependent variable. Wald statistic shows the level of significance for each variable in logistic regression method. Similar to Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression method, logistic regression method has the table of coefficients for variables. These coefficients are interpreted as in the case of OLS method.

In addition, apart from multiple regression method, there is no assumption for distribution of the variables in logistic regression. Therefore, variables do not have to have normal distribution, linearity or equal variances within each group (Mertler and Vanetta 2005). In this study, logistic regression method will be performed through SPSS tool.

3.9. Reliability and Validity Issues

Measurements of variables in the datasets are not immune to reliability and validity issues, some of which have already been addressed in the sampling and measurements sections. In this section, reliability and validity issues regarding the source of data or data collection are discussed in detail. From the methodological standpoint, the survey of autobiographies is considered a valid method of data inquiry as they reflect the author's semi-official accounts of one's personal life experiences (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000). Surveying autobiographies is one of the special types of secondary data analysis. In the absence of any other means and when researchers have difficulty in accessing the population of interest, autobiographies become a valuable source of information.

Besides, a number of terrorism scholars, so far, have utilized terrorist biographies and autobiographies to describe a typical terrorist personality (Berrebi, 2004; Della Porta, 1992; Hudson & Majeska, 1999; Sageman, 2004). Some scholars used open sources such as terrorist websites or publications to have access to terrorists' biographies (Berrebi, 2004; Della Porta, 1992; Sageman, 2004). Others used official sources to obtain autobiographical information about terrorists (Hudson, 2002; Sageman, 2004). Some others interviewed friends and family members of terrorists to obtain their biographies (Hassan, 2002). That is, in terrorism studies, biographical information has been a popular means of data collection of terrorists' backgrounds due to the ease of access.

On the other hand, autobiographies are not written for the purpose of research; therefore, they may potentially have some bias and problems with reliability and validity. The major issue in using autobiography for research purposes relates to their authenticity of the information. In general, all records that are deliberately produced to deceive and that are unconsciously misinterpreted are considered inauthentic. Therefore, using autobiographies without testing their accuracy can bias the findings of any research.

Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) mention two different procedures that can be employed by researchers to ensure authenticity. Accordingly, the researcher can first critically examine the intention of the author in writing their autobiographies. Turkish Hezbollah members submit their autobiographies to their leadership to become an official member

of their respective organizations. It is not wrong to assume that terrorists are aware that leadership has the capability to verify the accuracy of the information they provide in their autobiographies. In fact, it is known that all applicants, as a rule, are subject to a background check before they are admitted into a terrorist organization. Terrorist autobiographies, in this sense, can be considered reliable sources of information.

Second, Nachmias and Nachmias (2000) continue, researchers, themselves, can verify some of the facts by cross-checking the information mentioned in autobiographies or from other sources. Such type of cross-checking was done when collecting data on a random basis where appropriate information was available. For instance, when the author reported that he has a relative affiliated to TH, this information was cross-checked from official records or the pool of autobiographies. Another type of cross-checking was done using official data, when the author reported a prior arrest history.

Chapter 4 – Analysis and Findings

This chapter presents characteristics of the sample of this research, bivariate correlation of variables, and multivariate analyses of variables. When displaying characteristics of the sample, descriptive analyses will be used. In bivariate analyses, both correlation method and cross-tabulation technique is utilized via SPSS tool. Finally, since dependent variable is dichotomous, logistic regression is performed to examine hypotheses.

4.1. Descriptive Findings

The demographic characteristics with respect to the sample population are displayed in Table 1 (N=521). According to Table 4.1, it appears that 64.5% of the TH members were juveniles and 35.5% were above 18 years old when joining the terror organization. The majority of TH members in the sample were male (94.2%) while only a few of whom were female (5.8%). Whereas almost half of TH members graduated from high school (47.2%), 27.2% of the TH members held primary school graduation. The percentage of holding university graduation was 14.4. The majority of TH members was single (75.6%); only a few of whom was married (23.6%). According to job status of TH members, Table 1 displays that half of TH members (51.6%) were working before joining terror group. On the other hand, 31.5% of the TH members did not hold job before joining terror group. Almost 17% of TH members were student prior to involving in terror group. When examined whether they moved from their hometown, Table 1 displays that the majority of TH members (64%) left their hometown while 36% of TH members did not move from their hometown.

Table 4.1. Distribution of Participant's Characteristics

	Frequency	Percent
<i>Age</i>		
Below 18	294	64.5
Above 18	227	35.5
<i>Gender</i>		
Female	30	5.8
Male	491	94.2
<i>Education</i>		
Primary School	143	27.4
Middle School	57	10.9
High School	246	47.2
University	75	14.4
<i>Marital Status</i>		
Single	394	75.6
Married	123	23.6
<i>Job Status</i>		
Working	269	51.6
Not Working	164	31.5
Student	88	16.9
<i>Moved From Hometown</i>		
Yes Moved	333	63.9
Not Moved	188	36.1
<i>Life Style of TH Members</i>		
Conservative TH Members	83	15.9
Religious TH Members	88	16.9
Traditional	239	45.9

	Frequency	Percent
Opposite to Religious or Bohemian	111	21.3
<i>Political Party Affiliation</i>		
Rightist Affiliation	204	39.2
No Affiliation	281	53.9
Leftist Affiliation	36	6.9
<i>Attending Mosque Studies</i>		
Attending	362	69.5
Not Attending	159	30.5
<i>Crime History</i>		
Arrested	207	39.7
Not Arrested	314	60.3
<i>Number of Siblings</i>		
Siblings Above 7	235	45.1
Siblings Below 7	286	54.9
<i>Parents Deceased or Alive</i>		
Parents Deceased	96	18.4
Parents Alive	425	81.6
<i>TH Members' Family Life Style</i>		
Conservative Family	25	4.8
Religious Family	57	10.9
Traditional Family	434	83.3
Opposite to Religious or Bohemian	5	1.0
<i>Loss of Friend to Terrorism</i>		
Yes	24	4.6
No	497	95.4
<i>Family Member in Relation to Terror</i>		

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	343	65.8
No	178	34.2
<i>How One Became Member</i>		
via Friends	145	27.8
via Family or Relative	116	22.3
via Publications	18	3.5
via Propaganda	242	46.4
<i>Reason to Join</i>		
Ideological Closeness	149	28.6
Sympathy	245	47.0
Injustice	16	3.1
Personal Reasons	111	21.3

When examining life styles of TH members before joining terror group, Table 1 indicates that almost half of TH members in the sample population identify themselves as traditional. Remaining members identify themselves, as conservative, religious, and bohemian or opposite to religious (15.9%, 16.9%, and 21.3%, respectively). Frequencies regarding their political party affiliation before joining terror group show that TH members in the sample population mostly state that they do not have any affiliation with any party (54% of TH members). Only a few of whom identify themselves as leftist (7% of TH members). On the other hand, 395 of TH members in the sample population name themselves as rightist.

Whether TH members attend mosque studies before joining terror group is great importance of learning their background. The majority of TH members in the sample population (69.5%) stated that they attended mosque studies prior to involving in terror group. Remaining part stated that they did not attend mosque studies (30.5%). Learning whether TH members were arrested before or had crime history before joining terror group

also can give some clues about characteristics of TH members in the sample population. Almost 40% of TH members in the sample population stated that they had crime history before joining organization. Yet, 60% of TH members stated that they did not have crime history before joining group.

As in the case of life styles of TH members, the big proportionate of TH members (83.3%) identified their families' traditional lifestyles. They identified their families' lifestyles as conservative (4.8%), religious (10.9%), and opposite to religious (1%). In their autobiographies, TH members also mentioned whether they lost a family member or friend to terrorism, and they stated that a big proportionate of TH members in the sample population (95.4%) did not lose a friend or family member to terrorism. Only a few of whom (4.6%) indicated that they lost a friend or family member to terrorism. In those autobiographies, they were also asked whether they had family member in relationship with terror organization. The majority of TH members (65.8%) stated that they had family member in relationship with the organization. Only 34.2% of TH members said they did not have any family member in relationship with the organization.

This study also examined how TH members became member of the organization. Almost half of TH members in the sample (46.4%) stated that they became member of the terror group through persuasions. They also underlined that their friends (27.8%) played an important role in recruiting themselves. Family members or relatives (22.3) also contributed to become member of terror group. Only a few of whom (3.5) was recruited through publications. They were also asked the reason to join terror group. Almost half of TH members in the sample (47%) stated that the reason to join organization was sympathy to terror group. In addition, 28.6% of TH members also underscored the ideological closeness to terror group. The percentage of TH members who joined group for personal reasons was 21.

These demographic characteristics alone can give certain clues when producing policies against fighting terrorism. Therefore, every detail about TH members' characteristics have presented above. In the further section, to examine relationship among variables, bivariate correlation, cross-tabulation and logistic regression analyses are performed. These analyses make these descriptive meaningful.

4.2. Bivariate Correlation

In order to test Hypothesis 1, 6 and 14, a bivariate correlation analyses was performed. Hypothesis 1 assumes the relationship between the probabilities of involvement in military wing and joining age assumes a negative relationship among variables. In order to examine this assumption, a bivariate correlation analysis was performed. According to bivariate correlation result, there is a significant negative correlation between involvement in military wing and joining age ($r=-0.153$, $p\leq 0.01$). That is to say, when age decreases, involvement in military wing of organization increases as well. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is supported.

Hypothesis 6 assumes that economic status of the families is not related to the position in the organization. In order to examine this assumption, a bivariate correlation analysis was performed. According to bivariate correlation result, there is no a significant correlation between involvement in military wing and economic status ($r=-0.059$, $p=178$). Hence, Hypothesis 6 is supported.

Hypothesis 14 assumes that those TH members who come from crowded families are more likely to assume military position. To test this assumption, a bivariate correlation analysis was carried out. The result of bivariate correlation analyses showed that there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the number of siblings and joining military wing of organization ($r=-0.092$, $p\leq 0.05$). Therefore, this finding lends support for hypothesis 14.

4.3. Cross-Tabulations

Cross-tabulations were conducted for hypotheses from two to eighteen (excluding hypotheses 6 and 14) to examine which factors explain why some individuals choose to join in military wing of organization. In cross-tabulation analyses in this research, the chi-square test was performed to determine the statistical significance of the effects.

Hypothesis2: Cross-tabulation result indicates that the Pearson chi-square value is 29.593 based on significance level at $p\leq 0.001$. That is, the results of the chi-square test display a statistically significant relation between involvement in military wing of organization and

gender ($p \leq 0.001$). In sum, men are more likely to involve in military wing of organization (51.1%) compared to females (0%). This finding confirms hypothesis 1.

Table 4.2. Involvement in Military wing in Relation to Gender

Position	Mean	SD	Total Involvement (%)	Gender	
				Male # (%)	Female # (%)
Military Wing	1.57	1.56	(48.20)	251(51.1)	0(0)
Non Military Wing	2.05	1.74	(51.80)	240(88.90)	30(11.10)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 3: Married TH members are more likely to assume non-military position.

Cross-tabulation result shows that the Pearson chi-square value is 27.221 based on significance level ($p \leq 0.001$). That is to say, the chi-square test results indicate a statistically significant relation between involvement in military wing of organization and marital status ($p \leq 0.001$). Consequently, married TH members are more likely to involve in non-military wing of organization (17.2%) compared to single members (34.6%). This finding lends support for hypothesis 3.

Table 4.3. Involvement in Military wing in Relation to Marital Status

Marital Status	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Single	(34.6)	(41.60)	215(54.6)	179(45)
Married	(17.2)	(6.6)	34(27.60)	89(72.4)

Hypothesis 4: As education level increases the probability of assuming military positions decreases. The most striking difference appears at university level. University graduates are less likely to involve in military wing of organization (51.1%). compared to primary, middle and high school graduates. This hypothesis is only acceptable for university

graduates and there is no indicator that as education level increases the probability of assuming military positions decreases. In order to test this assumption, a correlation analysis was also performed, which showed no statistically significant relationship among variables ($r=-0.044$, $p=.318$). Therefore, hypothesis 4 was rejected.

Table 4.4 Involvement in Military wing in Relation to Education

Education	Total (%)	Position	
		Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Primary School	(27.40)	67(46.9)	76(53)
Middle School	(10.9)	31(54.40)	26(45.6)
High School	(47.20)	129(52.4)	117(47)
University	(14.40)	24(32.0)	51(68)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 5: Working TH members are more likely to assume political positions compared to non-working TH members.

Cross-tabulation result indicates that the Pearson chi-square value is 13.031 based on significance level at $p \leq 0.001$. That is, the results of the chi-square test display a statistically significant relation among variables ($p \leq 0.001$). As a result, working TH members are more likely to assume political positions (29.2%) compared to not-working members (12.7%). This finding confirms hypothesis.

Table 4.5 Involvement in Military wing in Relation to job Status

Job Status	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Working	(29.2)	(22.50)	117(43.5)	152(56)
Not-working	(12.7)	(18.8)	98(59.80)	66(40.2)
Student	(10.0)	(6.90)	36(40.9)	52 (59)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 7: TH members who lost a family member or a friend to terrorism are more likely to assume military positions.

Cross-tabulation result indicates that TH members who lost a family member or a friend to terrorism are more likely to assume military positions (54.2%) instead of non-military positions (45%). This finding confirms hypothesis 7.

Table 4.6. Involvement in Military wing in Relation to Loss a Friend to Terrorism

Loss a Friend	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Yes	(2.1)	(2.50)	13(54.2)	11(45)
No	(49.7)	(45.70)	238(48)	259(52)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 8: TH members who have a family member in relation with TH are more likely to assume military position.

Cross-tabulation result displays that TH members who have a family member in relation with TH are more likely to assume military position (33.6%) compared to members who

did not have a family member in relation with TH (14.6%). This finding lends support for hypothesis 8.

Table 4.7. Involvement in Military wing in Relation to Having a Family Member in TH

Having Family Member in TH	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Yes	(32.2)	(33.60)	175(51.0)	168(49)
No	(19.6)	(14.60)	76(43)	102(57)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 9: Those TH members who join the organization for political reasons are more likely to assume non-military position as opposed to those who join the organization for personal reasons.

Cross-tabulation result shows that TH members who join the organization for political reasons are more likely to assume non-military position (17.2%) as opposed to those who join the organization for personal reasons (10.4%). This finding confirms hypothesis 9. When separately examined, it was seen that big proportionate of TH members who joined organization for ideological reasons chose to involve in nonmilitary wing of organization (60%). On the other hand, TH members who joined organization for ideological reasons mostly joined military wing of organization (51%).

Table 4.8. Involvement in Military wing in Relation to Reason to Join TH

Reason to join Organization	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Ideological	(17.1)	(11.50)	60(40)	89 (60)
Sympathy	(23.2)	(23.80)	124(51)	121(49)
Injustice	(1.2)	(1.90)	10(62.5)	6(37.5)
Personal	(10.4)	(10.90)	57(51)	54(49)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 10: The way how one becomes a member of TH is not related to the position in the organization.

Cross-tabulation result displays that there is no relationship between the way how one becomes a member of TH and position in the organization. For example, when friends' row examined in Table 9, it is seen that there is no difference when choosing political wing (15%) or military wing (13%). This estimation is also confirmed in examining family, publications and propaganda. Therefore, Hypothesis 10 is supported.

Table 4.9. Involvement in Military wing in Relation to How One became a member

How One Became Member	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Friends	(15.0)	(13.0)	67(46)	78(54)
Family or Relative	(10.9)	(11.3)	59(51)	57(49)
Publications	(1.5)	(1.90)	10(55.5)	8(44.5)
Propaganda	(24.4)	(22.1)	115(47.5)	127(52.5)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 11: Whether a TH member moved from hometown is not related to the position in the organization. Cross-tabulation result shows that TH members who moved from hometown are more likely to assume non-military position (34.4%) as opposed to those who did not move from hometown (17.5%). That is to say, whether a TH member moved from hometown is related to the position in the organization. This finding rejects hypothesis 11.

Table 4.10. Involvement in Position in Relation to Moving from Hometown

Moved from Hometown	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Yes	(34.4)	(29.6)	154(46)	179(54)
No	(17.5)	(18.6)	251(48)	270(52)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 12: Those TH members who attended mosque studies of the organization are more likely to assume non-military positions. To examine this assumption, a cross-tabulation analysis was carried out through SPSS tool.

Cross-tabulation result indicates that the Pearson chi-square value is 16.602 based on significance level at $p \leq 0.001$. That is, the results of the chi-square test display that a statistically significant relation among variables exists ($p \leq 0.001$). According to cross-tabulation result, TH members who attended mosque studies of the organization are more likely to assume non-military position (40.1%) compared to those who did not attend mosque studies (11.7%). This finding gives support to hypothesis 12.

Table 4.11. Involvement in Military wing in Relation to Attending Mosque Studies

Attending Mosque Studies	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Yes	(40.1)	(29.4)	153(42)	209(58)
No	(11.7)	(18.8)	98(62)	61(38)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 13: Having a deceased parent is not related to the position in the organization. To test this assumption, a cross-tabulation analysis with chi-square value

was performed.

Cross-tabulation result indicates that the Pearson chi-square value is 0.029 based on significance level at $p=0.865$. That is, the results of the chi-square test display that there is no a statistically significant relationship among variables ($p=0.865$). According to cross-tabulation result, having a deceased parent is not related to the position in the organization. For example, while the percentage of TH members who had a deceased parent and joined non-military wing was 9.4%, the percentage of those who had a deceased parent and joined military wing was 9%. This finding gives support to hypothesis 13.

Table 4.12. Involvement in Military or non-military wing in Relation to Deceased Parents

Deceased Parents	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Yes	(9.4)	(9.0)	47(49)	49(51)
No	(42.4)	(39.2)	204(48)	221(52)

Hypothesis 15: Those TH members who have an arrest record are more likely to assume military position.

Cross-tabulation result indicates that the Pearson chi-square value is 84.407 based on significance level at $p=0.000$. That is, the results of the chi-square test display that there is a statistically significant relationship among variables ($p=0.000$). According to cross-tabulation result, TH members who have an arrest record (29%) are more likely to hold military position compared to those who did not have an arrest record (19%). This finding gives support for hypothesis 15.

Table 4.13. Involvement in Military wing in Relation to Arrest Record

Arrest Record	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Yes	(10.7)	(29.0)	151(73)	56(27)
No	(41.1)	(19.2)	100(32)	214(68)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 16: Those TH members who have a religious lifestyle are less likely to hold military position as opposed to those who have a more non-religious lifestyle.

Cross-tabulation result indicates that the Pearson chi-square value is 24.394 based on significance level at $p=0.000$. That is, the results of the chi-square test display that there is a statistically significant relationship among variables ($p=0.000$). According to cross-tabulation result, Those TH members who have a religious lifestyle (4.6%) are less likely to assume military position as opposed to those who have a more non-religious lifestyle (13.2%). This finding gives support for hypothesis 16.

Table 4.14. Involvement in Military wing in Relation to Religious Life Style

Religious Life Style	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Conservative	(8.4)	(7.5)	39(47)	44(53)
Religious	(12.3)	(4.6)	24(27)	64(73)
Traditional	(23.0)	(22.8)	119(50)	120(50)
Opposite to Religious	(8.1)	(13.2)	69(62)	42(38)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 17: Those TH members who have a religious family are less likely to assume military position as opposed to those who have a non-religious family. To examine this hypothesis, a cross-tabulation method was performed via SPSS tool.

Cross-tabulation result indicates that the Pearson chi-square value is 7.303 based on significance level at $p=0.063$. That is, the results of the chi-square test display that there is no a statistically significant relationship among variables ($p=0.063$). Therefore, hypothesis 17 is rejected.

Table 4.15. Involvement in Military wing in Relation to Family Religious Life Style

Family Religious Life Style	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Conservative	(2.3)	(2.5)	13(52)	12(48)
Religious	(7.5)	(3.5)	18(32)	39(68)
Traditional	(41.5)	(41.8)	218(50)	216(50)
Opposite to Religious	(0.6)	(0.4)	2(40)	3(60)

Notes: Percentages are in parentheses

Hypothesis 18: Political affiliation of TH members is related to the position in the organization. In order examine this hypothesis, a cross-tabulation analysis was performed.

When examining TH members who had left political party affiliation, it is seen that those members are mostly like to join non-military wing of organization (4.2%). Similarly, those members who had rightist views join non-military wing of organizations (22.5%). Interestingly, those members who did not have political party affiliation are more likely to join military wing of organization. This finding shows that those members who had political views rightist or leftist mostly prefer join political wing of organizations. On the other hand, those members with no political party affiliation prefer joining military wing of organization. Therefore, it can be argued that political affiliation of TH members is related to the position in the organization, which lends support for hypothesis 18.

Table 4.16. Involvement in Military or non-military wing in Relation to Political Affiliation

Political Party Affiliation	Total Involvement-Non-Military (%)	Total Involvement-Military (%)	Position	
			Military # (%)	Non Military # (%)
Right	(22.5)	(16.7)	87(43)	117(57)
No Affiliation	(25.1)	(28.8)	150(53)	131(47)
Left	(4.2)	(2.7)	14(39)	22(61)

4.4. Logistic Regression Analyses

The findings obtained from logistic regression analyses are presented in Table 4.17. Logistic regression analyses were employed in order to examine which factors affect TH's members in choosing military or nonmilitary position in organization. Logistic regression method is useful when estimating one independent variable's effect on the dependent variable, controlling the effects of the other variables. Before performing logistic regression method, outlier assumptions of logistic regression were tested. Since there was only one model in logistic regression model for this study, all variables were entered to the analyses simultaneously (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005).

The assumption for the outliers was controlled by examining the studentized residuals, which help us to determine outliers in a dataset (Cook & Weisberg, 1982). The criteria of studentized residuals are based on if a case has a studentized residual larger than 2.0 or smaller than -2. Based on this criteria, seven outliers were determined, seven of which were greater than 2.0. When these seven outliers were included in the analyses, the overall predictive accuracy rate was 74.3%. In order to see whether outliers affect the accuracy

rate of our analyses, logic regression model was reanalyzed by excluding the outliers. The predictive accuracy rate for the revised model was 75.5%. Since there was no difference over 2% in the predictive accuracy rate, the first model (with outliers) was employed in this research (Schwab, 2002).

Logistic regression model shows the regression coefficients (B), odds ratio [Exp(B)] and significance level. In this study, the probability of the model chi-square (192.269) was $p < 0.001$, less than or equal to the level of significance of 0.05. The null hypothesis that there is no difference between the model with only a constant and the model with independent variables was rejected. The relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable was confirmed and supported. That is, the overall model is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 192.269$, $p \leq 0.001$). The logistic regression model accounted for the variance in TH membership in a certain type of group (military or nonmilitary) up to 31.1% (Cox & Snell R Square) and 41% (Nagelkerke R Square).

The logistic regression table displays that eight variables turned out to be statistically significant: age, marital status, economic status, moved from hometown, lifestyle of members before organization, political affiliation of members, mosque studies, and crime history. These variables appear as statistically significant predictors of a TH member choosing military wing of organization ($p \leq 0.001$, $p \leq 0.05$, $p \leq 0.05$, $p \leq 0.05$, $p \leq 0.05$, $p \leq 0.05$, $p \leq 0.001$ and $p \leq 0.001$ respectively).

Age variable is negatively and statically significant. The value of Exp(B) for age was 0.871 which implies a decrease in the odds of 12.9% ($0.871 - 1.0 = -0.129$). TH members who were older were 12.9% less likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization.

The probability of the Wald statistic for the variable marital status was $p < 0.05$, less than or equal to the level of significance of 0.05. The null hypothesis that the b coefficient for marital status was equal to zero was rejected. Marital status variable is a dichotomous variable that is coded so that TH members with the higher numeric value were TH members who were married. The value of Exp(B) was 0.471 which implies a decrease in

the odds of 52.9% ($0.471 - 1.0 = -0.529$). TH members who were married are 52.9% less likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization.

When the probability of the Wald statistic for the variable economic status was checked, it was seen that its value was $p < 0.05$. Since b coefficient for economic status was not zero, the null hypothesis was rejected. According to coding of economic status variable, the higher numeric value represents TH members who were wealthy. The value of $\text{Exp}(B)$ was 0.646 which implies a decrease in the odds of 35.4% ($0.646 - 1.0 = -0.354$). TH members who were wealthy were 35.4% less likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization.

When the Wald statistic for the variable moved from hometown was checked, it was seen that it had significant level, which meant it was less than or equal to the level of significance of 0.05. The null hypothesis was rejected because b coefficient for moved from hometown was not equal to zero. According to coding of moved from hometown variable, the higher numeric value represents TH members who moved from hometown. The value of $\text{Exp}(B)$ was 0.643 which implies a decrease in the odds of 35.7% ($0.643 - 1.0 = -0.357$). TH members who moved from their hometown were 35.7% less likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization.

The probability of the Wald statistic for the indicator lifestyle of TH members was $p < 0.05$. The null hypothesis that the b coefficient for lifestyle of TH members was equal to zero was rejected. According to coding of lifestyle of TH members variable, the higher numeric value represents TH members who were opposite to religion. The value of $\text{Exp}(B)$ was 1.356 which implies a increase in the odds of 35.6% ($1.356 - 1.0 = 0.356$). TH members who had bohemian life style and were opposite to religion were 35.6% more likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization.

The Wald statistic results showed that the significance level of Political Affiliation of members was $p < 0.05$. Hence, the null hypothesis was rejected because the b coefficient for Political Affiliation of members was not equal to zero. As the coding of Political Affiliation of members variable indicated, the higher numeric value represents TH members who had leftist views. The value of $\text{Exp}(B)$ was 0.575 which implies a decrease

in the odds of 42.5% ($0.575 - 1.0 = -0.425$). TH members who had leftist views were 42.5% less likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization.

Since the significance level for the variable mosque studies was $p < 0.001$, the null hypothesis was rejected, That is to say, the b coefficient for mosque studies was not equal to zero. Mosque studies variable was coded as the higher numeric value represents TH members who joined mosque studies. The value of $\text{Exp}(B)$ was 0.274 which implies a decrease in the odds of 72.6% ($0.274 - 1.0 = -0.726$). TH members who joined mosque studies were 72.6% less likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization.

The Wald statistic results showed that the significance level for the variable crime history was $p < 0.001$, which meant its value was less than or equal to the level of significance of 0.001. The null hypothesis that the b coefficient for crime history was equal to zero was rejected. Crime history variable was coded in this way: the higher numeric value represents TH members who were arrested before. According to logistic regression results, there is a positive relationship between crime history and joining military wing of organization. That is to say, the regression coefficients for crime history ($B = 1.745$) has a positive value; therefore, TH members who had crime history were more likely to join military wing of organization.

As a result, logistic regression analyses showed that only eight variables had statistically significant results while other remaining variables had no statistically significant relationship with dependent variable.

Table 4.17. Logistic Regression Results- TH Members' Affiliation with Military Wing

Variables	B	Exp(B)
Age	-.139***	.871
Gender	-20.72	.000
Education	-.107	.899
Marital Status	-.751*	.472
Job Status	-.096	.909
Economic Status	-.437*	.646
Moved	-.441*	.643
Life Style	.304*	1.356
Political Affiliation	-.553*	.575
Mosque Studies	-1.29***	.274
Crime History	1.745***	5.727
Siblings	.039	1.040
Parents Deceased	-.032	.968
Family Life Style	.423	1.527
Loss of a relative	.090	1.094
Family Member in Terror	.300	1.351
How	-.022	.978
Reason to Join	.132	1.141
Constant	2.372	10.721
Cox	31.1(%)	.871
Nagelkerke	41 (%)	.000

* p=.05

** p=.01

***p=.001

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Key Findings</u>
Age	As age decreased, the probability of deployment in military wing increased
Marriage	Married recruits were more likely to be positioned in political wing
Economic Status	TH members who were wealthy were less likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization.
Political Affiliation	TH members who had leftist views were less likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization
Mosque Study	TH members who joined mosque studies were less likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization
Criminal History	Recruits who had an arrest record were more likely to assume military position
Life Style of Self	Recruits who had a religious lifestyle were less likely to assume military position as opposed to those who had a more non-religious lifestyle
Moved from Hometown	TH members who moved from their hometown were less likely to have chosen to join in military wing of organization.

Chapter 5 – Discussions and Conclusion

This chapter will include a discussion part followed by policy implication section and recommendations for the future studies.

5.1. Discussions

As elaborated in review of the literature, there exist two way relationships (either positive or inverse) between certain social characteristics of an individual and that individual's engaging in terrorist activity. This study analyzed Turkish Hezbollah (TH, a national terrorist organization originated and have operated in Turkey) membership profile at two levels to address the proposed research questions which seek to identify social characteristics and their relationships -if any- with a member of Turkish Hezbollah to lean (or to be assigned by the organization) either on non-violent political activity within the political branch or on violent activities within the military apparatus of the Turkish Hezbollah. To this end, the below section is structured first to thematically discuss (discussions of hypothesis one by one) the findings of this study against the related literature, first at the descriptive level and second to explain whether or not and in what way there social characteristics explain TH members take place in military or political wing.

H1

In the aforementioned context, the age-profile of TH members reflects no different results from the related literature. Strentz (1988) and Taylor (1988), for instance, found in Middle Eastern terrorists that the age or members ranges from 17 to 23 and around 16-17 respectively. In the TH, the majority of the members are found to be below 18 when they first participated in the organization. In addition to becoming a TH member, age is found to play a premium role in taking military position in Turkish Hezbollah. That is, TH members are more likely to be positioned in military wing rather than political wing at their younger ages. This is understandable to some extent when the following

characteristics of both missions are considered. First, recruits in military wing perform mostly operational jobs whereas recruits in political wing perform mostly intellectual jobs. Technically, those positioned in military wing should be in a better physical shape than those positioned in political wing. Accordingly, it is not wrong to assume that younger recruits have a better physical fit for military positions than older recruits. Secondly, recruits at their younger ages tend to be more energetic, thrill-seeking and risk-taking, which all make them have a better fit for militaristic duties. This finding also fits the literature well. As Strentz (1988) found in his research of US domestic terrorist organizations that members with older ages tend to be assigned to managerial/leadership positions whereas younger members were followers. Followers are not necessarily assumed in military wing but they are mostly tasked with violent activities. Considering these, it can be assumed that Hezbollah leadership intentionally assigns young recruits into military wing.

In short, similar to many prior researches, age comes out as a variable to have inverse relationship with participating in TH and among recruits, older ages are more likely to be deployed in political wing compared with members with younger ages that tend to act in military wing. As a result, the probability of involvement in military wing increases as joining age decreases.

H2

Research indicated that terrorist organizations predominantly consist of male. Russell and Miller's early research on worldwide terrorist characteristic study in 1977, member profile reflected male dominated characteristics. TH is no exception, nearly 95 percent of members are male. Figures in Table 4.1 indicate that Hezbollah is predominantly a male terrorist organization (94% vs. 6%, respectively). Research (for example see Handler1990) also has shown that terrorist organizations that lean left wing tend to have more female recruits. Given this, it is considered that TH corollary have male dominant character. Still, there is certain number of female terrorists in Hezbollah, most of whom were recruited through marriage. The recruitment of females is sociological in

characteristics rather than being tactical and ideological. Besides, since terrorists in military-wing maintain a professional life, they isolate themselves from feudal bonds, stay in safe houses and do not have a social life unless it is tactically necessary. Further, Hezbollah is a religious group in which policies are shaped through Islamic laws. Unless it is necessary, males and females are strictly banned from socializing without having a marriage bond. This keeps females from being recruited into the military-wing in which most terrorists renounce social life to maintain a thoroughly professional life. Furthermore, recruits in military-wing are expected to have technical skills in operating and maintaining weapons; be resistant against the rigors of maintaining clandestine activities, and be always physically and emotionally ready to engage in armed strike, all of which are not perfectly suited for females. Thus, the result that none of the females are positioned in military-wing is not surprising. As a result, similar to age, gender plays an important role in taking either political or military position and males are more likely to assume military position than females.

H3

Research on social characteristics also indicated marital status being single. The average member profile reflecting young aged males also indicates being unmarried. Taylor (1988).TH members reflect the proximate results with the literature in which nearly one third of members indicate unmarried status. For similar reasons mentioned for the characteristics of being at younger age and being male, being unmarried can be justified in assuming military positions (or being assigned by organization factors) in the TH. The result supported the assumption as most of married Hezbollah members were deployed in political branch rather than military branch. This can be attributed to the same arguments discussed in the preceding two variables/characteristics. First, married recruits tend to take lesser risk compared non-married recruits because they have more social bonds and stronger ties to social life. That is, risk taking is a discriminatory latent factor between the recruits in military branch and recruits in political branch. Second, married recruits, in general, are older than non-married recruits. The age of a person can limit his abilities based on his or her physical fitness. Since age automatically constrain one's capability, it

becomes another latent factor as it was discussed in hypothesis one. Overall, missions in political branch require a lesser risk-taking and physical fitness, which all make a married recruit suitable for political wing rather than military wing.

H4

Education level in terrorist membership is studied as an important characteristic of an individual to impact his/her choice in engaging in terrorist activity. Handler (1990) found that right wing terror groups tend to have members with lower educational attainment. As being a right wing group, nearly half of TH members are high school graduates. Literature indicates that the profiles of terrorists reflect a changing nature in the 1980s with lower educational level as opposed to members in 1960s and 70s with well-educated background (see Strentz, 1988). While TH members frequency results yield conformity with the generic literature in the level of educational attainments of TH recruits, it did not infer results that indicates opting for military and political wing based on educational attainment. The analysis did not identified a direct correlation between educational level and position in the organization, in other words, educated Hezbollah members are not necessarily less likely to assume military positions.

Literature says that educational attainments were higher in 1990s in compared with 1980s. However, in terms of deviation for military and political wing of the TH, The crosstab analysis portrays that more than two-thirds of university graduates were non-military.

On the other hand, recruits in other educational categories were almost evenly distributed between military and non-military positions. Nevertheless, there was considerable evidence showing that such a relationship may exist for university graduates. A relationship, if any, of this kind can be attributable to Hezbollah's employment strategy, in which uneducated recruits are employed as foot soldiers. In fact, this is true for most terrorist organization around the world. In most terrorist organizations, foot soldiers or militants are the main resource for recruitment. Mostly, operational duties are carried out by foot soldiers. On the other hand, leadership is mostly made up of educated recruits as they assume mostly strategic duties. Still, the

age, as in the relationship between marriage and position, would be a latent factor for such a relationship as almost two-thirds of Hezbollah members in the data set is under eighteen.

H5

As marital status and age, socio economic condition of employment is another significant characteristics in engaging in terrorist activity. In general, nearly half TH members were working before their participation into TH. In regards with positioning in military or political wing, the analysis indicated that there exists a relationship between work status and position in the organization. In other words, working Hezbollah members were mostly deployed in political wing rather than military wing. A possible explanation to this relationship is the type of recruitment which is mostly designated as professionals and non-professionals. Yilmaz (2009) argues that terrorists are differentially involved in terrorist activities, namely as professionals and non-professionals. Accordingly, professional recruits are dedicated terrorists and do not have a social life, while non-professionals are part-timers and only appear when they are given certain duties. The level of involvement might be instructed by leadership or might simply be an individual choice. He then argues that individual choice might be a factor of age, marriage, work status and education, which all subsequently may have an impact on one's decision on the level of involvement. Hezbollah recruits in military section, mostly, maintain a professional terrorist life, while it's the opposite for recruits in political section. Therefore, working recruits in Hezbollah might specifically be allocated for non-professional duties, which might be the reason for their recruitment in political section.

H6

As indicated in review of the literature, economic status is scaled based on sub-information if the source of the data is based autobiographies (Berrebi, 2004). In this analysis, same path is followed and economic status is scaled based on related criteria

(employment, income etc.). Economic status of families is expected to have an inverse relationship with engaging in terrorist activity from the same perspective of employment as discussed in the previous paragraph. However, economic status of families is not related to the position in the organization. The analysis showed no significant relationship between economic status of origin and position in the organization. Economic status of families or simply poverty might well be a reason to join a terrorist organization, but it becomes irrelevant as someone proceeds along his career path in the organization.

H7

The analysis showed that recruits who lost a loved one to terrorism are more likely to assume military positions than political positions. This can be attributable to the desire for revenge that emerges as a result of loss. In other words, some recruits may seek revenge and therefore may want to participate in military activities rather than political activities. Desire for revenge, on the other hand, may be a consequence of a broad range of reasons from previous arrest to use of force by the police as well as loss of someone to terrorism. Hezbollah tries to emphasize injustice in its publications to extra-motivate its recruits and thereby mobilize them against the authority. Even though one has no personal loss to terrorism, he may feel revenge if he is given a provocative reason to do so. Military duties, as compared to political duties, are better to take revenge for those who are frustrated against the authority for some reason. John Chowing Davies (1973, 251) a political psychologist saw violence as a response to frustration. Violent behaviors of TH members in the military wing, such as armed assaults, can be discussed with the Frustration Aggression Theory. This theory is used to be able to explain the terrorist behaviors (Victoroff, 2005). This theory first started to express the observed violence in early twentieth century in Europe as a result of studies at Yale University (Dollard et al. 1939; Friedland 1992) but this studies which uses these theory has been criticized a lot. Main criticism on why many other people who lives under frustration but never turn to terrorism.

H8

The analysis showed that recruits who have a family member associated to Hezbollah were more likely to assume military positions than recruits who have no such member. This can be attributed to the learning effect. According to the Theory of Social Learning or peer effect, the review of Social Learning Theory showed that terrorist behaviors can be learned from others. Further, people who have a family member associated with a terrorist organization are more likely to hear about terrorism than people who have no such family members. Even though learning might be a good reason for someone to know about a terrorist organization and to join a terrorist organization, it is not clear how learning may have an impact on one's career path in a terrorist organization. An alternative explanation to learning effect is what can be called as 'referencing effect'. Some terrorist organizations act like a social club and only do recruitment based on the references from existing members. Those who are recruited as such are given more strategic positions. In fact, there is no criterion to discriminate which position in Hezbollah is more strategic than the other. Therefore, one cannot say that it is the references from family members what discriminates recruits in military wing from recruits in political wing. In other words, one can hardly assert that recruits in military wing are positioned due to their references.

H9

The analysis supported the assumption that recruits who joined the organization for political reasons were more likely to assume political positions than military positions. This can be attributable to a couple of reasons. First, recruits who indicated that they joined the Hezbollah for political reasons mostly do so for ideology as opposed to recruits who indicated that they joined the Hezbollah for non-military reasons mostly do so for personal reasons. Those in the first group mostly seek to realize political goals while those in the latter group mostly seek revenge for their own grievances. Second, recruits in political wings are more intellectual than recruits in military group. This can also be clearly seen in the analysis for educational attainment. As opposed to those

primary, secondary, and high school graduates, most of the university graduates were in political wing rather than military wing. Those who reported that they joined the Hezbollah for political reasons are more likely to be deployed in the units where recruits are supposed to show their intellectual capacities. For instance, Hezbollah executives are mostly university graduates. Huseyin Velioglu, the founder of Hezbollah, graduated from the department of political science at Ankara University, which is a famous school for its alumni in government bureaucrats. On the other hand, those who reported that they had their personal reasons to join the Hezbollah are more likely to be deployed in the units where recruits do not have to show any specific skill because such recruits are assigned as foot soldiers.

On the other hand, the outcomes of this hypothesis can be attributed the theory of Relative Deprivation in terms of the reasons to join the TH organization at the first step rather than taking position in the organization. Basic assumption of this theory is that people may feel they are treated unjustly compared to some standards or reference groups and because of this perception they feel deprivation. Ted R.Gurr (1970) states that the gap between the ideal conditions and the current existing conditions of people create tension and this yield people to the violent behaviors. The feeling of political injustice or discrimination can be considered as political reasons for the TH members. Thus, they may feel deprived and this cause them to join the organization.

H10

Hypothesis ten was stated as null. It stated that the way how one was recruited into the Hezbollah, namely by friends, relatives or family, publications, or propaganda, was not related to his position in the organization. The analysis showed that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. More specifically, people do not have to be recruited in a specific way to be recruited neither in military nor in political wing in the Hezbollah.

H11

This hypothesis, like the previous one, was stated as null. The analysis indicated that whether a recruit's being a mover from his original hometown has nothing to do with the

position in the organization. In fact, it might be one the reasons that makes the recruit a potential target for the Hezbollah. In general, those who leave their original hometown settle in the suburbs of big cities where most terrorist organizations focus for recruitment. However, this has more to do with recruitment in the first place, but hardly to do with taking a position in the organization later.

H12

The analysis also indicated that Hezbollah recruits who attended mosque studies are more likely to assume political positions rather than military positions. The result is not surprising when one considers that the ideology of the Hezbollah spreads through mosque studies (Cakir, 2001). Those who were recruited through this way are not trained as foot soldiers. Rather, they are educated more on ideology, strategy and organizational policies. Therefore, mosque-study attendants mostly take political positions in the organization. From the policy point of view, this is a more robust way of maintaining recruitment compared to the other means such as using family members and friends for propaganda because in mosque studies attendants are not only educated on the ideology and the strategy, but also find themselves in an environment where they can thoroughly accept and internalize the very goals of Hezbollah. Unlike recruits in military wing, recruits in political wing are engaged to Hezbollah for personal reasons such as revenge and hate, rather for divine objectives such as overthrowing the existing secular regime in Turkey and establishing a new state based on Islamic rules. This may be one of the underlying factors what discriminates the recruits in political wing from the recruits in military wing.

H13

Like hypothesis six and eleven, this hypothesis was also stated as null. The analysis indicated that the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between having a deceased parents and the position in the organization cannot be rejected. As mentioned in the previous discussion, having a deceased parent is personal reason which could hardly

impact one's position in the organization.

H14

Turkish Hezbollah members who come from crowded families are found to be more likely to assume military position as a result of this analysis. Indeed, the path from a crowded family to the position in the Hezbollah is not that clear as the result of the analysis suggests. There seems to be some moderating factors that should drive the members of crowded families to their career paths in the Hezbollah. However, one cannot derive these factors from autobiographic accounts because these texts do not allow researchers to examine the underlying causes of what motivates recruits towards the Hezbollah in the first place and then what makes them deployed in military versus political wing. At this point, one can visit relevant theories, if any, to understand the underlying causes in-depth. Travis Hirschi's (1969) Social Control Theory of Crime asserts that children raised in crowded families can find themselves in different social groups due to lack of attention in the family. If the social group is a positive one or simply do not engage in delinquent activities, then there is no danger of socializing in criminal groups. If, however, the social group is involved in delinquency, then there is a good chance for criminality. Despite being reasonable argument for criminality, in what way lack of attention can influence one's career path in a criminal or terrorist group is not clear. Therefore, one cannot comfortably assert that children raised in crowded families are likely to end up in Hezbollah's military section due to lack of attention.

H15

Recidivism is another factor for crime and terrorist activity as well. According to the analysis, recruits who have a previous arrest history are more likely to assume military position. More specifically, recruits with previous arrest history are mostly deployed in military wing rather than political wing within the Hezbollah. There might be a couple of reason to this end. First, recruits with previous arrest histories have already become known by the police. Therefore, these recruits might have intentionally been assigned to

a militaristic duty to escape from the attention of police because recruits in this unit thoroughly maintain a professional terrorist life and avoid socializing in any way. Second, recruits with previous arrest history, in general, have a propensity for crime and therefore are assigned to militaristic duties. Third, in the previous two arguments, it has been assumed that arrest came before the assignment. However, there is no way of knowing, at least from the autobiographies, whether arrest occurred before the assignment or vice versa. If we assume that assignment to military unit came before the arrest, then we also can assume the arrest occurred as a result of a duty in military unit. Indeed, duties in military units are highly risky and recruits in this unit have a high risk of facing arrest.

H16 and H17

Result has shown that recruits who have a religious lifestyle are less likely to assume military position. As discussed in the previous paragraph, mosque attendants were mostly deployed in political units. This was not surprising when the nature of mosque studies and characteristics of attendants are considered. Likewise, recruits who have a religious lifestyle mostly join the Hezbollah to fight for the cause of Hezbollah. On the other hand, recruits who are less religious mostly choose the Hezbollah to fight for their own causes. That might be one of the reasons as to why recruits in the first group are mostly deployed in political unit. Of course, the difference between these two groups of terrorists in terms of their sympathy to the religion is not always clear. There might still be recruits in military unit who have higher sympathy to the religion than recruits in political unit. However, the profiling here is necessary for the sake of categorizing these two groups of terrorists to understand the differences in their motivations in general. Family lifestyle also was based on a similar assumption to that of personal life style before the member's joining to the organization. The result of the analysis also showed support for the assumption. This time, however, the significance value dropped. That was normal because family's lifestyle preferences become less relevant to the position in the organization compared to one's own preferences.

H18

The results of the analysis showed that those who have a rightist or a leftist party affiliation compared to those who have no affiliation at all are more likely to be deployed in political units. On the other hand, those who have no affiliation compared to the rightist or the leftist are more likely to be deployed in military unit. This result, also, supports the previous argument that recruits in military units mostly have some reasons other than the ideology to join the Hezbollah.

Aggregate/collective impact of social characteristics

In addition to the analyses in which the impacts of social characteristics are analyzed in the individual sense first in participation into the TH and second, recruits being assigned either into political or military wing in the organization, the collective (simultaneous) impact of these characteristics in in-organization deployment are analyzed in the study. From a dichotomous perspective, a logistic regression analysis was conducted to see whether independent variables combined have the same impact on the dependent variable, the position in the Hezbollah, as they do at individual level. The result of logistic regression analysis showed that age, marital status, economic status, moving from hometown, mosque studies, crime history (or previous arrest), and political party affiliation had a statistically significant impact on the position. Logistic regression also indicated which one of the independent variables has the most significant impact. The analysis showed that both criminal history and mosque study had a large impact on the position in the Hezbollah. Since the prediction was made for those in military unit, the positive sign for criminal history indicated that it was the most important factor for deployment in this unit, while the mosque study, with a negative sign, had the same impact for deployment in political unit. Age was another factor that had a large impact on the position. The negative relationship as indicated by negative sign showed that the probability of involvement in military unit increased as age decreased. Marital status was also a significant predictor of one's placement in the political unit.

Given the aforementioned arguments about criminal history, mosque study, age and

marital status, the results were not unexpected. The arguments for criminal history and age revealed that compared to the old, young recruits, in general, have a higher propensity for crime and better physical shape. Also, they are more energetic, thrill-seeker and risk-taker, which all make them suitable for militaristic jobs. The arguments for mosque study and marital status revealed that Hezbollah members who were recruited through mosque studies were not trained as foot soldiers, rather, they were educated more on ideology, strategy and organizational policies. Therefore, mosque-study attendants mostly take political positions in the organization. For married recruits being mostly in political wing, the tendency for taking less risk was a significant factor. To sum up, the recruits in military wing were younger and mostly had a criminal history compared to the recruits in political wing who were trained in mosque studies and mostly married.

In brief, this study sought identifying TH membership's dichotomous deployment in the organization by -first- descriptively analyzing characteristics of participation into TH and then the individual and collective impact of these social variables as to take place (or be positioned) in either military or political wing of the organization. Most of the social characteristics, e.g., age, gender, economic status, job status, marital status, incorporated into this study in relation to participating into TH, a terrorist organization in Turkey, reflect conformity with the generic sense of the related literature of average terrorist in the Middle East. While age, job and economic status, and education reflect inverse relationship with becoming a TH member (aka engaging in terrorist activity), the participating in mosque studies [of TH] , and crime history (recidivating) show a positive relationship. In addition, nominal level characteristics, e.g., marital status and gender, also indicate close proximity with literature in that unmarried males constitute the majority of TH members.

In terms of the individual and collective impact of the social characteristics into the dichotomous deployment of military vs. political wing within the TH, this study found that age, marital status, economic status, whether moved from hometown, lifestyle of members before organization, and crime history have same effect in opting for (or being

deployed) military vs. political wing positions in the organization at both, individual and collective level. In that, TH members are either choose or be intentionally/deliberately deployed into political and military wings of the TH based on certain social characteristics of younger age, in unmarried status, with lower educational attainment, with lower level work and in turn economic status.

5.2. Policy Implications

As specified in the earlier chapters, Turkish Hezbollah, by characteristics, is a violent organization that rests on religious extremism through abuse of religious motives and belief systems. Moreover, underdeveloped socio-economic and socio-cultural dynamics in the region constitute a fertile ground for people -especially the youth- for engaging in illegal activities to meet the need of social status and self-actualization. In addition, religious believes are very strong in the region which couples with the tough culture (closed society) and becomes the crucial determinants of the social life in the region. Having mentioned all these significant dynamics, the creed and doctrine of religion becomes the most important tenet in order to impede the abuse, the misconception, and the misinterpretation of the Islam (Theology). Because members of the Hezbollah recruit individuals through mosque activities and one to one base contact, the foremost policy must focus on the accurate and appropriate education of Islam in the region. Findings of this study revealed that intellectual and more educated members are more (highly) likely to be assigned in the political wing. This explicitly means that the core cadre of the Hezbollah is comprised of political wing and they lead the organization including the military wing. From this perspective, the demise of the organization depends on the containment of the Hezbollah ideology and impediment of Hezbollah activities and this is possible only through reducing political wing because the political wing pre-dominates the vital activities of the Hezbollah; such as recruitment, training, leading, planning and devising organizational strategies that also relates to military wing activities and attacks. Within this regard, the original and true doctrine of Islam and its education (at different levels and contexts) gain significant importance. Hence, policies that would guarantee the dissemination of the original and core spirit of the Islam should be adopted and sensitively implemented through intellectual independent imams. In

other words, Islam as a religion must be taken apart from the politics in both the micro-level (regional) and macro-level (national). In brief, the true doctrine of Islam that is far-fetched with any kind of violence and political dogmas must be underlined within the region.

In relation to the specifics, the findings of this study revealed that Hezbollah leadership assigns recruits rationally; in fact, they intentionally assign young recruits to military wings to benefit their energy, thrill seeking and risk taking features. These features of youths should also be considered rationally by policy makers and administrators in order to stop new recruitments. Namely, administrators should find ways for youths to legally direct/redirect their energy thrill seeking and risk taking features. These can be providing places for youths to do sport activities, and sport clubs to be a member. Youths can also be led to attend local, national and international games. These leadings require a high value games and activities; however, underdeveloped economy in the region reflects the condition where lacks such kinds facilities for youth to culture in these kinds of activities, games and sport complexes are not very common and not very valued in the region. For example, neither is there a city football team playing in the Turkish National premier league, nor any basketball or volleyball teams in the region. This also causes the lack of role models for youths in the region.

The results of the analysis about hypothesis 3 also show the importance of religious education referred by the Quran and Sunnah perspectives that are isolated any political pragmatic interpretation. The results reveal that married members are more likely deployed in political branch rather than military branch. In addition, female members are generally recruited through marriage. The administrators in the region should also be aware of the importance of the education of girls specifically in the region wherein the cultural values indicate man-oriented/dominated themes. Campaign can be performed by the administrators for social policies that would create opportunities and related environment for young girls to go to school and get education. Both, the religious and regular education might lead individualized and conscious people (young girls) so they cannot be recruited through marriage (and early marriage).

From another perspective, whether to be married is important determinant for the male members of the Hezbollah for engaging in military wing operations, namely male members are less likely to be recruited in military wing if married. This is because, married people tend to take lesser risk compared to non-marrieds because of more social bonds and stronger ties to social life. Married people tend to act more responsibly and they are more dependent on their family to take care of compared with single young males that are easier to be diverted in illegal military wing activities because these people have less to lose. In this sense, raising the opportunity cost in the region or rewarding non-terror activity as a state policy through social and economic perspective would decrease such terror activities as Hezbollah.

The findings supported hypothesis 7 which implies the impacts of injustice and revenge. The recruits who lost loved one(s) in Hezbollah activities are more likely to assume military positions than political positions. This hypothesis reflects the importance of capturing Hezbollah members alive rather than incapacitating them in the concept of war through use of military force. In addition, there might have been certain illegitimate applications of security forces in the early years when Turkey ruled with statement of emergency in the region. In this period certain applications of security forces and law enforcements reflected illegitimate perceptions by nature and then these applications invoked revenge retaliation sentiments. Hence, as frequently said, the wrongdoings of law enforcement agents in the past might have caused more terror incidents and more recruits by terror organizations today. From this point of view, two things are vital for law enforcement officers; internal and external control of street level bureaucrats in the region.

Despite that Turkey has lifted emergency rule totally in 2002 from the region, internal control should be ensured by education and recruitment process of street level bureaucrats in the region. The external control should be ensured by government entities very tightly. Human rights violations by law enforcement officers were a serious problem in the region during 1990's although these violations are now decreasing very sharply (Akdogan, Karakus, & Basibuyuk, 2008).

Within the aforementioned context, administrators should set control procedures to minimize wrongdoings of street level bureaucrats and also violation of human rights.

Zero tolerance to torture and recourse policies are two examples of external control by government. Zero tolerance to torture policy ensures investigating every torture allegations, suing all parties involved in torture cases even though they are high rank military or police personnel and accepting every control and supervision of international Human Rights entities. Recourse policy is about revoking the paid money to the victims of human rights violations from law enforcement officers whoever involved in the violation cases decided by European Court of Human Rights.

Parallel to the findings of previous hypothesis analysis, the findings of the analysis of hypothesis 15 reveals that a recruit with a previous arrest records are more likely to assume military position. There may be several reasons for this propensity that one of them has been discussed above. Other than this, the terror organization may rationally want to employ these recruits in the military wing since they are known by police and military wing recruits used to live as a professional terrorist life and avoid socializing in any way. Due to this fact, administrators should be aware of the importance of correction system. During the correction period in the jails, these recruits could be socialized and educated. Correction administrators can teach them new skills for their future life after the jail. With their new skills they may want to work in the future and earn their lives in a legal way.

Within the aforementioned regards, religious education based solely on the Quran and Sunnah (without any political and pragmatic interpretation) be imposed upon the captured members of the Hezbollah. That is, religious education can be provided during the jail period and the original facts concerning the Islamic Theology can be taught to them (such as teaching them killing one innocent means killing all humanity according to Quran). Terror organizations abusing religious believes always use the word “jihad” to justify their terrorist actions, and they rely on the fact that the prophet Mohammed also do jihad during his life against non-believers. But the truth is that, the prophet do small jihad which means war against nonbelievers only 2, 5 months during his 23 years prophecy. The rest almost 20 years during his prophecy he did the big jihad which means educating one’s lower-self and living in a peaceful manner. These kinds of key points about the religion can be thought to arrested young recruits.

The impacts of these religious educations in the correction units may help these recruits to assume political positions in the terror organization as supported by the findings of the analysis of hypothesis 16 and 17. These findings support that recruits who have a religious lifestyle are less likely to assume military position.

5.3. Recommendations for the Future Studies

Terrorism is a multi-facet phenomenon that -by nature- complicates the research upon it. There exist various perspectives/disciplines from different levels to understand the dynamics and parameters of it. These include -in the most generic sense- first the individual level basing upon micro-economy, individual-psychology, sociology and etc. social characteristics as studied in this study are matters of this level. Second, a probe from a group level to identify the group dynamics at organizational level is necessary from the disciplines of political science, sociology, social psychology and etc. Analysis of groups and their dynamics that lead the divergence of military and political wing, the real role and dynamics of these entities (wings), how the terror groups -at the group level- organize such motivation and recruitment and etc. These are vital to know in terms of portraying the significant tenets of the problem so the necessary countermeasures could be taken by the nations. Third, the society level research is required to know how a terror group is perceived and legitimized in the eye of the society with its military actions conducted by the people who chose to go for militancy. Research from political science, sociology, social psychology is essential to determine the legitimacy and popular support to terror groups which is the focal point of counterterrorism efforts. Last but not the least, research from international level is beneficial to understand how terror groups act towards international actors in the international arena. How they strive for legitimization of their militancy (terror attacks through their respective military wings)

Out of the aforementioned levels of research, exploratory and case study research specifically for religiously purported terror groups is required as well as research for terrorism in general. This is because, the conditional dynamics for every terror case yield

important differences and characteristics which are determinative when deciding solutions and counter actions. To illustrate, in order to identify the recruitment process.

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